Diasporas Reimagined
Spaces, Practices and Belonging

Edited by
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Foreword

By Robin Cohen

Diaspora, conceptually speaking
What makes a good concept? This is perhaps something we do not think about enough. Gerring (1999) suggests the qualities needed are eight-fold – familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, differentiation, depth, theoretical utility and field utility. Diaspora does well on most of these criteria, but it would be difficult to say it is either especially parsimonious or particularly coherent. Indeed, the explosion of the use of the word ‘diaspora’ led Brubaker (2005) to complain that ‘as the term has proliferated, its meaning has been stretched to accommodate the various intellectual, cultural and political agendas in the service of which it has been enlisted. This has resulted in what one might call a “diaspora” diaspora – a dispersion of the meanings of the term in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space’.

Brubaker’s lament was written in 2005 when Google yielded one million search results for the term. Ten years later that number is 128 million. Is this evidence of conceptual success or failure? While the depth, resonance and several other criteria of a good concept remain, coherence and parsimony have been traded for imagination and audaciousness. For many represented in this collection, the exchange has been well worthwhile. Concepts that are too precise become too prosaic, obvious and boring. Nor should they be confined and tethered by one historical experience. I like to tell the story of an Israeli professor, who shall remain nameless, who I encountered while giving a presentation on the comparative study of diasporas in a beautiful room at the Sorbonne which was covered in murals depicting the leading figures of the French Enlightenment. The joys
of pure reason were far from his mind when, red-faced and obviously angry, he suddenly burst out: “They have stolen “ghetto”, they have stolen “Holocaust”, and now you have stolen “diaspora”!

Thieves abound and it is important for his health that he does not read this book. Diaspora appears here as ‘linear negotiations in costumes of culture’, Muslim burial funds, school alumni associations, nomadic cyberspace, intimate cross-cultural liaisons, architectural permissiveness, multiple religious affiliations, Pentecostalism, Yiddish anarchism, job-seeking networks, polygamy, carnival, skilled entrepreneurship, floating roots, anti-politics, counter-insurgency, international relations, global ecumenes, pan-Somali unity, Palestinian statelessness, bodies in motion, and much else besides.

With endless assessments and the narrowing of research horizons in the interests of relevance or utility, younger academics do not have much fun these days. In this collection they were allowed to imagine and reimagine diaspora; they have responded with spirit and élan. Contrary to the views of my antagonist at the Sorbonne, there is no proprietorial right to a concept. Property owners cannot suddenly declare the global commons or a public park their own. On the commons one is free to roam. A concept can take you here or there, make you look forwards, backwards and sideways, through a glass darkly, with clear-sighted vision or rose-tinted glasses.

As we roamed far and wide, we needed a little rounding up, but this was done gently, with the friendly muzzles of our editorial sheep dogs, Nando Sigona, Alan Gamlen, Giulia Liberatore, and Hélène Neveu Kringelbach. They were ably assisted by Sally Kingsborough, Claire Fletcher and Jenny Peebles. We owe them our warm thanks for bringing *Diasporas Reimagined* to a successful conclusion.

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Introduction

By Nando Sigona, Alan Gamlen, Giulia Liberatore and Hélène Neveu Kringelbach

The self as plural

To put it bluntly – most of us prefer our own kind (Goodhart 2004).

David Goodhart’s controversial essay on diversity in Britain has attracted sustained criticism from academics since its publication in the early 2000s. Scholars of diasporas and transnationalism have observed that in recent decades, ‘Western’ societies have undergone a prolonged and arguably irreversible process of diversification as a result of complex colonial and postcolonial histories that make the definition of ‘our own kind’ far less straightforward than Goodhart’s work implies.

That human mobility is part and parcel of globalisation – both a cause and a consequence of further interconnectedness and new forms of belonging and identification – is now widely accepted. The emergence of diaspora studies, underpinned by an expansion in the notion of diaspora itself (cf. Brubaker 2005), forms part of this process, as does the worldwide creation of state bodies and initiatives to engage diasporas (Délano and Gamlen 2014; Gamlen 2014).

However, scholars of diasporas also remind us that processes of diversification are neither confined to the ‘West’ nor to the present alone, and we should therefore be wary of idealising the past as a time and place of social homogeneity and ethnic purity.

Drawing on contributions from Oxford Diasporas Programme core staff and associates and covering a range of disciplinary traditions,
including social anthropology, sociology, human geography, politics, international relations, development studies and history, the pieces brought together in *Diasporas Reimagined* evoke a world increasingly interconnected through migration, and yet layered with the sediments of previous encounters (not necessarily peaceful ones).

This publication marks the end of ODP, and offers the chance to look back on the work carried out during the lifespan of the programme while also looking forward to a future research agenda in diaspora studies. While it is not intended to offer an exhaustive overview of diaspora studies, we wanted to capture the vitality and variety of research being carried out in this field. Different epistemological standpoints inform the ways in which contributors use the term 'diaspora.' They fall along a spectrum between emphasising group identity as the bounded object of institutional intervention, to understanding diasporic belonging and mobilisation in more fluid, dynamic and performative ways.

The style of contributions varies, from photo essays to ethnographic vignettes, from theoretical ruminations to poetic contemplations, and from broad-brush literature overviews to detailed accounts of human encounters. We hope that the collection as a whole will provoke new ways of thinking around diasporas and some of the foundational concepts of social science. The structure of the collection has arisen from the pieces, rather than the contributions being shaped for particular headings; many pieces, therefore, could certainly fit within more than one heading.

The first section covers ways of imagining and conceptualising the notion of diaspora. In the following section, drawing on a diverse range of case studies, we explore issues related to diasporic belonging and home making. Spatiality and performativity are addressed in the third section, together with a discussion of the role of social networks and intermediaries in the process of diaspora formation and engagement. The collection concludes with a series of pieces addressing actors and factors shaping the politics of diaspora and the role of states and international organisations in this regard.

**Metaphors, concepts, genealogies and images**
We open this collection by juxtaposing images, poems, hidden
histories and botanic metaphors to capture the vast and elusive terrain of diaspora scholarship. A brief history of the term is laid out through two core elements: the loss of ‘home’ and the ongoing link to some notion of it. This is accompanied by a reflection on the images that have been used to grasp this multifaceted social phenomenon. Contributions consider the appropriateness of botanical metaphors as analytical tools for diaspora scholars, taking the archetypal image of a dandelion – a recurring presence on book covers and logos related to this field – as a starting point.

In addition to addressing definitional challenges, contributors look into the analytical frameworks that might help to capture the loose assemblage of meanings, practices and spaces of action that coalesce around the term diaspora. This section also includes images and poems that explore the constant negotiation of diasporic identity through the experience of nostalgia; words and images that echo the Cape Verdean sodade and the longing for an elusive ‘something’ that pervades hundreds of melancholic fados, and the powerful and yet fragile reach of transnational networks, made of emotions, relationships and time.

Belonging: imagining and remaking ‘home’
The notion of belonging evokes an emotional attachment to a homeland, a place of origin, whether real or imagined. But as the pieces in this section show, ‘home’ is not always conceptualised as a specific location. Some transnational and diasporic groups reconfigure home in myriad other ways, from political and intellectual projects to divine kingdoms. Kenyan Pentecostals in London thus conceptualise home in radically de-territorialised terms, where the promise of the Kingdom of God, rather than the place of origin, is the ultimate home – even if it has not materialised yet. Homeland is very present in the imaginations of Hadramis across the world, both in the sense that they trace their ancestry to the south coast of the Arabian Peninsula, and in the sense that they carry their social hierarchies with them as they roam: this is a group for whom home is very much their sense of belonging to the diaspora group itself, regardless of where they are.

In many cases the reconfiguration of home highlights attempts to
promote a life well-lived and a culture of tolerance, as was the case with some of the Yiddish-speaking groups which thrived in East London at the turn of the twentieth century. They advocated not so much for the emerging Zionist project as for the cosmopolitan, radical political and intellectual movements burgeoning across Europe at the time. The notion of home pointing to a place of origin while keeping an eye out for transnational lives is also present in the piece on Senegalese migrants from Casamance now settled in Spain, whose ideas about conviviality draw on their experiences of living with difference in all the places they have traversed. Similarly, Nepalis in the UK often belong to multiple Nepali organisations while also being comfortable with practising several religious traditions simultaneously.

People's sense of belonging in diasporic contexts is forever in the making, and emerges in constant interplay with 'host' cultures, as Avtar Brah's (1996) seminal work on diasporas reminds us. Making home anew, therefore, is not just a matter of conviviality and tolerance; it is also one of friction and exclusion. For African migrants in Britain, for example, a diasporic orientation does not weaken the permanent nature of home in Britain; indeed perhaps the sense of grievance individuals of African descent express about racism reflects the depth of the stake they hold in that country. Yet, claiming membership is never simple, as shown in the piece on diasporic youth and British young men of colour in Luton and Swindon. Are these young men British, European or Asian, or all of these?

As part of the host culture, state policies have an important role to play in facilitating the making of new homes, particularly when old ones are threatened or contested. Thanks to generous Swedish multicultural policies, Swedish Kurds, for example, are able to mobilise and to engage in homeland politics without feeling detached from Swedish society.

Finally, diasporic home-making affects places of origin in multiple, often unexpected ways. In the small West African state of The Gambia, where over 60 per cent of the skilled population lives abroad, businesses of various kinds are riding on the back of the moral economy of migration. In other instances, it is return or migration to an old place of origin which brings into relief the complexity of belonging, as in the case of Armenian returnees who come to realise that home
is everywhere, and thus perhaps nowhere in particular. For many members of diasporas, a life well-lived involves a careful balancing act between home as imagined, experienced, and forever remade.

**Diasporic spaces, networks and practices**
The pieces in this section foreground churches, schools, burial funds and sites, trade links and transnational marriages, carnival festivities and inter-religious devotional practices. These spaces, networks and practices push us to view diaspora in novel ways. New analytical entry points are explored and the unexpected is revealed: from Hindus in East London engrossed in Catholic devotional practices, to Somalis from the West opting to resettle in Kenya rather than their places of origin. These contributions challenge assumptions, question mainstream trends and policies, and force us to reimagine diaspora anew. Viewing the spaces, networks and practices of diaspora in the making provides an opportunity to focus on the performative processes of adaptation and change, and on moments of creativity. Contributors use written and visual media to capture the texture of lived experiences, the expressions and feelings that are constitutive of diasporic living. They mark the passing of time, while capturing diasporic memories and nostalgic engagements with the past.

However, the pieces in this section also remind us not to romanticise fluidity or to simply equate it with creativity and resistance. Networks and practices are never neutral, but rather shaped by power dynamics, revealing of both resistance and constraint. Transnational polygamous marriages, we learn, can be constituted through immigration policies which seek to curtail them. Networks and practices can also fix and entrench, and spaces can be static and bounded, resulting in both forms of exclusion as well as forms of self-identification and solidarity. A church may be built to emphasise its distinctiveness from a community centre, symbolically marking off and preserving the spiritual from the encroaching secularity of everyday life. Efforts to ensure fixity and immobility can also have inverse effects. A Cuban school that seeks to educate citizens to serve and govern a socialist nation-state can conversely foster aspirations for social and spatial mobility, giving rise to movement and dispersal. Diasporic networks may emerge not in relation to a
shared homeland, but to an institution, or through a shared habitus. They become a source of social capital drawn on to seek employment or a place to live, and to navigate immigration restrictions.

**Governance and mobilisation**

Diaspora is a deeply political idea. Fundamentally it refers to a kind of ‘identity’ – a concept that entered social science through the notion of ‘identity crisis’: a situation in which a stable sense of human self is disrupted. However, it soon became clear that such crises were the norm rather than the exception: social identity arises not from some primordial source but from constant debates about who belongs to specific groups, who does not, and the power relations underpinning the responses to such questions. In a sense all identity is political because this question of who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ is the kernel of the basic political question of ‘who gets what’.

But, as the pieces in this section illustrate, diaspora identity is especially political, because it inhabits a grey zone between different definitions of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’. In the post-Westphalian world the core unit of political organisation is the nation-state, and the question of who gets what is decided by who is a citizen – a formal member of the nation-state – and who is not. Citizenship is multifaceted and means different things in different contexts, but usually it combines a sense of common values or formative experiences, with a sense of common adherence to the rules of a specific shared place. For much of human history these two conceptions of political belonging have been more or less synonymous. Diasporas were the exception because they were inside the *demos* but outside the *polis*: inside the nation, but outside the state. But this decoupling of identity from place is becoming the norm rather than the exception in an increasingly mobile and networked world.

No wonder then that diasporas have become a preoccupation of politicians and policy makers, and that their enthusiastic embrace of the term – and their rapid recent establishment of government ministries and other institutions dedicated to emigrants and their descendants – is shifting the meaning of the word from a category of belonging defined in opposition to the nation-state, to one defined by it. Even Latvia now has a ‘diaspora support programme’, aimed
in a sense at governing those who leave. Such diaspora engagement institutions exist in the grey zone between the disciplines of political science and international relations, and have therefore caught social science unawares. Now that they are suddenly found in over half of all United Nations Member States, they deserve further theoretically informed comparative research.

But diasporas are not simply discovered by policy makers: they are mobilised by political entrepreneurs and opportunists toward specific ends. Recognition of a national cause in the eyes of a destination state is often one of these, as in the case of diasporic debate over the term ‘genocide’ amongst Armenian-Americans and Turkish-Americans. To be properly understood, diasporas must be disaggregated rather than reified as unitary actors. Their various spheres of engagement in the homeland must be analysed. Their squabbles over who is in and who is out must be examined, as it is through these contests that the boundaries of the diaspora group are drawn and redrawn. Indeed, cases such as Rwanda and Zimbabwe show that efforts to animate diasporas are not always successful or durable: diasporas are not eternal and pre-given social formations; they are born, they die and they may even have an afterlife.

Individuals are not always passively activated by established homeland authorities: their very statelessness may be the source of their cohesion, as was the case with the archetypal Jewish diaspora. Nor are their engagements necessarily benign. If not weapons of mass destruction, they may become ‘weapons of knowledge construction’, as has been the case with Afghan-Americans who act as ‘cultural advisers, interpreters, translators, and subject-matter experts’ for the US military that occupies their homeland. Even through their efforts to evade authoritarian structures such as patriarchy, diasporic subjects may be ‘servicing the imperial machine’, for example by promoting the idea that violence against Muslims is legitimated by the plight of Muslim women. □
Metaphors, concepts, genealogies and images
Seeds, roots, rhizomes and epiphytes: botany and diaspora

By Robin Cohen

The study of diasporas is interleaved with botanical comparisons and metaphors. I alluded to this myself in the first edition of *Global Diasporas* where I provided a table titled ‘The good gardener’s guide to diasporas’ (Cohen 1997). I pointed out that weeding, which refers to the uprooting and casting out of undesired plants, has an equivalent in ‘victim diasporas’ being subject to expulsion, deportation, genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing’. When favoured plants are sown by scattering seed, that act closely corresponds to the original Greek origins of the notion of diaspora. Transplanting involves digging up and replanting. This has a high rate of failure, depending on the original condition, the journey and the new site and echoes the idea of ‘labour diasporas’. (On the ships taking ‘coolies’ to the Caribbean 18 per cent died. Another 25 per cent returned to India at the end of their indenture.) I included various other comments on layering, cross-pollinating, dividing, grafting and mulching.

I decided to discard this line of analysis in the second edition of *Global Diasporas* (Cohen 2008), thinking it was both too cute and too fanciful. Again, to be truthful, I did not know that much about gardening, other than cutting the lawn. However, I now want a second bite at the cherry, particularly since I have familiarised myself with Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari and Édouard Glissant, and in recognition of Judith Misrahi-Barak’s intervention. I follow the words of my title in sequence.

Seeds

This is not a mere metaphor. Seeds are integral to the etymology of the
word diaspora (the Greek *speirein* meant to sow or scatter). Indeed the ‘spr’, sometimes with intermediate letters, is found in a number of cognate words – think of spore, disperse, sperm, sprout, sprawl, sprinkle, spread or spray. However, we need to go beyond etymology alone and think of how seeds are distributed. A farmer throwing out handfuls of seeds is one way; bird excrement and wind dispersal are others. The last is the most commonly evoked representation of diaspora, with the image of a dandelion used particularly frequently (see Figures 1–4). This may signify the lack of materiality associated with a postmodern lightness of being (no bird shit, no peasants) or, more likely, a lack of imagination on the part of designers, or those who brief them.

**Roots**

Roots, or more strictly the search for roots, is a frequent leitmotif in diasporic life. It is more pronounced in those groups that suffered violent uprooting. For example, one can cite the sentiments of the prominent New World leader of the ‘Back to Africa’ movement, Marcus Garvey: ‘A people without the knowledge of their past history, origin and culture is like a tree without roots.’ Many African Americans undertook a painful emotional journey to connect with their past. Alex Haley’s famous book *Roots* (Haley 1976) involved an elaborate hunt for his family’s origins using fragmentary linguistic clues and oral history (Figure 5). The three subsequent TV series and movie based on the book not only told a story which resonated with African Americans, it connected with a much more general interest in ethnic origins and genealogy (family trees). A generally weak, but occasionally funny, parody of the movement to discover one’s roots is Howard Jacobson’s *Roots Schmoots* (Jacobson 1993) (Figure 6).

**Rhizomes**

In direct contrast to the preoccupation with rootedness, indeed in contestation with it, is rhizomatic thinking, closely associated with Deleuze and later with him and Guattari, in particular with their joint book *A thousand plateaus* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Both were philosophers, and theirs is essentially an epistemological intervention. They were reacting against the pervasive idea of ‘trees of knowledge’
Figure 1. Logo, Leverhulme-financed Oxford Diasporas Programme, 2011–15
Figure 2. Book jacket, Robin Cohen, Global diasporas: an introduction, 2008. 2nd ed, London: Routledge
Figure 3. Logo, Arts and Humanities Research Council research programme, 2005–10
Figure 4. Banner of the diaspora* social network, with one million accounts in 2014. Original image ©Horia Varlan
Figure 5. Book jacket, Alex Haley, Roots: the saga of an American family, 1976. Artwork ©Peter Newark American Pictures/Bridgeman Art Library. Reproduced by arrangement with The Random House Group Ltd.
Figure 6. Book jacket, Howard Jacobson, Roots schmoots: journeys among Jews, 1993. The Overlook Press
Figure 7. Illustration in Llull’s Arbor Scientiae, 1295–6
Figure 8. Masthead, online journal, Rhizomes. First image ©Todd Childers
Metaphors, Concepts, Genealogies and Images

derived from Aristotelian and biblical thought. One influential example was Ramon Llull's tree of science (Arbor Scientiae) (Llull 1295–6) written in Rome in the thirteenth century, which depicted 16 branches of science together with 18 roots, including wisdom and logic (Figure 7). Instead of roots and trees, Deleuze and Guattari saw knowledge as a reiterative multiplicity of loose connections being made between meaning, social relations and power, without definite origin or teleology. Like the shoots of rhizomes, they argued that knowledge has a nomadic character, growing from near random wanderings, rather than from a single rootstock. An online journal, Rhizomes, has been published since 2000 in tribute to their work (Figure 8). The diasporic connection is hinted at by the evocation of ‘nomadism’, but it was the Caribbean critic and cultural theorist Glissant who make the most explicit link. Glissant was reacting against what he saw as the central weakness of the theory of creolité, which celebrated the amalgamation of diasporas into one fused culture. This outcome was too static for Glissant, who turned to the Deleuzo-Guattarian rhizome to develop his Poetics of Relation (Glissant 1990), Relation being grandly capitalised as a core concept signifying the constant making and remaking of the Self–Other dialectic, an explicitly unstable form of creolization.

Epiphytes
Rhizomes usefully conflate roots and shoots, but they have one analogical deficiency, that is they spread subterraneously, suggesting some sort of covert and unpredictable fertility which, in the social imaginary, easily plays into anti-immigrant rhetoric. How much better then is an epiphyte, which my deep research on Wikipedia tells me is affixed to another plant, but is not a parasite and draws nutrients from air, rain and debris? The photograph of one such epiphyte, Tillandsia, on the cover of a recent collection is attributed to one of the editors, Judith Misrahi-Barak (Misrahi-Barak and Raynaud 2014) (Figure 9). Given the restrictions inherent in choosing an image for one’s book cover, other than her tantalising illustration and a few lines of description, she does not have the opportunity to elaborate on the reasons behind its choice. What is particularly attractive about this botanical comparison is that epiphytes need the support of a tree, just
as diasporas may need the support of a country, and do not harm it. On the contrary, epiphytes provide a welcoming shelter for other organisms and are often very beautiful.

I conclude by making the obvious point that botanical comparisons cannot substitute for social scientific understandings of diasporas, but they are suggestive and vivid conceptual tools and may be particularly helpful in pedagogy. □
The loss and the link: a short history of the long-term word ‘diaspora’

By Stéphane Dufoix

When is a word born?
It might seem that such a question is easy to answer. Etymology and first use should be able to tell us the truth (etumos means true in ancient Greek) about the birth and therefore the essence of a word. Unfortunately, such a perspective not only hinders the various evolutions in the uses of the term, it also presumes that a word is only born once. The instance of diaspora demonstrates the many lives a word can live: as a religious term, as an academic notion, as a category of practice, as a scientific concept and as part of the international bureaucratic lexicon.

The first occurrence of ‘diaspora’ can be found in the Septuagint, i.e. the translation into Greek of the Hebraic Bible, in the third century BCE. ‘Diaspora’, then, does not indicate a historical dispersal such as the Babylonian exile of Jews in the sixth century, but describes the divine punishment – the dispersal throughout the world – that would befall the Jews if they did not respect the commandments of God. The dispersal as well as the return of the dispersed is a matter of divine, and not human, will. Diaspora seems to be almost exclusively confined to Jewish biblical literature until the first century CE when the New Testament refers to ‘diaspora’ as the members of the Christian Church as exiled from the City of God and dispersed across the Earth. The condition of dispersion is understood as the very proof of their, and not the Jews, being the chosen people. Christian writers eventually abandon ‘diaspora’ in the second century CE, limiting its use to the Jewish dispersion as an exemplary curse for their sins. With the replacement of Greek by Latin within the Western Roman
Empire in the first centuries of the Christian era, ‘diaspora’ is confined to the Eastern Roman Empire and later the Byzantine Empire. Uses of it perpetuate until the mid-fifteenth century. Apart from Jewish and Christian meanings, a new religious meaning emerges in the eighteenth century with the rise in Germany and diffusion abroad of the Protestant Moravian Church that officially calls ‘diaspora’ the nomadic church that helps maintain the link between the various Moravian communities dispersed into Catholic lands.

From the first decades of the twentieth century onwards, two distinct processes characterise the evolution of ‘diaspora’: secularisation, i.e. the extension to nonreligious meanings; and trivialisation, i.e. the widening of the spectrum of relevant cases. ‘Diaspora’ starts a new life as an academic notion, without any formal definition, that may encompass more than one relevant case. Some scholars played a pivotal role in this importation from the religious realm into the vocabulary of the social sciences. Among them is the Jewish Russian historian Simon Dubnow. In the ‘Diaspora’ entry of the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (1931), he provides a vision of the phenomenon that goes beyond the Jewish case to include Greeks and Armenians. A few years later, American sociologist Robert E. Park relied on Dubnow’s writing to reframe and even enlarge the scope in order to apply it to Asians. In the 1950s, British anthropologist Maurice Freedman made a similar attempt to demonstrate that Chinese and Indians constituted ‘other diasporas’.

In parallel to this evolution, the word became progressively used by social actors from various racial, religious or ethnic groups and associations to describe their connection to a land or state different from the one they lived in. The most eloquent example is that of African Americans. From the late 1960s within the African American community, academic and non-academic publications started to multiply that used ‘diaspora’ to refer to black people residing outside Africa. ‘Diaspora’ provided black people with a name for themselves. This name was at the same time a reminder of their historical tragedy and a positive way to recover a sense of unity by emphasising the connection and the return – spiritual and intellectual if not physical – to Africa. This emphasis established the existence of continuities or survivals between the African origin and the black people living
outside Africa. From this time on, the value of the word was changed and it was more and more widely used to express the continuing existence of communities characterised by a common origin.

Building on the aforementioned academic notion, scholars only started conceptualising ‘diaspora’ from the late 1970s. Two different streams can roughly be distinguished, forming two separate versions of ‘diaspora’. The first one, mostly relying on the paradigmatic Jewish case, sees diasporas as characterised by either migration or exile, nostalgia, perpetuation of original traditions, customs and languages, and a dream of return to the homeland. In this respect, this is a centered, essentially political, version of diaspora. The second version relies not on the Jewish, but on the black/African case. Its origins lie in the evolution of British cultural studies, from the mid-1970s, towards a greater attention to identity issues. British sociologists Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy epitomised this version. In this respect, not referring to any kind of real and direct connection to Africa, ‘diaspora’ became the positive symbol of ‘life’ as opposed to ‘survival’ and of ‘heterogeneity’ as opposed to ‘homogeneity’. These two versions of ‘diaspora’ are opposed to one another: a modern, centered, territorial and political vision versus a postmodern, emancipatory, deterritorialised and cultural one. Such an opposition could have sterilised the concept and made it impossible to continue using. However this opposition only enlarged the semantic horizon of ‘diaspora’, making it available to various categories of people (journalists, scholars, militants, spokespersons, politicians) who had the opportunity to choose between the several meanings associated with the word: a minority, a migrant community, a transnational community, a statistical group of expatriates, or even any kind of group whose members happened to be dispersed across many territories.

Among the fields that appropriated ‘diaspora’ is the international bureaucratic field. From the early 2000s, some international organisations, in particular the World Bank and the International Organization for Migration, attempted to import ‘diaspora’ into their own specific lexicon. Relying mostly on previous conceptual works by Robin Cohen or Steven Vertovec, especially Cohen (2008), experts from these international organisations seized the word and made ‘diaspora policies’ a specific dimension of the ‘best practices’
that newly independent or emerging states were more and more suppos ed to implement. As Alan Gamlen (2014) and Stéphane Dufoix (2012) showed in their respective work, a new definition of 'diaspora' emerged within this expertise. The term now described expatriate populations, who possessed citizenship of the homeland or were of national origin, and whom states now had to take into consideration, and for whom they are strongly incited to implement specific policies aiming at embracing them more efficiently into the space of the nation. Through the work of those international organisations, the word came to be globalised. Within the last century, the old religious sense of 'diaspora' was successively supplemented by new layers of meaning. But the latter did not replace the former. Each new layer represented a new opportunity, adding up to the previous ones. This complex stratification turned a very ancient word into a most appropriate descriptor of the new global world. □
Network

By Sondra L. Hausner

There is nothing wrong with the idea of
A network
It implies that you go somewhere
Your mother's cousin's brother's wife's uncle (or someone such)
Has a shop or a *pasal* or a launderette or a car hire service or a
cleaner's job
Somewhere in a crowded family home there is a place for you to sleep
It is a corner of the earth from which
You may make your own way.

That is no small thing, that network.
Someone might pick you up from the airport
Or drive you to an interview
Or teach you how to speak a language
Or introduce you to someone who might have a job for you
Or loan you five pounds for a phone card
Or cook you dinner
That is no small thing, that network,
In the first moments and days and weeks of arrival
As long, that is, as we,
the analysts,
Remember how charged
how palpable
Those early days
Those connections
Those negotiations
may be.

Networks are the way they happen,
those transnational flows;
They are not the end of the story
They are the beginning.
They come to fruition
in human time.
The sinews of empire in the world of modern warfare

By Vron Ware

Aldershot in Hampshire, UK is a garrison town that has been a military centre since the Crimean War when the first permanent army training camp was established there. Today it has other claims to fame as the epicentre of a living military history that stretches back 200 years.

The borough of Rushmoor, which includes Aldershot and Farnborough, currently includes some 90,000 residents, ten per cent of whom are Nepali. A significant proportion of these are either serving, or recently retired, Gurkha soldiers and their families. These military migrants have formed a relatively settled community in the area since the late 1990s. However, it is the newest arrivals that constitute a more controversial addition to this particular minority.

Elderly men and women habituated to life in the Himalayas can be seen strolling through the town’s main streets, searching for bargains in the market or finding respite from the cold in the indoor shopping centres. They too belong to a category of military migrants whose connection to the UK can be traced back to 1815, when warriors from the Gurkhal kingdom in what is now Nepal were first hired as mercenaries by the East India Company. Once recruited to fight Britain’s wars of decolonisation, they now find themselves in a very foreign country as a result of an emotive public campaign to allow ex-Gurkhas welfare and residency rights.

Aldershot has been the official destination for many of these individuals since 2009, when the significant changes were made. Despite vocal support for Gurkha veterans on the basis of the sheer numbers who died fighting for Britain in the two World Wars, the former soldiers and their wives have been targets of racism.
and resentment from local groups. This reaction exposes the contradictions that emerge when migrants also serve in the armed forces, or have done so at some point in their past. Members of the public are quick to laud their readiness to sacrifice their lives for British ‘freedoms’, but are then ready to castigate them as immigrants, foreigners and scroungers when they turn up in their neighbourhoods without their uniforms.

For Queen and Commonwealth

These very modern contradictions provide an invaluable lens through which to examine transnational networks of military migration. But serving and former Gurkhas are not the only candidates who fit into this category. There are currently several thousand Commonwealth citizens serving in the UK armed forces, recruited between 1998 and 2013 when a five-year residency requirement was temporarily waived.

The fact that migrants from the Caribbean, South Asia and the African continent were deemed eligible for military service in Britain, despite stringent restrictions aimed at deterring non-EU nationals, is invariably justified by recourse to the longer history of the Commonwealth ‘contribution’ to Britain’s war efforts. The presence of non-nationals in the army is routinely explained by the UK media as an index of deep-seated ties to the ‘mother’ country, rather than as a
particular channel of economic migration or a strategic response to low recruitment numbers.

Since the recruitment of military migrants into the armed forces draws so heavily on two centuries of colonial history, any serious analysis of the term today must contend with the implications of this past in the present. This means, for example, teasing apart the unpredictable links between military service, citizenship rights and other qualifications to ‘belong’ to Britain. The commemoration of the centenary of World War I currently provides opportunities for British citizens of Caribbean and South Asian heritage to explore genealogies of military labour performed in support of British interests. Thus their particular patterns of migration to the UK are recast within a longer story of entanglement in which militarist values of sacrifice, courage and loyalty can be emphasised, albeit along the lines of gender, ethnicity and faith.

**Family reunion**

Since 2007, the word ‘soldier’ has become interchangeable with the word ‘hero’, a label that makes the reality of migrant status all the more galling for those servicemen and women who are not UK citizens. Not surprisingly this discrepancy has often been highlighted in campaigns to stop the deportation of individuals who have served in the UK forces, often for more than a decade, and who are subsequently denied residency rights on the basis of minor infractions which prevent them from passing the ‘good character’ test.

In 2012, for instance, Isimeli Baleiwai, a citizen of Fiji, was served a deportation order after serving for 13 years in the British Army. During this time he had married a UK citizen with whom he had two children. His application for residency had been turned down on the basis of an assault he had allegedly committed while in the army, a military conviction that was later overturned in a magistrate’s court. Once he had established his innocence and been granted the legal right to remain, he returned his medals in disgust at the treatment he had received (Vuibau 2013).

However, this particular cohort of military migrants also face other forms of disadvantages that are not experienced by their British-born colleagues, such as rising visa costs for the partners and children
who accompany them. Often moving from their country of origin straight into a UK military base, families of Commonwealth soldiers inevitably experience an intensified form of isolation. This situation is often mitigated where ethnic groups are concentrated in certain areas, such as the all-Gurkha regiment in Folkestone, Kent.

**Mercenary markets**

It is important to draw attention to the military migrant as a wider global phenomenon since it brings into view the wholesale marketisation of private military and security work. Third country nationals (TCNs), as they are known, frequently occupy the periphery of this increasingly diverse workforce. The vast majority are men who come from countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Fiji, the Philippines, El Salvador, Chile, or Uganda, their remittances providing a significant percentage of GDP in each case. Inevitably TCNs from the global South endure the most intensely discriminatory terms and conditions. These internal dynamics provide further evidence of how ‘the politics of market fundamentalism, militarism and disposability’ drive modern forms of violence (Giroux 2014).

In her ethnographic study of Nepali men working within the security contracting industry, Amanda Chisholm suggests that the management and marketing of TCNs’ services is ‘amenable to the labour-disciplining mechanisms used in other global industries, such as textiles and domestic care’ (Chisholm 2014: 349). However, there are particular features of this rapidly expanding ‘global market for force’ that make this form of labour migration distinctive as well.

The privatisation of military work draws largely on the experience and skills provided by thousands of former soldiers eager to transfer into a more risky but lucrative job market. Within a sector already stratified by nationality, racism and geography, certain minorities are able to market themselves on the basis of aptitude, trainability and other military attributes. One example is provided by the UK-owned Group 4 Security (G4S) Gurkha Security Services, whose brochure claims that their operatives are ‘responsible for an enhanced security service for customers with higher risk requirements and can offer strategic advice when dealing with volatile situations’.
The rationale for marketing Gurkha contractors as a separate force indicates the value of promoting an ethnic exceptionalism that can clearly prove valuable for employee and employer alike. In this instance, G4S are able to emphasise the elite Gurkha ‘brand’ on the basis of the Nepali soldiers’ historic reputation for ferocity, discipline and loyalty. For their part, the ex-Gurkhas are able to animate these claims, creating a niche identity within a crowded market.

**The use of force**
In broadest terms the label ‘military migrant’ can be applied to all those who are motivated, obliged or forced to move from their country of origin to work in a military or security-related occupation. As US legal scholar Darryl Li (2015) argues, they form a distinct category ‘because of their employment on behalf of a foreign government in the exercise of a core sovereign function: namely, the use of force’.

The various paths of military-related migration outlined here entail extensive transnational networks, often rooted in colonial structures of power and sometimes involving complex entitlements to citizenship and other forms of postcolonial belonging. Family members of those who serve in conventional armed forces potentially benefit from the prestige entailed in the work, but communities across both sectors face the particular risks that come with professions of violence. And as the reception of the elderly veterans in Aldershot suggests, the symbolic rewards of military service earned by migrants in the past provide little immunity to forms of xenophobia and forgetfulness today (Ware 2014).
Points of origin: a visual and narrative journey

By Alpha Abebe and Jyotsana Saha

‘The questions you pose, belong to generations, and so it goes.’

Scholars have observed that ‘diaspora’ represents more than a fixed identity, a passive experience, or a theoretical term. It is a practice as well, including conscious action, negotiation, and articulation. The visual and literary arts have served as an important platform for this practice of identification, as it is often through the process of creating artistic narratives that diasporic identities also take shape. The flexibility of artistic mediums is conducive to the fluid and often ambiguous nature of diasporic subjectivities – with their shifting relationships to place, myth, and memory. It allows individuals and groups the space to imagine and long for their places of belonging, particularly when their desire to belong is not satiated by their current locale. Questions of home and belonging can be complex for diasporans who migrated from their place of birth, but even more so for their children and descendants. For those who were born or raised in the diaspora, it can be difficult to feel settled when they have such ambiguous ties to both their countries of citizenship and origin. Often their social, cultural, and political lives are spread across multiple places, some of which they have never been to outside their imagination. While it may be challenging to live in this liminal space of ‘in-betweenness’, it can also be a beautiful and productive place ripe for creative thought and expression. It is a place from which one can observe the world through a lens of curiosity – a lens that can shift its perspective and proximity with greater ease than most.

Points of Origin is a collection of images and poems that explores
All images ©Alpha Abebe
the constant negotiations of diasporic identity through the experience of nostalgia. Using photography and poetry as a language, it celebrates the movement of those who are removed from their points of origin and are reinterpreting their relationships to place, home, and self. Alpha Abebe was born and raised in Toronto, Canada to Ethiopian parents, and was very much embedded in both social and cultural worlds. Jyotsana Saha was brought up in Zambia, South Africa, India and Canada. She currently lives in Vancouver and New Delhi. In 2009, the two met in Toronto and quickly discovered that they were both preoccupied with questions of identity, migration and the diasporic experience. This series is a collage of their experiences, conversations and insights over the course of five years. Alpha’s photographs were taken during her travels across Ethiopia, and reflect her imagining of a country she cannot claim by birth, but only attachment. Jyotsana’s poems are an interpretation of Alpha’s photographs, filtered through her own migrations and ruminations about her world.
Abbreviations
Scents of rain that seeped the town.
Warm winds that swept the ground.
Rumbling clouds the bellowing thunder, that cracked and collided, a familiar clamor.
The hum of the blue fan that hushed the house in Hot afternoons and Humid monsoons.
Evenings with tea, songs of the oldies, a crackling radio that played black and white melodies.
The hot red earth that simmered and soaked as rain tap-danced with deafening tones.
Landscapes

Paint spills over the contours,
Colors converge,
Submerge,
Diverge.

Against history’s canvas,
movements collide, cultures explode.
Boundaries bleed,

Borders fade.
A festive triumph!

This world after all
is
flat.
References

1. New languages
born in the vast abyss.
Vocabulary written
in transparent ink.
Stories echoed
in vacuums of journey.
Meaning connected
within the disjunctures.
Translations of experience
deliberate in absence.
Reference and context
hidden the passage.
Inheritance
the questions you pose
belong to generations
(and so it goes)
you are the answer to questions that rose
blown into the future
a generation ago.
And the answer to your question today
absent-minded, incidental
comes back, a generation away.
For no question is in isolation
not created, nor destroyed, rather transformed
binding, lingering, energy in motion.
Seeping into another generation
that will ask questions, I suppose,
absent-minded and incidental (and so it goes).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reflections</th>
<th>Reflections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My mind is a room full of mirrors, reflecting illusions of the past onto my present, my future. (A delusion), distorted reality of my choosing.</td>
<td>My mind is a room full of mirrors, these linear negotiations in costumes of culture I search for myself in sheltered pursuit. (Defining who I am) within the confines of these reflections.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Baggage Tag
Scraps and fragments
of a past. Folded.
Packed.
To be pieced together
in another home.
A jigsaw puzzle. Those missing pieces.
What is the weight of memory?
Twenty five kilograms,
tagged, “Fragile. Handle With Care.”
In Between Generations
What happens in midnight’s moment,
When seconds are bracketed between histories.
And if history’s instant is still yet to come
What is this moment, this vacuum of fervor?
of energy, of hope?
Of unspoken words finally releasing?
Is this where deferred dreams culminate,
When the thick crowd swings with the pendulum?
Their energy spilling out, bursting at seams,
Enduring through the future in stories re-told?
They speak to voices, etched in time.
Calling them forth, to come bear witness, saying,
‘We are here. And look at what we have done.’
Spheres of diaspora engagement

By Nicholas Van Hear

The degree of congruence between the perceptions and aspirations of people in diaspora and the perspectives of those who remain in the country of origin has long been a matter of debate. This is seen not least in the much-discussed notion of ‘long distance nationalism’ (Anderson 1998), which refers to the ways diasporas exert influence from abroad while not bearing the consequences of their intervention in the homeland. The issue of connection and disconnection between those inside and outside conflict-torn societies like Sri Lanka, Somalia and Afghanistan has been a matter of intense controversy both during conflicts and after their end. This short contribution suggests that a disaggregation of diaspora engagement can help to tease out different orders of connection and disconnection between the diaspora and those at home: it can reveal the conditions and circumstances that can generate common ground as well as rendering them at odds with one another in conflict settings.

It is suggested that transnational activities by diasporas can be considered in three spheres, which feature different combinations of the private and public: the largely private and personal sphere of the household and the extended family; the more public sphere of the ‘known community’, by which is meant collectivities of people that know each other or know of each other; and the largely public sphere of the ‘imagined community’, including ethnic, national, religious and other allegiances and affinities.¹

The household/extended family sphere
Engagement in the household and extended family, largely personal
and private, is likely to be the most sustained of the three spheres – not surprisingly since it involves basic, core relationships of kith and kin. The most common, well-known, and most tangible form of engagement is of course sending money – remittances – to assist extended family members to survive and cope, especially in conflict settings or other circumstances of distress. The money sent may be used for everyday needs, housing, schooling, healthcare, and sometimes to help people get out of zones of danger – this can involve paying an agent to organise migration abroad. Besides such transfers in cash and kind, diaspora members may participate in life course events such as births, coming of age ceremonies, marriages and funerals either ‘virtually’ or in person. Such engagement may involve visits and other physical encounters, but in conflict settings online connections and telephony often necessarily replace face-to-face physical connection.

The known community sphere
Engagement in the ‘known community sphere’ takes place in spaces where one lives or has lived, among people one knows or knows of. It is the sphere of encounters between people connected in the past and present – in schools, neighbourhoods, workplaces, markets and shops, places of religious observance, associations and clubs, sports and leisure venues and during cultural activity. It is the realm of associational life: of associations based on residence, ethnicity or religion; educational, mutual aid and welfare bodies; and community-based and civil society organisations. Home town and home village associations, and in particular old school associations, have been important forms of diasporic organisation and transnational engagement. Their influence may decline in conflict contexts as time passes and connections grow weaker; on the other hand, engagement in these and other forms of associational life may also expand with the use of social media. Transfers to wider collectivities than households and extended families can be considered here: examples include donations made in temples, churches or mosques for relief in the home country; the home town association or old school association that collects funds to rebuild a school, equip a hospital, or refurbish a library; collections by diaspora-based welfare organisations to
Metaphors, concepts, genealogies and images

provide relief for the victims of conflict; or, more menacingly, the collections by supporters of insurgent groups for funds to buy weapons or otherwise support insurgency. These transfers, for more public or collective purposes, are somewhat different in nature from the more private remittances described above in the first, household or extended family sphere. In the aggregate they are also probably smaller in scale than such private remittances. In conflict settings, however, the significance of such collective transfers goes beyond their immediate economic and material effects, since they can help repair the social fabric shredded by years of conflict, not least by helping to re-establish social linkages ruptured during war and to rebuild trust and confidence.

The imagined community

In coining the notion ‘the imagined community’, Benedict Anderson (1983) referred to the nation with which one has an affinity without necessarily knowing its members personally. The notion can be extended to other collectivities such as co-nationals, co-religionists and co-ethnics – and maybe to classes, generations and some social movements. This is the sphere in which such allegiances are articulated and contested – indeed some argue convincingly that it is through such mobilisation and contestation that diasporas come into being (Sökefeld 2006). Engagement here includes membership of or involvement in political parties and movements, and support for insurgent, oppositional and sometimes loyalist groups. It might involve lobbying politicians or other influential people in the host country, in the homeland or in the international arena. In recent years, it has increasingly taken the form of engagement in political, social or cultural debate in cyberspace. This sphere is usually the most volatile of the three and perhaps the least pervasive in terms of general and sustained participation: it requires greater degrees of social mobilisation than the more routine activities of the household and known community spheres.

These three spheres are analytical categories and there is of course overlap and interplay among them: for example, what happens in the ‘imagined community’ sphere may shape what is possible in the ‘known community’ and ‘household spheres’; vice versa,
family allegiances may shape ‘known community’ involvement and engagement in the ‘imagined community’ sphere. There are also tensions among the different spheres – diaspora members may find themselves pulled between obligations to their own family in the host country, to their own community in the host country, to those in the wider diaspora, to those left in the conflict-ridden homeland, and to the wider political struggle in the homeland. Their capacity to meet these different calls varies according to their resources and social position, and shifts over time. Likewise, those at home may view diaspora engagement in the different spheres as congruent with or inimical to their interests, at times prioritising help in the household sphere and at others welcoming – or conversely expressing discomfort with – political mobilisation in the ‘imagined community’ sphere. It is suggested here that some of these and other apparent contradictions and paradoxes of diaspora engagement may be explained and better understood if such engagement is disaggregated in the way proposed in this short contribution.
Belonging: imagining and remaking home
Cultures of translation: East London, diaspora space and an imagined cosmopolitan tradition

By Ben Gidley

Historian María Rosa Menocal, in her 2002 book *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Christians and Jews Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain*, describes Andalucía under Moorish rule, when Spanish Christians, Muslims from across the Mediterranean world, and Jews who spoke an antique Judeo-Spanish, that later came to be known as Ladino, together forged a fragile space of *convivencia*, conviviality. Interwoven traditions of commentary and exegesis took root in spaces of intercultural learning in the Moorish cityscape: Greek learning was translated into Arabic and Hebrew, books were shipped between the libraries of Cordoba and Toledo and those of Baghdad and Damascus, scholars compared the fine details of Sharia and Talmudic law.

Menocal describes Golden Age Andalucía, linked to both Christian Europe and the Islamic world by ‘dozens of new avenues of cultural commerce’, from trade to intermarriage, as a ‘culture of translation’, sustained through the translation of texts and spoken words between languages, but also through the cultivation of an intimate understanding of the cultural practices and memories of the others with whom its diverse populations shared space. Because it was a culture of translation, she argues, it was ‘perforce a culture of tolerance’ (Menocal 2002).

In one sense, *all* diasporic cultures constitute what the late Stuart Hall called ‘cultures of hybridity’: ‘They are irrevocably translated… They must learn to inhabit at least two identities, to speak [at least] two cultural languages, to translate and negotiate between them’ (Hall 1992). But there seem to be particular diasporic formations – perhaps
the most quintessentially diasporic formations – which seem to have had a particular elective affinity for translational practices or for practices of creolisation.

Thus the concept of a culture of translation has been used, for instance, by the Portuguese historian Luís Filipe Barreto in relation to the intellectual cultures of the Portuguese empire’s Asian cities in the early modern period (Barreto 1996), by Croatian writer Andrea Zlatar, who described the anti-nationalist counter-culture in the Balkans as ‘a culture of translation, a culture of connection, a culture of change’ (Zlatar 2001), and by Middle Easternist Sami Zubaida to describe the interstitial cosmopolitan worlds of the Ottoman empire, which he argues still tenaciously survive in some crevices of the Islamic world and its European diaspora (Zubaida 1998). Stuart Hall’s own Caribbean is perhaps another example, a space in which the cultural, musical, liturgical and political traditions of Old and New Worlds are creatively translated into rooted local vernaculars, sampled or versioned, mixed and remixed, and circulated back out to other global locations.

Diasporic formations have historically been carried along shipping routes linking port cities; port cities have often been the exemplary locations of diasporic and inter-diasporic cultures of translation. London has been one such metropolis, and its East End arrival quarter has seen one of the most intense examples of this process. My own archival research, most recently as part of the ODP project ‘Religious faith, space and diasporic communities in East London’, has sought to capture some of the traces of this, focusing on the late Victorian and especially Edwardian peak years of Jewish migration and settlement.

In that historical moment, the East End hosted a complex web of contentious, subaltern, multi-lingual micro-public spaces. Such spaces included the street (its walls covered in what the Victorian writer Israel Zangwill (2009) called ‘hybrid posters’ advertising English products in Hebrew script); the street corners and parks, such as the Mile End Waste or Victoria Park, which functioned as open air debating societies free from the respectable proprieties of the bourgeois public sphere; working men’s clubs, reading rooms, mutual aid associations and friendly societies, where competing political
tendencies hosted lectures and debates; and *khevres* or *shtiblekh*, the profane attics and backrooms transformed for a few hours each Sabbath into sacred spaces of prayer, religious learning and Talmudic dialogue by an improvised *minyan* (quorum) of kinsfolk or co-workers. A rich print media flourished, in English, Yiddish, Hebrew, Russian, Polish and German, for both local circulation and for distribution 'back home', discussing the topical issues confronting Londoners specifically *and* those engaging the global working class and/or transnational Jewish population generally.

Within this culture of translation, we can identify political currents and cultural formations which seem to have cultivated the elective affinity for a kind of vernacular cosmopolitanism. One of these was the Bundists, a Jewish socialist movement who argued against the emerging Zionist project of return to the Jewish homeland, instead articulating the concept of *doykayt*, which roughly translates from Yiddish as ‘hereness’, a commitment to making a tolerant, just world in the here and now, in dispersion.

A second example was the Yiddish anarchist movement. An anarchist movement emerged among the migrant Jews of East London in the last decades of the nineteenth century, but in the decade before World War I it grew to be a mass movement, not only playing a major role in the political life and trade union struggles of the East End, but also in the area’s cultural life. The anarchists’ club – the Workers’ Friend Club on Jubilee Street in Stepney Green – was the heart of the movement. The club had a library, served food, staged musical and theatrical performances, and hosted lectures. The most popular lecturer was Rudolf Rocker, a non-Jewish German bookbinder, who had come to anarchism while working as a journeyman in Paris. The poet Joseph Leftwich (1987) described Rocker:

*Rocker was to all the Yiddish-speaking workers of that time… the symbol of culture. They flocked to his lectures on literature and art… he was a man who spoke to them, in their own Yiddish, of things of the spirit and the mind about which they wanted to hear.*

Rocker had learnt Yiddish in the East End, but other speakers – ranging from William Morris to Peter Kropotkin – addressed their
audiences in English, Russian, German, Polish or Hebrew.

The Workers’ Friend group also published an extraordinary volume of Yiddish translations – by anarchist theorists but also international freethinkers and avant-garde aesthetes, such as the Germans Ludwig and Georg Büchner, Norwegian Knut Hamsun, American Robert Ingersoll, Belgian Maurice Maeterlinck, Frenchman Octave Mirbeau, and Irishman Oscar Wilde. This body of translated work can be seen as the attempt to establish a relationship between the Yiddish ghetto and an imagined cosmopolitan tradition at the margins of European culture, a sense of a counterculture of modernity, or what Seyla Benhabib has called ‘an alternative genealogy of modernity’ (Benhabib 1996). The print culture of the East End – as a paradigmatic arrival city within an exemplary diasporic formation – was about more than literal translation; it valorised its own status as a culture of translation, translating between Yiddish specificity and cosmopolitan modernism, between the locality of the city and the transnationalism of radical thought. □
Living with difference locally, comparing transnationally: conviviality in Catalonia à la Casamance

By Tilmann Heil

People on the move always engage with different places and different materialities, as well as with the people whom they meet along their migration trajectory. For people who have moved from Casamance in southern Senegal to Catalonia, the north-eastern autonomous region of Spain, both transnational reference frames, and local references matter. The local social practices can be described as conviviality, understood as a minimal sociality of living with difference.

I met Keba Deme, a Jola, at his uncle’s house in Catalonia, as I was explaining my research project to a group of Casamançais. Over the course of numerous meetings, he shared his migration history and his understanding of ways of living with difference. Keba had lived in Senegal, The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, and he had passed through Morocco before trying twice to get to the Canary Islands by boat. To live a transnational life means to be involved at home, with people around the globe, and in the place of current residence. In each place, Keba and many others like him had accumulated experiences of living with difference.

Ideas and concepts travel, together with and alongside the people who use them. Keba talked about relations between men and women, the various notions of brotherhood among Muslims, work attitudes, sincerity, and many more concepts through which he made sense of his social relations. The various concepts of conviviality, for example how people relate to one another despite being different, also transfer between contexts and mediate them.

Through the perspective of Senegalese living in both Catalonia and Casamance, I have focused on conviviality as the everyday process
of how people live together in mundane encounters. It points to how they translate between sustained differences and how they (re)negotiate minimal consensuses. With the continued marginalisation of minorities, a better understanding of these processes seems more urgent than ever (Heil 2013, 2014).

In today’s crisis ridden Spain, in Mataró, a Catalan town of just over 120,000 inhabitants, people come from more than 100 different countries (Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya 2014). There is a concentration of people from Casamance, particularly in the peripheral neighbourhoods. Many share apartments with co-migrants, but in the streets they encounter members of previous migration streams from southern Spain, Catalans and other migrants from Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia. It is on corridors, stairs and elevators of apartment blocks, as well as on streets and squares that people cross paths. While economic, social and legal insecurity matter and restrict people in their activities, they are administratively the same as long as they register with the municipality: they are residents.²

At times, the administrative process of becoming a resident reinforces local belonging. At other times, de facto presence in a place mattered more than the paperwork. In both cases, specific localities are anchor points – if only temporarily – in people’s lives. Residency is a concept that engages the here and now, irrespective of the past (or the future). Independent of one’s legal status, it comes with de facto entitlements and obligations within the current context.

People from Casamance follow daily routines of living with difference in Catalonia under the heading of convivència, a local term related to conviviality. However, past experiences matter. Keba and others compare their everyday encounters with strangers, neighbours and friends to the social relations they had in the places they grew up in or passed through as part of their migration. Throughout this process, they (re)learn how to engage with different people. Interlocutors like Keba always connected various contexts in which they stayed or passed through in an act of continuous comparison. Everyone is aware of the fact that people sharing the same locality might nevertheless remain different. Therefore, the comparison of convivialities often concentrates on fleeting encounters. For example, Keba recalls:
[I met] some Mancanya [from Guinea-Bissau]... Because they spoke Creole... I thought, they’re my relatives... I have to greet them... I greeted them, I asked their names, I asked [and] they said they live in Cerdanyola, I said [where I live], adja, adja, I left them there. […]

TH: And with the Spanish?

KD: There is one thing: I don’t understand Spanish well. If I understood Spanish, I could do something with the Spanish. But I do not understand the language well... I am ashamed... The street allows you to meet people. Because, sometimes walking... you can say ‘Ah, this dude, I always see him here’. Sometimes [you say]: ‘Hola - Hola’ ‘Bon dia - Bon dia’ - all that, it makes you acquainted... Even if I don’t know you, I can tell you ‘Bon dia’ in the street... Since Senegal I’ve been used to this. [Mataró, 2010]

Keba contextualises his need to greet in Catalonia within his life trajectory. Frequently, my interlocutors compared the values and ways of conviviality to their upbringing, the (pre)conceptions they had before coming to the West/Europe, and their experiences on the way. Variations in greeting as a way of (not) showing respect were a crucial element in this.

To foster everyday relations in any locality, most of my interlocutors were speakers of truncated multilingualism (Blommaert et al. 2005): they were able to manipulate various languages to get by in everyday life. Although Keba said he did not know Spanish well, he was able to greet in Castilian and Catalan, along with the many other languages he knew. As a crucial aspect of engaging with everyday life, this multilingualism is constitutive of the cosmopolitan self-understanding of many people from Casamance. This involved speaking first languages such as Jola and Mandinka with children born in Catalonia. These language practices show how the transnational dimension shapes local lives.

This short insight into the localised practices of people from Casamance in relation to the travelling ideas of how to live with difference has raised three points. First, people who maintain an affinity with a distant place called home do engage in many
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ways with the localities where they live, despite maintaining their distinctiveness. Second, and importantly, a comparison is ongoing between the current and past places of residence. Third, it is not only people who travel, but also their ideas about conviviality, and about living together with difference. People who migrate combine transnational and local references, shown here through linguistic and greeting practices. These aspects have informed my analysis of conviviality as a minimal sociality of living with difference locally while comparing transnationally. □
Making a Kurdish identity in diaspora: Kurdish migrants in Sweden

By Barzoo Eliassi

Due to political, cultural and economic marginalisation in the Middle East, more than 70,000 Kurds have migrated to Sweden, where they have found a democratic political context in which to live their Kurdish identity. In Sweden, many Kurds have gradually adopted a Kurdistani identity and feel that the national identities of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey do not represent them. The Kurdish diaspora in Sweden is shuttled between experiences of inclusion and exclusion, citizenship rights and ethnic discrimination, belonging and non-belonging. The chapter draws on fieldwork undertaken in Sweden as part of the ODP research project, '(Re)Conceptualising “Stateless Diasporas” in the EU', which examines the formation of the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden.

Negotiating multiple identities

Kurds in Sweden have had significant impact on Swedish society and are taking a leading position in framing different societal issues in Sweden. Kurdish debaters and authors like Lawen Mohtadi, Dilsa Demirbag, Mustafa Can and stand-up comedians like Soran Ismail and Özz Nûjen often appear in the public sphere and make interventions on political and social issues. The public action of these Kurdish-Swedish public figures can be viewed as attempts to shape a new national imaginary in Sweden beyond fixed ideas about Swedishness in regard to appearance, culture, history, religion, gender relations, etc. The importance of these Kurdish public figures is related to the fact that they are involved in framing narratives about Swedish identity and experiences of immigrants through their
access to and power in public debates. Yet, their involvement in Sweden's public debates has not made them indifferent toward the political situation of the Kurds. Members of the Kurdish diaspora both underline the democratic political culture that exists in Sweden and the structural and everyday ethnic inequalities that prevent non-European immigrants from enjoying full citizenship rights. Kurdish migrants make a clear distinction between being Swedish on paper and being a real Swede. The immigrant identity is both an imposed identity and an experienced identity since immigrants are reminded by ethnic Swedes in their everyday life about their undesired and sometimes exoticised cultural differences. Many of them experience racial slurs and ethnic discrimination in school, the labour market, housing, and the legal system, to name but a few. Ethnic discrimination strengthens their Kurdish identity and makes them aware of the fact that they are not fully accepted as members of Swedish society.

Another important arena of success for the Kurds is sport. Dalkurd FF is a football club that was founded in 2004 and now plays in the third best football division in Sweden. Although it is a young club, it has become the biggest Swedish football club on Facebook. The Facebook page of Dalkurd’s supporters has more than 785,487 likes (as of 11 February 2015). The name Dalkurd is interesting because it connects Kurdish identity with Dalarna, a region in Sweden. This indicates a transnational identity that links Sweden to Kurdistan but also regionalises Kurdish identity in Sweden. Other clubs like Uppsalakurd and Skanekurd have been founded to follow in the footsteps of Dalkurd. Football is a global sport and a field in which Kurds can gain international recognition and visibility, but also represent their suppressed Kurdish identity that has been silenced by the overarching nationalisms in the Middle East.

**The shift from ‘Kurdish’ to ‘Kurdistani’: constructing a Kurdistani identity in cyberspace**

In January 2014, two Kurdish-Swedish youngsters started a Facebook campaign called ‘Ez kurdistanî me/Min kurdistanî m’ (I am Kurdistani). On their Facebook page, Kurds around the world post their picture, declaring that they are Kurdistanis. Famous Kurdish
artists, poets, public figures and politicians as well as ‘ordinary’ Kurds around the world are participating in this major campaign. When I asked these two youngsters why they started this campaign, one of them said:

We should stop saying that we are Iraqis, Turkish, Iranians and Syrians or saying that we are Iraqi Kurds, Iranian Kurds, Turkish Kurds and Syrian Kurds. We should not accept the definitions from the occupying states and should instead say that we are Kurdistanis, that our homeland is Kurdistan and that it is Kurdistan that unites all Kurds. This will make it easier for us Kurds to identify with each other and feel closer to each other. Look at Palestinians, they never say that they are Israelis, they always say they are Palestinians and want to remain Palestinians. But we Kurds do adopt the definitions from our enemy states and forget our Kurdish identity.

While it is assumed that a Kurdish identity is not attached to a particular territory or geography, a Kurdistani identity is used to create a national imaginary within specific geographical borders in the Middle East. Geography is central to creating a national identity because national identities are usually anchored in territories. For Kurds, territorial identity has been an important part of the struggle for recognition, autonomy and even independence. Many Kurds are well aware that in a world of nation-states, you need to locate your identity on the world map because it is where it is displayed, recognised and represented to the outer world. The campaign ‘I am Kurdistani’ clearly shows that naming is important in the construction of a new national imaginary but it is also central to reclaiming and renaming territories that have been Turkified, Arabised and Persianised and where Kurdish presence has been given a marginal position. The campaign ‘I am Kurdistani’ attempts to disrupt the political geographies that have divided Kurds into four national groups and states. One can not underestimate the power of the diaspora in transforming political identities (e.g. from Iraqi to Kurdistani) and produce new forms of solidarities among Kurds across Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria. The lack of a Kurdish state with a united political administration has also impinged on the divisions
existing among Kurds. Therefore it is difficult to talk about a united Kurdish identity because it is impossible to achieve in the context of the current geographical and political divisions. Yet, thanks to information technologies, Kurds are coming closer to each other. They negotiate their Kurdish identities and diversity through social media like Facebook.

The symbolic meanings of Kurdistan Region for the Kurdish diaspora

One of the main issues that different diasporas deal and struggle with is the question of homeland and returning. The emergence of a quasi-Kurdish state in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has made Kurdistan into a safe area for Kurdish migrants where they can live their Kurdishness without being exposed to assimilation policies and ethnic oppression. The construction of airports in Hawler/Erbil and Slemani/Sulaimania has linked Kurdistan to the Kurdish diaspora. Kurds from all parts of Kurdistan visit this region since it is viewed as an unprecedented historical experience but also a break with the domination that Kurds have been exposed to in Iraq. Kurds often remember the painful experiences and the humiliating acts of Turkish border officers when Kurdish diasporans wanted to cross the Ibrahim Khalil border between the Turkish part of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. This was a political context in which they experienced a denial of their Kurdish identity in Turkey. While Turkey represented a geography of denial, the Kurdistan Region symbolised the existence of the Kurds. This Kurdish entity is not only important for Kurds from Iraq but also for Kurds from other parts of Kurdistan. Many of them indicated that a liberated part of Kurdistan sends hope and gives them political inspiration that they could also achieve a similar degree of autonomy and that they could break with the oppressive state structures they were exposed to.

In conclusion, the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden is a product of political and economic deprivation in the Middle East. Thanks to generous Swedish multicultural policies, Kurds can mobilise themselves and engage in homeland politics without being detached from Swedish society. Kurds in diaspora do not want to make a choice between their Kurdish and Swedish identities but instead
want to harmonise them in a symbiotic relationship. For the younger generation, this becomes central to an identity project that can only be understood in its multiplicity. The emergence of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq has enabled Kurds to come closer to their imaginary homeland, Kurdistan. So long as the Kurds are exposed to discriminatory acts in the Middle East, the Kurdish diaspora is likely to remain a politicised diaspora, and invoke a victim narrative in order to motivate transnational political mobilisation. Kurds in Sweden take a leading position in this respect, as many become more and more aware that they did not come to Sweden to fully assimilate or give up their Kurdish identity but rather to continue being Kurdish without suspending their everyday realities in the political, economic, social and cultural life of Sweden. ☐
African migrants at home in Britain: diasporas, belonging and identity

By Naluwembe Binaisa

‘Home’ is an evocative concept for African migrants and their descendants living in Britain. ‘Home’ often appears as an elusive point on the horizon, particularly in relation to the question: ‘Where are you really from?’ An innocent question, yet it is always laden, always definiational and somehow linked to place, emotions, loyalties and documents. Does it refer to country of birth, citizenship, continent of origin, to one’s parents, to a self-claimed identity? My work with communities from Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Ghana has emphasised how people tell their stories and share their lives through the twin aspects of ‘home’ and belonging. Through a range of encounters with people in public and private spaces, tracking online encounters and debates through social media, as well as through participatory photographs and video, I have been struck by both the simplicity and complexity with which participants express how Britain is and is not ‘home’. I have found that questions of ‘home’ reveal multi-faceted material, symbolic and emotional expressions of belonging. Depending on context, place of discussion or subject you can hear and see multiple answers from a single respondent. This is not a question of confusion, tactical positioning or memory loss; rather, it reflects the complex historical linkages between Africa and Europe. In the words of the 1980s anti-racism slogan: ‘We are over here because you were over there.’

Africa has long stood in the European social imaginary as its double, its reference for all that is ‘other’ and different. Over time Africa and her diasporas have scattered across the globe and Britain has remained a primary destination for migrants. This historical dimension is an
important factor within everyday practices of what it is to make home in Britain. The movement of African communities stretches back to the earliest encounters, dominated by the slave trade, where the flow of migrants began in ports along the coast of West Africa, such as Elmina Castle in Ghana. Subsequently the long road to Britain has been taken by students, migrants, asylum seekers and spouses, creating visible and invisible diasporas of exploitation, conflict and exile, as well as communities of settlement. Diaspora networks reflect historical transnational connections of language, religion and service. These are captured in stories about the Mothers’ Union, university alumni, the Scout movement and faith organisations with congregations spanning Africa and Britain. These strong links echoing the colonial episode are increasingly layered by new flows of migrants from outside former colonies. Not all Africans or their descendants maintain networks of affinity or identity with the countries of their birth or descent. Others claim alternative primary identities, and this is particularly the case in London, a global city in which the identifier ‘Londoner’ blurs the local with the national. Many Ugandans, Ghanaians and Congolese view being a Londoner as synonymous with making home visible in Britain. Certain areas of the city attain an association with different groups: Ugandans in Forest Gate; Ghanaians in Tottenham; Congolese in Newham. Others embrace the alternative invisibility and sense of belonging that being a Londoner offers.

Diaspora as practice or identity can be claimed, co-opted or prescribed, and it offers access to both the singularity and the multiplicity of ‘home’. The space that Britain provides in terms of civil liberties engenders flexibility and opportunities for individuals to move across multiple registers of identity, yet still feel at home. Paradoxically, it can simultaneously erase identities through personal choice or the pressures of racism. This is particularly true for long-standing resident communities such as those from Uganda and Ghana, with diverse composition including naturalised citizens, students, economic migrants, refugees, children, reunified families as well as second and third generations born in Britain. This last group in particular neither hold the trauma and memory of refugee flight, nor do they know the poverty of limited opportunities that motivates the search for a better life. Instead the testimonies of these young
people, like that of Abwoli below, reflect an experience whereby her identity as British, is eroded through everyday and institutional racism that remind her that she will never be accepted as British without a qualifier. She now insists on using her Ugandan name instead of Mary, her English name: ‘I always [her emphasis] say that I am Ugandan although I carry a British passport. Who you are on the inside is never dictated by what passport you carry.’ She is British-born and a successful 29-year-old professional. I asked her why she and many in her generation held this view, to which she answered ‘racism’. An injustice that few first-generation Africans claim, perhaps reflecting their dream that Britain will never be a permanent home and that one day they will return to Africa.

Everyday practices of making home in Britain also reflect access to resources and documentation. Those who are asylum seekers or undocumented migrants have limited access to home-making practices. In these three communities practices of making home revolve around ethnic identity but also around national identity, captured in country of origin and country of birth, as well as – for some – the continental identity, African. Diaspora identifications are captured in efforts to support development, political projects, sending remittances or sustaining culture through the arts. Yet making home in Britain also allows opportunities to extend social networks beyond ethnic identity. Examples include volunteering and befriending elderly people, providing neighbourhood advice clinics for women, men or youth across ethnic boundaries. Perhaps the length of time in Britain, the diversity of migration trajectory and historical ties also matter. For a newer community like the Congolese, the majority of whom came as asylum seekers, the immediacy of the DRC’s economic and political crisis is at the forefront of their lives. Many regard themselves as a minority within a minority, coming from a French-speaking African country that was not a former colony of Britain. Few are naturalised citizens or born in Britain and resentment towards racism is far more muted amongst the youth. They instead focus their diaspora mobilisation efforts on countering the negative image of the DRC, with Eastern Congo being infamously branded ‘the rape capital of the World’ by a United Nations official, as well as seeking political change and the possibility of return.
Diaspora orientation does not weaken the permanent nature of home in Britain. For Abwoli, after several trips ‘home’ to Uganda she returned ‘home’ to Britain. She felt frustrated by narrower identity positions where she is considered a *Muzungu* (Kiswahili for white person) because of her country of birth, her accent, her mannerisms and outlook on life. This complicates a picture where on the one hand many first-generation Africans ignore racism, blaming it on ‘bad manners’ or ‘poor upbringing’, and on the other hand the African values they strive to transmit to their children are not sufficient to ensure acceptance in the ancestral homeland. As the scholar Avtar Brah asks: ‘When does a location become home? What is the difference between “feeling at home” and staking claim to a place as one’s own?’ (Brah 1996). This disconnection between parents’ projected aspirations and the second generation’s reactions and experiences, illustrates two contrasting dynamics that sustain diasporas. On the one hand, inclusion and a sense of belonging, on the other exclusion and the search for belonging. These are not mutually exclusive, as Africans and their descendants making home in Britain realise. The sense of grievance that descendants express about racism in some respects reflects the depth of the stake they hold in Britain, which they claim as their home. □
Dimensions and dynamics of the Gambian diaspora in the digital age

By Sylvia Chant

The tiny West African nation of The Gambia allegedly possesses a diasporic population of approximately 70,000. This represents around 4 per cent of the national total, making The Gambia’s net migration rate (migrants per 1,000 people) the tenth highest in Africa (Kebbeh 2013).

Movement out of The Gambia has a history which stretches back centuries, not least on account of the Slave Trade (Kebbeh 2013). Nowadays, however, flows are more diverse and of differing durations. Over and above short-term (including daily) cross-border transit between The Gambia and Senegal, there are longer-distance and longer-term sojourns. Many international migrants go to other Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) such as Nigeria, while others move to North African countries which often serve as stepping stones to ‘Babylon’, a colloquial term referring to the world’s ‘advanced economies’. Yet as many North African countries have become far less manageable staging posts in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, journeys by sea have become much more precarious. Going the so-called ‘back way’ is riskier than ever. If rafts and fishing boats overloaded with people are not apprehended and returned by fleets patrolling the eastern Atlantic, then there are strong chances that deception, dispossession and/or death by drowning becomes the fate of aspirant voyagers at later stages of their journey, as evidenced so starkly by the huge number of fatalities incurred in Mediterranean crossings from Libya to Lampedusa in the first few months of 2015.

The most uncertain and dangerous routes of migration to Europe, and especially to the eventual most aspired-to destinations of Spain and the UK, are often undertaken by young men, who, facing few
opportunities for employment in The Gambia itself, put life, limb, and savings on the line in order to explore ‘greener pastures’ abroad (Jones and Chant 2009). As with many international economic migrants across the globe, the particular appeal of ‘Babylon’ owes to the lure of better education and employment, more lucrative earnings, and the opportunity to support immediate and extended family back home.

In many ways this has become easier in the ‘digital age’, through mobile phones, internet facilities and rapid financial transfers. According to World Bank data, overseas remittances amount to nearly 10 per cent of GDP and render The Gambia one of the topmost recipients in Africa (cited in Figure 3 in Kebbeh 2013). This complements other forms of diasporic assistance such as the shipping of containers packed with second-hand goods for recycling and resale. While international migration entails sacrifice and hardship for those who leave, as well as for those left behind, many forms of diasporic support and connectedness, enhanced by the ICT revolution, go some way to alleviate the burden, as well as playing a part in transforming The Gambia’s social and economic dynamics.

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Passengers leaving the Banjul–Barra ferry crossing over the River Gambia, from where many proceed by bus and taxi through the North Bank Region into Senegal. Senegal encircles The Gambia, with which it was briefly united in the Senegambia Confederation during the 1980s. ©Sylvia Chant
Can love be transferred? A Western Union bureau at Serrekunda assures its clients that this is so. Another Western Union billboard asks if you are ‘Far from your family?’, and promises that the company will guarantee that ‘you can always count on them’. Western Union is one of a large and growing number of foreign exchange bureaux and banks offering the rapid transfer of remittances to The Gambia. ©Sylvia Chant
Banks and foreign exchange bureaux go to the greatest lengths to incentivise remittance flows during Ramadan, the end of Ramadan (Tobaski), and the Islamic new year (Eid) when the majority Muslim population in The Gambia fall under the most intense economic pressure of their annual calendar. Prizes or free gifts include bags of sugar or rice, phone credit, or entry into draws for winning a ram, the ritual sacrificial Eid feast. ©Sylvia Chant
Banks in The Gambia are increasingly offering ‘diaspora accounts’ to overseas workers, which, in further reducing transaction costs, ensures more income flows back to The Gambia. ©Sylvia Chant
The rising use of mobile telephony in The Gambia, including smartphones, which frequently find their way into the country in the hand luggage of diasporic friends, relatives and lovers, has given rise to the proliferation of small-scale roadside businesses offering credit for an ever-increasing suite of mobile providers who rely heavily on informal operators to distribute their services. ©Sylvia Chant
Comium advertises its increasingly global roaming facilities. On another of its billboards it claims to have the lowest tariffs for international calls. As more mobile providers enter into competition with one another, prices drop, and diasporic communications are better assured. ©Sylvia Chant
Never out of touch. The owner of a small neighbourhood ‘Naar’ shop (grocery store), connects to the world on Facebook during a brief lull in customer traffic. The increased power of Gambian citizens to readily access global social media has been especially marked since the installation of the ACE (African Coast to Europe) submarine cable in December 2012. ©Sylvia Chant
The tendency for ‘one-way’ traffic of phones and other goods exported from the diaspora back home – such as second-hand clothes, bicycles, furniture, computing equipment and household effects – finds notable expression in the huge number of containers which end up becoming permanent features of the urban (and rural) landscape of The Gambia. Here a container has been converted to a depot for the sale of beer and soft drinks, on which global brand Coca-Cola finds another opportunity for advertising. ©Sylvia Chant
Container real estate, Fajara. The often unaffordable cost of sending containers back to Europe or North America, can, in their own way, make profits in The Gambia, with the marketing of vessels divested of the merchandise with which they came offering potential conversion into commercial outlets, and sometimes an extension to dwellings. ©Sylvia Chant
Mural of love: heartfelt ‘welcome home’ to a returning migrant displayed graffiti-style on a wall in Kanifing. The economic benefits of international migration must always be weighed up against the emotional sacrifices made by those who go and those who stay – lovers, spouses, relatives, friends – who are often separated for years. The excitement of receiving long-term returnees is such that Gambians will go to the country’s international airport at Yundum hours in advance to meet them, and also let their feelings be known in public places. ©Sylvia Chant
Ambitious cultural polyglots: Kenyan Pentecostals in London

By Leslie Fesenmyer

The lives of migrant Kenyans in London highlight the importance of religion, in their case Pentecostal Christianity, in social identifications and formations. Though religions have not been thought to constitute diasporas because they span more than one ethnic group and do not generally try to return to or create a homeland (Cohen 2008), Vasquez suggests that there are interesting similarities between religion and diaspora (Vasquez 2010). The case of Kenyan Pentecostals encourages us to think anew about their inter-relationship.

Having arrived in London during the 1990s to find no established community to welcome them, migrant Kenyans have since developed social relations rooted in their religious affiliations. They were at least nominal Christians in Kenya, primarily raised in the mainline denominations of their parents, such as Presbyterianism, Anglicanism, and Catholicism. In the years following their migration, however, many converted to Pentecostalism or re-dedicated themselves to God. Kenyan pastors have founded numerous churches in London and elsewhere in the UK, and churches play a central role in members’ spiritual and social lives. Each week, churches hold Sunday services, often three hours long, mid-week services, prayer meetings, bible study, and other activities, such as choir practice, cell and fellowship meetings, and youth events.

Kenyan Pentecostals make sense of their experiences through their religion. Though they said they migrated to ‘work’ or ‘study’, they have recast their migration in religious terms – they seek to ‘bring the UK back into the Kingdom of God’. This rationale can be understood in part as a response to their social, economic, and
Belonging: imagining and remaking home

religious marginalisation in the UK. For example, a major issue their churches in London face is locating affordable, reliably available, and accessible spaces, which can accommodate their growing numbers. In the London borough of Newham, with its tremendous religious diversity, different religious groups compete to transform old cinemas, warehouses, shop fronts, and other non-traditional spaces into churches, mosques, temples, and gurdwaras. In Barking and Dagenham, a borough on the far eastern edge of London, churches face competition from businesses for mid-sized spaces, as well as resistance from the council, which wants to attract industry and thus jobs for local residents. In both boroughs, Kenyan Pentecostals turn to religion to make sense of why their efforts to 'plant' a church have been thwarted. Questions arise about favouritism toward non-Christian groups, and about the workings of the devil in frustrating their efforts to realise the will of God.

Yet, importantly, claiming to be religious missionaries to the UK also speaks to the evangelising mission of Pentecostalism and thus cannot be seen as solely or even primarily reactive. Kenyan Pentecostals heed the biblical injunction 'to go and make disciples of all nations' (Matthew 28: 16–20). In asserting their identity as Pentecostal Christians, they make a claim to a global religious identity and membership of a global religious community. Although one ethnic group – Kikuyu – predominates in many congregations, members are quick to distinguish between 'culture' and 'religion'. With cosmopolitan aspirations, members come together as brothers and sisters in Christ. As one pastor remarked to me during a youth weekend at the church, ‘we do not want to raise our children to be Kenyans, Africans, or Kikuyus; instead, our ambition is for them to be able to succeed anywhere in the world.’

Kenyan Pentecostals conceptualise 'home' in radically de-territorialised terms – the Kingdom of God, rather than their place of origin, is their 'ultimate' home. Just as diasporas are oriented toward their homeland and their own eventual return, Kenyan Pentecostals aim to live their lives in ways which ensure they will be delivered to God. Their moral values and ideals – marriage, family, fidelity, and notions of gender complementarity – contribute to the creation of an emotionally significant community of belonging. This sense of
belonging is in part also constructed through practices of exclusion. They make a point, for example, of abstaining from alcohol, shunning British pub culture, and looking down on sexual promiscuity, all of which are seen as reflections of British ‘immorality’.

In addition to conducting services in English, they speak in tongues, known as *glossolalia*. The ability to do so is considered a gift from the Holy Spirit, which distinguishes Pentecostals from the rest of the Protestant world. This so-called universal language allows them to communicate directly with God in ways unmediated even by language. Their transnational ties are increasingly religious ones. While the churches in London are largely independent and were founded in the diaspora, pastors, lay leaders, and church members participate in transnational Pentecostal networks of churches and ministries. They travel to Kenya, the United States, and elsewhere in Europe to preach and fellowship. The community of which they are a part encompasses Pentecostal Christians around the world, who they see as kin related through the shared experience of becoming born again and through the blood of Jesus. In such ways Kenyan Pentecostals strive to be polyglots, able to traverse and transcend cultural, social, and linguistic boundaries.

Their religiosity helps to locate them in London, to link them to other Christians near and far, and to deliver them to God. In Tweed’s terms, it is locative (religion engages with the territorial location where believers live and contributes to the re-making of home locally), translocative (religion facilitates the creation of links across space where co-religionists live), and supralocative (religion transcends homeland and host land) (Tweed 1997). Conceptualising it in this way allows us to move away from categorising a religion as ‘ethnic’ or ‘universal’, and asking if it constitutes a diaspora, to focusing on how religion can help to reinforce and transcend place- and ethnic-based identities. Pentecostalism therefore helps Kenyan migrants maintain a consistent moral identity while navigating within, across, and between local, transnational, and global scales.
Dreaming of the mountain, longing for the sea, living with floating roots: diasporic ‘return’ migration in post-Soviet Armenia

By Nanor Karageozian

Oscillating sense of belonging
For 50-year-old Sanan, an ethnic Armenian born and raised in Lebanon, living in Armenia was ‘a dream’ since she was a teenager. She realised her aspiration in 1997. I interviewed her in March 2013 in her Yerevan apartment as part of my DPhil fieldwork on diasporic ‘return’ migration. Her voice was filled with immense euphoria as she described how, 16 years after having settled in this landlocked country, she still reveled every morning in the view of Mount Ararat from her living room window. At the same time, Sanan missed the sea, reminiscing about the Mediterranean coast where she had grown up. ‘When Ararat is covered by fog, I sometimes feel the sea is behind it’, she explained – an optical illusion of which she was fully aware.

My thesis examines the self-initiated immigration to, and long-term settlement in, post-Soviet Armenia by Armenian diasporans, mostly from well-established Armenian communities in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Canada and the US. I observed ambivalent emotions like Sanan’s among many other ‘returnees’. This oscillating sense of belonging, is one of the significant patterns that returnees adopt to (re-)assess and/or (re)define their identities and sense of belonging in Armenia. In this pattern, both the returnees’ new environment and the old one feel like home in one way or another – sometimes concurrently and at other times interchangeably. After having lived in Armenia for over 12 years, Ishkhan, another returnee from Lebanon, said he identified himself with both hayastantsis (Armenians from Armenia) and diasporan Armenians. ‘But I don’t feel I understand any of them 100 per cent…
I'm actually in the middle,' he added.

Such an ambivalent experience resembles that of second-generation American- and German-Greek returnees to Greece, for whom return seems ‘to hover uncertainly between the closure of a definitive return “home” on the one hand, and an expression of ongoing transnational identity on the other’ (King and Christou 2010). For some of my research participants, this ambivalence is an unexpected, and even discomforting, experience. While living in the diaspora as Armenians, they had often felt as strangers in a non-Armenian majority environment. By leaving their physical diasporic existence behind, they expected to find an anchor in Armenia, a place where they could feel they fully belonged. Experiencing a sense of alienation again, this time in the homeland, is thus unanticipated. This time, the feeling of being ‘others’ or *odars* (strangers) is in the form of a contrast to or differentiation from ‘local’ Armenians. At the same time, however, a certain level of disconnect from the Armenian diaspora is also manifested among many returnees.

Staying in Yerevan for fieldwork brought me face-to-face with some of these ambivalent feelings not only among my research participants but also within me. As a diasporan Armenian myself – born in Lebanon, raised in Greece, and currently living in Lebanon again – I became to a certain extent a ‘returnee’ myself, albeit temporarily. On the one hand, I was a resident of Yerevan who did not completely understand and was even somehow critical of the diasporan tourists who complained about dirty building entrances or the perceived unfriendly treatment of local restaurant waiters. On the other hand, I was sometimes the romantic diasporan who was trying almost daily to gaze at Mount Ararat from the window of my rented apartment – like Sanan and others – admiring its daunting beauty and sending its photographs to family and friends ‘back home’. While in Armenia, I often felt an inexplicable sense of comfort, also described by several of my participants. However, a feeling of foreignness was also sometimes present, when hearing, for example, my otherwise very hospitable neighbour say that the Armenian spelling I use is ‘wrong’.6

A more complex identity
For other returnees, identity and belonging demonstrate a more
multifarious and looser pattern than the duality felt by Sanan and others like her. Following a pattern of belonging that I call cosmopolitan floating, such returnees feel that home is everywhere. They embrace a cosmopolitan or globalised identity, of which Armenianness however remains a quite important part. Members of this relatively smaller group have some sort of emotional or subjective attachment both to Armenia, as a country which is an essential
element of their heritage, and to their pre-return society, as a key part of their upbringing and past. Nevertheless, they have neither a strong feeling of anchoring or grounding toward a specific place nor a sense of identity with a particular ‘group’. They argue they feel comfortable living anywhere, building a home wherever they want or choose to, and changing homes, if and when needed or desired, without facing many major difficulties. Thus, they usually view positively the ability to straddle two or multiple cultural worlds and identities; rootlessness is celebrated.

This fluid and multi-local conception of home and homeland abounds especially among younger returnees who hail from culturally diverse societies in North America. It is in line with the ‘hybrid identity’ of diasporan Armenians from Western communities that Panossian describes. Such diasporans ‘can have more than one “homeland” which can alternate between, or simultaneously be, the host-land, the current home-land, the ancestral-land, or the diaspora condition itself as home-land’ (Panossian 2005). This trend is also related to the ‘Armenian diaspora’s shift from exilic nationalism to diasporic transnationalism’ (Tölołyan 2000).

Zaven (31) and his wife Armik (29), born in California and Toronto, respectively, aptly illustrate this pattern. Before moving to Armenia, they had studied and lived in several North American and European cities. Their parents also came from different backgrounds; they had immigrated independently to North America from Syria, Lebanon and Iran in the 1960s–1970s. Zaven feels ‘comfortable’ wherever he goes. ‘That’s one of the things that as a diasporan you get used to: not really having a home, and then everywhere is your home’, he told me. His wife shared the same view, elaborating it as follows:

*Diasporan identity is [often] seen as a negative thing, where you don’t quite belong here or there, and you’re kind of in between. But in my experience, it has always been a positive thing. I have this sense of movement in me and of not feeling attached to a specific place. That’s sort of engraved [in me].*

Traces of diverse cultures amorphously appear in the daily lives and interactions of such returnees. For instance, while many of them are
comfortable communicating primarily in English, their language often includes an amalgamation of Western and Eastern Armenian, as well as other foreign words (such as from Arabic and Russian). Their outlook on the future is also quite flexible. Some know that their sojourn in Armenia is only temporary. Others remain undecided – a situation that they do not regard as too unsettling. Although many of them are eager to raise children in Armenia, they usually make concerted efforts to ‘keep them open to the world’. They take them on frequent trips, and some even encourage their education abroad, perhaps to return to Armenia later. How will the identities of these and other returnees develop over time, whether they stay in Armenia or not? This, and what the future holds for the second generation, are topics for further research.

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Diaspora youth and British young men of colour

By Linda McDowell, Esther Rootham and Abby Hardgrove

In post-recession Britain, youth unemployment remains stubbornly high. In 2013, for example, one in five people aged between 16 and 24 were not in employment, education or training (compared with an eight per cent rate overall) and young men were more likely to be unemployed than young women (23.4 per cent compared with 18.4 per cent). Young men of colour, British-born and recent migrants, are particularly disadvantaged in the search for a job in a labour market where casual and precarious unemployment is increasingly common.

We interviewed 80 young men in Luton and Swindon about their search for work, to assess the significance of connections within diasporic communities and between second and third generations of in-migrants to the UK. There is evidence that members of minority communities, especially those with few workplace credentials, often find work through personal contacts within their own group.

In both towns, many men we talked to were of South Asian heritage, from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, there were significant differences between them: in Luton the men were members of long-established communities, with fathers or grandfathers who had migrated to the UK from the 1970s onwards, attracted by jobs in the then expanding car industry. In Swindon, there was a group of young men of Goan origin who had moved to the UK within the last ten years and who had few existing contacts in the town. For both groups, the history of migration was not straightforward. In Luton, early migrants typically were from East Africa, as the Africanisation policies of newly independent states reduced their prospects. In Swindon, the imperial heritage of Goa, a Portuguese colony until 1975,
led to a different pattern, as the fathers of the men we interviewed moved variously to Angola, Macau and Mozambique or to Portugal. The men in Luton had long-established networks of contacts to draw on. Luton is one of the most diverse towns in the UK, second only to London in terms of its black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) population, approaching 30 per cent of the total. It is also a town where racialised harassment is common, through the street protests organised by neo-fascist groups such as the English Defence League. In Swindon, the BAME population is only five per cent of the total (the national average is almost 13 per cent), and has a shorter history of settlement. The total Goan population in the UK is small and mainly concentrated in London. Goans typically are Christians and have few links with other groups of South Asian backgrounds.

**Claiming membership: British, European or ‘Asian’?**

One of the defining features of a diaspora is its constitution through a set of networks, organisations and common cultural beliefs and practices. Although inaccurately referred to as ‘Asians’ in the UK, the mainly South Asian population in Luton consists of people whose origins lie in what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh. Safran Mansoor, a journalist, is a Luton-born second generation South Asian. Here he is talking about his father’s decision to migrate in the 1970s:

*I imagine that my father arrived in Britain with a mixture of fear and hope... He was leaving the sunshine of Karachi, a wife and young family. He worked at the Vauxhall car plant.* (Mansoor 2002)

The men whom we interviewed told similar stories and, by the second decade of the new millennium, were part of a diaspora community only in the sense of their adherence to Islam and through various forms of organisation in response to racist harassment. They all identified as ‘hyphenated-British’ – British-Muslim, British-Asian, British-Bengali – representing their identity as hybrid with links to both ‘here’ and ‘there’, a homeland which most of them had never visited but learnt about through talk at home or in the mosque.

The Goan young men in Swindon, first- rather than second-generation in-migrants, maintained closer links with other Goans,
a community in the UK of perhaps 5,000 in total, represented by
the Goan Association in London to which some of the interviewees
belonged. They differentiated themselves from other British Asians,
in part because of their Christian beliefs. Jonah said: ‘People shout at
me in the street – dirty Paki, go home Muslims, things like that. But
that isn’t us’. They are also differentiated by their citizenship. Michael
said: ‘I came from Goa, but my Dad has a Portuguese passport so
Dad actually made me a Portuguese citizen... It is much better to be a
Portuguese citizen right now’.

Finding work: the importance of personal networks
One advantage conferred by diaspora membership is a set of networks
that might help in securing employment. Many young men in Luton
reported that they had found work through their fathers, other
relatives or friends of the family and their peers. As Mumtaz told us:
‘My dad’s friend, he runs a taxi business and he took me on in the
office’. Mohammed said: ‘My friend works… one of my other friends...
they work in a warehouse and he said he’ll try and get me in’. Another
man explained: ‘My dad, he works for the post office and he spoke up
for me when they had a job’.

In Swindon, there were fewer opportunities to draw on personal
contacts and youths turned to employment agencies to find work.
James told us: ‘I apply for jobs online. All the agencies are online so
you have to register with them and then they see a particular job for
you, then they put you in for that’. Philip, who moved to Swindon
in 2010, told us: ‘When I got here it was the complete opposite of
what I’d heard – no admin work, no vacancies at all. I work through
an agency for a warehouse company’. As he explained, diasporic
networks were important in Swindon, but among Poles:

The team leaders are all Polish – it is done through personal networks so
I have no chance. I think Goans face rejection when applying for work
but we don’t raise our voices to complain. This is not a proper system to
make people work well.

Only one man had been able to use community networks to earn
a living. Laurence ran a successful small business, taking photos at
social events organised by the small Goan community in Swindon.

**What sort of jobs? Feminised service sector employment**

In Luton and Swindon, well-paid ‘male’ jobs, including in the car industry, are declining, replaced by jobs in the fast food industry, in hospitality, and in the retail clothing trade, for example, in which customer relations and a deferential performance are important. Men, and especially minority men, are often disadvantaged in these forms of employment. They chafe at regulation and restrictions. Momtaz in Luton: ‘I like to be physical, I hate being inside, in one place’.

Men not born in the UK find their style, their voice, their lack of familiarity with conventional assumptions about acceptable social relations disadvantages them in their search for work. Here is Michael in Swindon: ‘I could speak English properly but I obviously had an Indian accent and found it very hard to understand what people were saying’. James, failing a customer relations test in a fast food outlet – ‘I told them I’ll be nice. I’ll be good to the person’ – managed to hit the wrong tone through a lack of familiarity with the fine line between service and servility.

For all the men we interviewed, finding work was a central concern. In 2013, they were determined and resilient, countering media images of disaffected youth. Their community involvement was a source of strength, especially in Luton, but all mentioned racialised harassment by ‘locals’. In 2015, post-*Charlie Hebdo*, for young men of ‘Asian’ appearance, whether Muslim or not, the climate is now even more austere and their search for work more difficult.
Associational profusion and multiple belonging: diaspora Nepalis in the UK

By David N. Gellner

Oak Farm Community School in Farnborough is booked out every Saturday for months ahead, especially in summer. The same goes for other popular venues like Tamu Dhee house (a former church hall in Mytchett, bought for £0.5 million and refurbished) or the Cumberland Road Community Centre in Reading. Leading figures in the Nepali community sit on the executive committee or act as advisors to a dozen associations or more; on Saturdays and Sundays they rush from one meeting to another.

There are, so far as we could establish, very few non-joiners. Almost every Nepali in the UK belongs to or attends the public events of at least some organisation or other. In an astonishingly short time – given that they only began to arrive in the UK as civilians in any number from 2004 – Nepalis have created over 400 organisations that exist in a state of continual movement and demonstrate impressive fundraising abilities.

There are religious organisations (Hindu, Buddhist, Kirant, Bon, and Christian). There are ethnic organisations (Gurung/Tamu, Magar, Tamang, Sherpa, Newar, Chhetri, Thakali, Limbu, Rai), with both central committees and branches in different parts of the UK. There are organisations based on a specific district, Village Development Committee (VDC), or cluster of villages back in Nepal. There are organisations based on a particular locality in the UK (Burnt Oak Nepali Community Organisation, Greater Rushmoor Nepali Community, etc.). There are associations (known as ‘numberi’ or ‘intake’) that bring together groups of Gurkha soldiers who were recruited and went through their basic training at the same
time. There are several competing ex-Gurkha associations, which campaign for Gurkha rights and support Gurkha welfare activities. There are literary, musical, sports, and youth-based associations. There are professional organisations (for doctors, nurses, caterers, engineers, businessmen, and media professionals). There are political associations (both linked to political parties in Nepal and issue-based). Attempting to unite all Nepalis there are various pan-Nepali organisations and charities (usually aiming at providing support for development work or education in Nepal). The UK branch of the Non-Resident Nepali Association aspires to speak for all Nepalis and to incorporate them into a global movement that can negotiate with the government of Nepal, particularly on the issue of dual nationality.

Most of these organisations hold at least a summer barbecue and an annual festival or general meeting. Many come together at the annual Nepali Mela (fair), organised by the Tamu Dhee UK, held in recent years at Kempton Race Course, where the numbers, activities, and sheer ebullience of the various parts of the Nepali community in the UK are displayed and performed for each other and for a wider UK audience (and then uploaded to Youtube).

The 2011 census recorded 60,202 Nepalis in England and Wales. After a detailed sample survey, the Centre for Nepal Studies UK estimated in 2008 that there were 72,173 Nepalis in the UK as a whole, the vast majority living in South East England. Community estimates, often repeated in the press, have ranged between 30,000 and 150,000. But regardless of numbers, for a newly arrived community there is an astonishing level of activity.

One of the little-known facts revealed by the BBC following the 2011 census was that Rushmoor (which includes Aldershot) – not a place one would immediately have associated with Buddhism – has the highest proportion of Buddhists in the UK, at 3.3 per cent. It is appropriate then that the Buddhist Community Centre UK, which brings together Nepali Mahayana Buddhists and others, bought a disused telecom building in Aldershot and have remade it as a Tibetan Buddhist monastery (gompa) and community centre. The campaign for a centre included a visit by the Dalai Lama in 2012, when Aldershot Town Football Club was filled to capacity to welcome him.

It would be misleading to suggest that everything is rosy and
friction-free in this communitarian garden. The desire for recognition sometimes leads to fierce competition in elections. Conflict cannot always be managed through the politics of consensus; the losing side, alleging malpractice, may secede and set up a rival organisation. Sometimes organisations that are claimed as ‘branches’ behave with what the ‘centre’ believes is insufficient deference. Accusations of embezzlement are commonplace, probably far more common than actual embezzlement itself. What remains truly impressive is the sheer number of people devoting their time and energy for communal ends without any financial reward.

The UK Nepali population is unusual when compared to other Nepali diaspora communities around the world in that it is dominated by the Gurkha connection. About two thirds of UK Nepalis are either ex-Gurkhas themselves or related to an ex-Gurkha. This means that those ethnic groups who were historically favoured for recruitment into the British Gurkha regiments (Magar, Gurung, Rai, Limbu) are present in the UK in much greater proportions than elsewhere or in Nepal. Gurungs (also known as Tamu) are only 1.9 per cent of Nepal’s population, but are the biggest group in the UK with approximately 22 per cent. Limbus are 1.4 per cent in Nepal but 9.6 per cent in the UK. This gives a different flavour to politics; and in particular it changes the religious complexion of the community, because many Gurungs identify as Buddhist or as both Hindu and Buddhist. Thus, the overwhelming dominance of Hinduism characteristic of Nepal itself does not hold in the UK’s Nepali diaspora.

Even though Nepal is no longer the world’s only officially Hindu kingdom and declares itself a secular federal republic (at the time of writing a new constitution, under discussion since 2008, is yet to be agreed), nonetheless 81 per cent of the population is recorded as Hindu. This falls to 40–64 per cent in the UK, depending on whether or not multiple religious attachment is included. Just as many Nepalis are very happy to belong to multiple Nepali organisations, so many are also quite comfortable with practising several religious traditions at once.

Dr Chandra Laksamba, ex-Gurkha and Limbu by background, gave the following explanation in a video that was shown as part of an exhibition on the Nepali diaspora in Surrey Heath Museum in 2012:
Members of the Limbu ethnic group, from far eastern Nepal, who are followers of the Satyahangma religious tradition, perform a Mangseva ritual in Coates Park, Swindon, 26 May 2012. ©David Gellner

Members of the Rai ethnic group, originally from eastern Nepal, dance as part of the Sakela festival (also known as Ubhauti), held in the grounds of Connaught School, Aldershot, 21 May 2011. ©David Gellner
Nepalese people do not strongly stick with one religion, they are always with at least two or three. I do believe and practise in three religions: Hindu; I go to the Pashupati temple in Kathmandu, a very famous Hindu temple, when I go to Nepal. I go to Swayambhu, and the birthplace of Lord Buddha, that is the Buddhist religion. And I do practise my Kirat religion. Even though I practise Hinduism and Buddhism in my day-to-day life, I have a small puja place [shrine] in my house. I have Hindu and Buddhist statues. On top of that, at the time of birth and death, death rituals mainly, when you do wedding ceremony or naming ceremony, we have to follow Kirat religion. Especially when we die, death ritual is based on Kirat religion. We don’t use Hindu priests or Buddhist lamas. I practise, directly or indirectly, three religions. But we are not very hardcore fundamentalist type of thing. When I was in the army I used to go to church. We do celebrate Christmas as well, we Gorkhas [sic] celebrate all (laughs).

As this quotation, and the above discussion, both show, talk of a ‘Nepalese community’, with the implication that such a thing is either internally homogeneous or simple (whether considered from the point of view of ethnicity, religion, ritual, or anything else), is seriously misleading.
A diaspora-for-others: Hadramis in the world

By Iain Walker

The south coast of the Arabian peninsula is a distant, inaccessible place, the stuff of legends. The Queen of Sheba, frankincense and myrrh, the lost city of Iram, Ali Baba and Sinbad the Sailor: myth and fact intertwine in a harsh land caught between the sands of the Rub’ al Khali and the waters of the Indian Ocean. Much of this region is part of Hadramawt, an ancient land that claims a mention in the Book of Genesis (10:26); others say that Hadramawt means ‘land of death’. Certainly, until ‘pacified’ (principally by the RAF) in the early twentieth century, the largely justified reputation enjoyed by the warring local tribes meant that few Westerners visited, and even those who arrived in one of the coastal ports had great difficulty penetrating the wadi, the long, fertile, canyon-like valley almost 200 kilometres from the coast across harsh terrain, but where the bulk of the population lives.

Yet despite this reputation for isolation and wariness, the people of Hadramawt – Hadramis – can be found all over the Indian Ocean, and beyond; and they are not simply found in small numbers and in isolated pockets: there are substantial and influential communities of Hadrami origin from Timor to the Comoro Islands, from Jeddah to Hyderabad. The Raja of Perlis and the Sultan of Brunei both trace their ancestry back to Hadramawt. The second wealthiest African, Mohammed Hussein Ali Al Amoudi, is an Ethiopian of Hadrami descent. The Bin Ladin and Bin Mahfouz families of Saudi Arabia are of Hadrami origin, as are religious leaders on all shores of the ocean. Hadramis themselves (with a touch of hyperbole) will tell you that they number 50 million in Indonesia.

The reasons for the geographical spread of Hadramis on the shores
of the Indian Ocean are fairly prosaic: although productive when the rains were generous, the homeland often suffered long periods of drought. Famine and disease were frequent and emigration often the only alternative to death. Ships frequenting the Hadrami ports of Mukalla and Shihr were ready to carry passengers as far as their coins would take them: a dollar to Mombasa, a few more to Surabaya. A long history of emigration meant that a Hadrami arriving in almost any port on the Indian Ocean littoral could find a compatriot ready to assist. Some of these compatriots were kin – where possible emigrants headed for places where they knew that others of the same tribe had gone before them; but others disembarked almost at random. ‘Are there any Hadramis here?’ was the only real question upon arriving in a port; the answer was generally yes.

Kin or not, the newcomer could usually place the locally resident Hadramis in their social ‘map’ of the homeland and its relationships, and thereby establish their own relationships with the individuals in question almost before meeting them. The hierarchical structure of social systems in Hadramawt combined with the segmentary character of tribal affiliations meant that the relationship between newcomer and resident was already established: a masakin meeting a sayyid. Respect would be required in one direction and an obligation to protect and assist in the other. Two members of the Al Attas tribe? They will be able to map out a reasonably close relationship. A Bin Mafouz meets a Basweid? They are both Kindah tribes. What is notable about the relationships between Hadramis is that the strength of social structures in the homeland are carried into and underpin relationships in the diaspora, and they are enduring. There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, of how one of the wealthiest men in East Africa, a Hadrami of masakin origin, came across an impoverished sayyid sitting in the street in Zanzibar. The sayyid commented on the man’s success and how he had risen in the world; the millionaire replied: yes, but I still have to kiss your hand.

These pre-existing social hierarchies and networks permeate all relationships both in Hadramawt and outside the homeland. That this is so has become particularly noticeable with the growth of the virtual world. If I come across another Walker as I trawl the internet, I barely give our common family names a second thought. If a Tamimi comes
across another Tamimi they will immediately recognise a pre-existing relationship and may well develop it further; if a Hadrami comes across another Hadrami and their relationship is not immediately obvious then some genealogical and geographical exploration will soon reveal one. This sort of thing, so my informants tell me, is increasingly common on social media and now allows Hadramis in (for example) Abu Dhabi to establish or renew links with kin in Indonesia, and so on.

However, these Hadramis in diaspora also discover and/or maintain links with Hadramis in the homeland. Genealogies are retained in exile and the names of ancestral villages passed from generation to generation. Emigrants who sailed away came back to visit wives and families left behind. Others discover their ‘roots’ on Facebook and decide to visit their grandfathers’ villages. Many of these returnees bring influences – some of which are incorporated, others resisted – and money, which is rarely refused. The fact of these relationships maintains a very real awareness of the diaspora in the homeland and the desire to maintain the engagement of members of the diaspora in the affairs of the homeland is strong, even at the risk of undesirable foreign cultural practices – young men wearing jeans instead of the customary wraparound *futa*, for example. As a result the home society and the diaspora are bound into a single global Hadrami ecumene.

In 1998, Nick Van Hear (‘paraphrasing Marx’) distinguished between the ‘dormant, latent or avoided’ diaspora that exists ‘in itself’; and the diaspora that is ‘actively maintained and [in which] migrants actively engage’, that exists ‘for itself’ (Van Hear 1998: 250). This is a useful distinction, but in the light of the phenomenal growth in diasporic activities – and in the number of diasporas – over the almost two decades since those words were written, I suggest there is call for a further distinction. While the characteristics described above – the maintenance of homeland social structures outside the homeland, the rights and responsibilities accorded or imposed by these structures, the social cohesion not only maintained but reinforced by these relationships through time and space – all accord the Hadrami diaspora the status of a diaspora ‘for itself’, these characteristics are shared by an increasing number of diasporas.

Such diasporas are often localised – the Moroccan diaspora
in Belgium, the Mexican diaspora in the United States – and the relationships that they maintain are usually bilateral links with the homeland. Few diasporas exhibit the sort of transnational cohesiveness that the Hadrami diaspora exhibits. Not only do different localisations of the Hadrami diaspora maintain relationships with the homeland, they also maintain relationships with one another. This accords the Hadrami diaspora a dimension that is both global and reticulate.

As noted above, members of the Hadrami diaspora are generally, if to varying degrees, aware of their relationships with one another, throughout the Indian Ocean and, increasingly, the rest of the world. While relationships in the homeland frame those in diaspora, acts in diaspora may affect relationships not only with the homeland but between groups in different locations in diaspora. The two groups – and here the diaspora is the collective community in a variety of places outside the homeland – are inextricably bound. Van Hear’s definition of a diaspora ‘for itself’ as one ‘where diasporas are actively maintained and where migrants actively engaged in them’ (loc. cit.) neatly distinguishes these diasporas from what might be also called passive or latent diasporas; but within the category of the diaspora ‘for itself’ there are diasporas that are more deeply networked across a transnational diasporic space, actively engaging their members wherever they may be; following Van Hear, therefore (and paraphrasing Sartre (1957), perhaps), I suggest that a further distinction is required, that of the diaspora ‘for others’.

The distinction is important, since while the ‘diaspora for itself’ requires a socially cohesive homeland which provides the underpinnings for a reproduction of social relationships in diaspora which in turn feed back into the homeland, the ‘diaspora for others’ extends these interactions to intra-diasporic relationships, allowing for diasporic practice to structure relationships between different places in diaspora usually, but without necessarily, involving the homeland. These inextricably intertwined and all-pervasive relationships within and between diaspora and homeland accord the ‘diaspora for others’ – such as the Hadrami diaspora – a special quality that distinguishes them from other diasporas. The ‘diaspora for others’ is a whole, a social unit that is transnational, multi-sited and interlinked and greater than the sum of its parts.
Spaces, networks and practices
Creolization, diaspora and carnival: living with diversity in the past and present

By Olivia Sheringham

As Stuart Hall remarked in the late 1990s, ‘[t]here has been a veritable explosion in recent years around the concept of “identity”’. This identity explosion reflected responses to challenges arising from accelerated processes of globalisation, heightened levels of international mobility, and a growing awareness of possibilities for forms of solidarity and resistance that transcend nationality or class-based allegiances. The identity epidemic has been, however, fraught with contradictions. On the one hand, there has been increasing acknowledgement that fixed identities are no longer (or never were) relevant and there is a need to acknowledge the hybrid, fluid and multi-directional nature of individual and collective identities. On the other hand, the greater contact and connectivity between diverse groups has led to a re-emergence of assertions of fixed identities and delineated markers of difference.

Over the last three years I have been working with Robin Cohen on a project entitled ‘Diaspora and creolization: diverging, converging’ which is, to some degree, an intervention into the identity debate. It is an attempt to bridge the gap between contemporary discussions around – and assertions of – identity in the context of recent globalisation, and historical processes of identity formation in contexts that were always, already ‘hybrid’. We explore the relationship between the concepts of creolization – referring to processes of cultural exchange and the emergence of new languages and cultures – and diaspora in four different settings, namely Louisiana, Cape Verde, Mauritius and the French Antilles. While the research has been focused predominantly on historically ‘Creole’ societies, we have also

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explored how the concept of creolization relates to contemporary social realities. More importantly, we ask: how can we use creolization beyond its original context in ways that do not dilute its meaning and undermine its conceptual depth? And finally, how do processes of creolization and diaspora, which seemingly reflect quite opposing identity ‘trajectories’, interact with each other in different spatial and temporal contexts, sometimes diverging and sometimes converging?

Just as there are those who would argue that the term diaspora loses its vigour beyond its association with the Jewish experience or instances of forced dispersal, for some creolization can only be applied to specific historical contexts of violent encounters in the New World and, more specifically still, the Caribbean. But just as the concept of diaspora has been unmoored and taken in multiple directions in ‘semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space’ (Brubacker 2005), creolization (though less extensively than diaspora) has been taken up by others as a useful term to refer more broadly to the cross-fertilisation of different cultures as they interact (Cohen 2010). Going even further, scholars like Ulf Hannerz or Edouard Glissant have used creolization as a more universal metaphor for processes of cultural globalisation, suggesting that we live in a ‘creolizing world’ (Hannerz 1987; Glissant 1990). We suggest that creolization can be usefully applied to new contexts, but only if the differential power relations within such cultural interactions and the semantic legacy of the term are acknowledged. Keeping these power dynamics in mind, we argue that the concept of creolization gives space to the possibilities for agency, creativity and resistance.

Carnival – in its many guises – represents a fascinating illustration of the interplay between creativity and resistance, between encounters in the New World and the contemporary metropole, between creolization and diaspora. Carnival enacts the creative and resistant elements of creolization: it is a moment where cultural identities merge and transform as official culture is challenged and often explicitly critiqued. Yet carnival also often retains diasporic traces, or ‘echoes’.

Carnival on the Cape Verdean island of São Vicente, for example, stages the complex history of the archipelago and its position at a crossroads between Europe, Africa and the Americas. It harks back to conquest and colonisation by the Portuguese – originating in the
Portuguese Entrudo (or ‘entrance’) to Lent which was celebrated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It also exposes practices of resistance and creativity conceived by African slaves in the exploitative and violent space of the plantation. Yet the processes of creolization which are laid bare during the Cape Verdean carnival are not purely re-enactments of past encounters. Today’s carnival is frequented as much by people residing on the island as it is by Cape Verdeans living in diaspora who play a key role in the event’s evolution and new cultural influences. It is also heavily influenced by the Brazilian carnival, owing to its widespread propagation on the TV and via other media, but also due to the fact that many Cape Verdeans either live or have lived in Brazil. Carnival in São Vicente thus represents an enactment – a creative and often spontaneous performance – of the ongoing processes of creolization and engagements with diasporic pasts and presents, in Cape Verde’s dynamic culture ‘in the making’.

The London carnival at Notting Hill, which in its modern form dates back to the 1960s, emerged in direct response to the Notting Hill ‘race riots’ of 1958 directed against Caribbean migrants. It developed among Caribbean people in Britain, not merely as entertainment but, more importantly, as an affirmation of Black culture in Britain which draws on a shared cultural heritage and says ‘We are here to stay’.

Today’s carnival in London has not only grown dramatically to attract more than a million revellers, its form and content has also
evolved to reflect London’s ever-more-diverse demographic. Thus, in addition to Mas bands led by Caribbean carnival artists, who still predominate, the parades also involve multiple other ethnic groups. The notably strong presence of Brazilian Mas bands, for instance, is a consequence of the more recent burgeoning Brazilian presence in the city, also with a strong tradition of carnival and history of slavery. Brazilian groups have participated in the event for several years – with two samba groups, three ‘samba-reggae’ groups, and two ‘maracatu’ groups. Maracatu is a performance style that has its origins in the North Eastern state of Pernambuco and dates back to slavery, and combines elements of the Afro-Brazilian religion Candomblé. The group, Maracutudu Mafua, formed in 2009, is illustrative of the evolution – and constant creolization – of Notting Hill Carnival. The group comprises over 70 performers from a diverse range of countries and while drawing on traditional maracatu forms, it also adapts and creatively reworks these as part of the carnival performance. It is a way of performing Brazilian styles to new audiences, but is also an example of how carnival evolves and adapts, engaging with diasporic pasts and presents.

What can creolization and diaspora contribute to thinking about identity in our dynamic, evermore interconnected world, a world of movement, a world of migrants, a world of ‘relation’ (to use Edouard Glissant’s term)? A focus on creolization, and its interplay with diaspora, might compel us to think about the importance of history in the emergence of social and cultural forms and identities. It allows us to engage with the dynamic relationship between culture and space: from the space of the plantation or the island, to contemporary cities and moments such as carnival. Finally, thinking about creolization and diaspora in the past and the present forces us to recognise the socio-economic inequalities – the power play – that underlie many intercultural encounters. And this is not just a question of domination and subordination, but also necessarily encompasses creative forms of resistance. Both creolization and diaspora represent alternative expressions of identity in the context of forceful assertions of nationalism or religious certainties, and challenge the solidity of closed ethnic and racial categories.
Malian traders in the Senegalese capital

By Gunvor Jónsson

In Dakar, the capital of Senegal in West Africa, there is an abandoned train station which lies not far from the harbour. If you peek through the metal wire fence that surrounds this impressive structure, you can get a glimpse of the empty arrival and departure halls, and if you walk around the back, you might notice a small group of traders lined up against the old railway tracks which are overgrown with weeds. This is the former terminus station of the Dakar–Niger railway line that stretches all the way from the Atlantic coast and eastwards into the interior of West Africa, ending at the River Niger by the capital of the landlocked neighbouring country, Mali. Since 1923 and up until the turn of the second millennium, this railway was the only means of direct transport to Dakar that was available to the majority of Malians. The terminus station in Dakar was a hub for the city’s Malian population and a point of convergence for a great variety of travellers, beggars, civil servants, migrant labourers, and traders.

The Malian traders I met in Dakar during my 12 months of fieldwork in the city in 2013, generally traced the origins of their community back to the pioneering kola nut traders, who imported these precious nuts from the Ivory Coast, either by ship or on the railway via Mali, to the port of Dakar. Several Malians settled in Dakar in the late 1960s, after the fall of the socialist regime in Mali which had discouraged emigration and commerce. These Malians had previously participated in the so-called navétanat, one of the most important migrations in the modern history of West Africa, involving the seasonal agricultural labour migrations of men to the peanut plantations of Senegal and The Gambia (David 1980). Peanut
production provided the economic base of French colonial rule in the region, and constituted the principal source of revenue for the post-colonial Senegalese state. A series of severe droughts and the falling world market price for peanut oil undermined the peanut economy, and some Malian cultivators therefore decided to settle in Dakar where they transformed themselves into kola nut traders, drawing on their transnational family networks in Mali and the Ivory Coast to facilitate their businesses.

Initially, these Malian traders stored their shipments of kola nuts at La Gare, the terminus train station in Dakar, in three big old warehouses that were no longer used by the state. Gradually, the kola traders were able to acquire warehouses, offices and accommodation in a neighbourhood in the vicinity of La Gare. They were still present in that neighbourhood in 2013, even though most of them had abandoned the kola trade and instead become forwarding agents and transporters. One of the most successful kola traders had founded the Mosqué des Bambaras – a mosque for the Malians living in this neighbourhood, the former epicentre of the Malian kola trade in the city.

Since the beginning of the railway, Malian women known as bana-banas had been travelling back and forth on the passenger train with goods that they traded with the populations in the towns and villages along the line (Lambert 1993). When the kola traders abandoned La Gare, a female bana-bana took over the warehouses and pioneered the wholesale import and trade in dried agricultural produce (fruits secs) from Mali. Subsequently, a Malian wholesale market gradually emerged around La Gare, as a new wave of Malian immigrants associated with the fruits secs business entered the stage in the 1980s. Bana-banas acted as suppliers to the Malian traders at La Gare and also sold their own goods that they displayed in the doors of the warehouses or on pieces of cardboard on the ground. Additional warehouses were built, and a retail market began to sprawl around the terminus station. The female bana-banas who came with goods on the passenger train from Mali often used La Gare as a dormitory in between the two trains; other bana-banas would seek a host among the big Malian kola nut traders settled in the capital city.

However, in 2009 the Senegalese authorities evicted the traders and demolished the Malian market at La Gare. In its place a Grand
Théâtre – which was a gift from China – was constructed, as part of the president’s neoliberal vision for the capital, aimed largely at attracting foreign investment (Melly 2013). The Dakar–Niger railway was privatised in 2003 and in 2009 the new owners, a Franco-Canadian consortium, decided to take the passenger train out of service. This was the train that the bana-banas had been travelling on with their goods. Thus the Malian women, whose businesses and livelihoods depended on the railway and its terminus station, had their trade infrastructure pulled from beneath their feet.

However, this did not lead to the disappearance of Malian trade in the Senegalese capital. Instead, several smaller Malian markets emerged in the vicinity of the old train station. These dispersed traders were connected through kinship and credit networks and their shared history at the former market, and they continued referring to themselves as ‘les gens de La Gare’ (the people from La Gare). However, supply and customers had dwindled. As one market woman told me, ‘After the market was destroyed, people say that, “Now there is nothing at La Gare, so we’re not going there anymore”’. The supply trucks from Mali preferred stopping in the northern suburbs of Dakar instead of venturing south to the Malian markets in the congested city centre; the customers followed suit. Most bana-banas stopped bringing Malian goods to Dakar and only continued their journeys to the capital in order to purchase goods for sale back in Mali.

Several of the remaining Malian market traders seemed to have little commercial rationale for perpetuating their businesses in the city centre. Instead, they largely persevered on the basis of their memories of the profitable trade they had enjoyed at La Gare and their sense of belonging to this place and its trading community. In contrast, most of the bana-banas had re-oriented their trading networks and were drawing on new infrastructures to facilitate their businesses. Several of them were acting as middlemen on behalf of traders based back in Mali, who the bana-banas supplied with goods that they collected in Dakar. One entrepreneurial female bana-bana had started up a bus route in 2003 for passengers travelling between Bamako and Dakar. A few years later, she started up her own bus company, and several other Malian bus companies started appearing in the following years. Some of the Malians based in Dakar were
catering to the bana-banas who had been deprived of their temporary accommodation at La Gare and of the possibility of transporting their goods on the passenger train: informal enterprises had sprung up in 2009, renting out bedrooms and simultaneously providing trucks that would transport the bana-banas’ goods back to Mali.

This contribution has tried to dissect the diasporic black box, by disentangling some of the different networks, generations and waves of Malian migrants in Dakar, as well as the histories, memories and imaginaries that might be involved in a process of diaspora formation. The Malian market traders appeared to show the signs of an emerging diasporic mentality, as reflected in their self-designation as ‘the people from La Gare’. Only time will tell whether this imagined community will persist, perish or transform itself, in the face of persistent and dramatic developments in the urban environment and the wider socio-economic landscape they inhabit.
The Indigent Moslems Burial Fund

By Nazneen Ahmed

On 10 January 1930, a little girl called Zohra was buried at Brookwood Cemetery in Woking. She was just ten months old. Her burial was attended by 17 people. The family were unable to afford the funeral and sought financial assistance from a recently set up fund for burial assistance. After the sad event, Zohra's parents, Mr and Mrs Makarab, wrote a letter to the fund expressing their 'grateful thanks to the committee for their help in a time of great need'. The family were Muslims, resident at 61 Cable Street, London, but hailed from India, and this was the one of the first burials supported and organised by the Indigent Moslems Burial Fund.

The history of the burial fund is to some extent also a history of the Muslim diaspora in Britain. Set up in 1925, it aimed to provide Muslim burials to those unable to afford them. At the time of its establishment these were mostly seafarers residing in the East End who passed away due to ill health or succumbed to maritime accidents, which numbered three to four per year. Records show a marked increase in burials during the Second World War, with a peak of 18 in 1944 – which we can attribute to casualties from the bombings that rained down upon the East End, where the majority of Muslims lived. But the fund is still active today, its contact details on noticeboards in hospital mortuaries around the country, who ring up the fund when a Muslim, perhaps homeless or estranged from family, dies without the finances to pay for his or her own funeral. The fund receives three to four applications for assistance each week.

Funeral rites are an important way for diasporas to enact religious duties, a way to make foreign earth become that final iteration of
home. Before the establishment of the fund, Muslim seafarers who died in Britain were lucky if they had a semblance of a religious funeral. Those with close friends and perhaps family on their ship could hope for a burial following Qu’ranic instructions, such as the burial described in 1823 by Samuel Johnson’s first employer, in the popular monthly periodical *The Gentleman’s Magazine*:

*As they filled the grave they sprinkled water over it, from an earthen vessel, and burying a shovel at the feet of the corpse, poured down upon it the remains of the water... Over this they all stood muttering some words, as if by way of prayer, and thus the ceremony ended, without the attendance of a priest of any persuasion whatever. They sat up in rotation, two at a time, provided with lights and implements of defence, for several nights.* (The Gentleman’s Magazine 1823)

The nightly vigil hints however at the precariousness of these graves, their difference rendering them vulnerable to vandalism and grave robbing. Those without family were buried in mass paupers’ graves in non-denominational cemeteries, their resting places left unmarked and unmourned. There are several records, for example, of men with Muslim surnames buried in West Ham Cemetery, including Sheik Hasan Sheik Ahmed, buried in 1899, Dien Mohamed, buried in 1902, and Subder Khan, buried in 1918. But even they were lucky, compared to some:

*There is a place in the neighbourhood where they used to be buried wholesale, and a person who went to dig in his garden found skeletons of them but poorly covered by the earth! He has taken up a skull to preserve it for a curiosity. These creatures came to an untimely grave through ill treatment, and were buried here in quick despatch out of sight.* (Peggs 1844)

From 1924, the fund paid the London Necropolis Company to transport Muslim bodies to Brookwood Cemetery, location of the only Muslim burial ground at the time. For this, the London Necropolis Company provided separate washing and preparation facilities for the bodies of Muslims at its London terminus in
Waterloo. All burials were conducted within a week of death. The funerals were officiated by Khalid Sheldrake, a British convert to Islam who was part of the social circle around Abdullah Quilliam, imam of the Liverpool Mosque and translator of the Qu’ran. Sheldrake dutifully travelled from London to Brookwood for every funeral funded by the burial fund until 1932. Whilst the predominantly working class, South Asian seafarer congregants of the East London Mosque have always been perceived as being quite remote from the aristocratic British Muslim converts involved with Woking Mosque and its English-language journal *The Islamic Review*, the Indigent Moslems Burial Fund records indicate co-operation and collaboration between the groups and signal the beginnings of a British Muslim culture.

The records of the Indigent Moslems Burial Fund also tell us some surprising things about the history of Muslim settlement in Britain prior to the Second World War. Although the majority of Muslims in London at this time were male seafarers, there were also women and families with young children who were settled enough in London to want to have their kin buried there. Some records, such as that of the death of Dorothy Eva Hassan, suggests intermarriage took place even in this early period. The records give us first ethnicities, including ‘Pathan from Peshawar’, ‘Arab’, ‘Malay’, ‘Somali’ and ‘Bengali’, and, later, places of origin of the deceased, who originate from a diverse range of places from Singapore to Lahore to Morocco.

The fund is also indicative of the transformation of Muslim associational culture over the twentieth century. At its inception, the fund’s Board was made up of illustrious international names that reflected the imperial times: Indian politicians such as Syed Ameer Ali, diplomats from Persia and Egypt, British politicians with links to British India and aristocratic white British converts to Islam. However, after the Second World War, Bengali seafarers from the East End were increasingly not only beneficiaries of the fund, but also took an active part in its maintenance. While the 1910 London Mosque Fund minutes state that the Mosque fund was to remain separate and distinct from aid for burials, in practice there was considerable overlap in terms of personnel between the running of the East London Mosque and the burial fund. Suleiman Jetha, Haji
Taslim Ali and Salahudeen Haleem were all involved in running both the East London Mosque and the Indigent Moslems Burial Fund. The efforts of this committed group of devout ex-seafarers in the very early period of settlement complicate the popular narrative of Bengali migration to East London which depicts the lives of early settlers in the 1950s–1970s as largely secular and a-religious until a process of ‘Islamicization’ took place from the later 1980s onwards (Eade 1989; Eade and Garbin 2006; Kibria 2008).

The fund continues to respond to the changing burial needs of the Muslim community in Britain. Its records show efforts by Suleiman Jetha in the 1970s to set up a burial society, modelled on Jewish burial societies, in order to enable the growing British Muslim community to save for their funerals. In 1975, the fund unsuccessfully attempted to halt the passing of the Brookwood Cemetery Act, which enabled developers to sell off unused land in the cemetery. More recently, in the early 2000s, reacting to increasing pressures for Muslim burial space in Britain, the fund invested a significant part of its capital in the setting up of the Islamic Gardens of Peace, currently the largest Muslim cemetery in Europe, and reserved a number of graves for those who may need the fund’s assistance in the future. Tracing the history of this small, little-known charity tells us the story of how diasporic Muslims have lived and died in Britain from the early twentieth century onwards. □
Strangers and diasporas in Lusaka

By Oliver Bakewell

It was fifty years ago that George Shepperson, speaking at the International Congress of African History at the University of Dar es Salaam, adopted the term ‘diaspora’ to compare the dispersal of Africans, caused by slavery and imperialism, with the scattering of the Jews. For Shepperson, this diaspora included not only those transported as slaves across the Indian and Atlantic oceans but also those forced to move to other parts of Africa, whether as slaves, labourers, or those displaced by imperial enterprises such as plantation farming.

Since then, the idea of the African diaspora has expanded to encompass a vast array of different African populations that have spread across the world through migration, not just those forced from their homes by slavery or exploitation, but also those who move in search of new opportunities and a better life. There is great interest in how these different diasporas – whether from Nigeria, Somalia, Mali or any other part of Africa – relate to their country of origin. In particular, can they contribute to economic and social change through their continued involvement, often through personal contacts and sending remittances to family and friends, but also through business investments, the transfer of knowledge and expertise and the support for democratic change? In recognition of their potential contribution many African governments have established special departments or even ministries to work with their diasporas, keeping close contact and encouraging their involvement in the ‘homeland.’ There have been innumerable conferences, workshops and seminars about engaging African diasporas in development. The African Union has
gone as far as referring to the African Diaspora as the ‘sixth region’ of the continent (alongside Northern, Eastern, Western, Southern and Central Africa). However, almost all of this attention is focused on ‘people of African origin living outside the continent’.

But what happens to those Africans who move within the continent? For example, do Nigerians who move to Zambia stay connected to a Nigerian community in the same ways as we see among the Nigerian population in London? Are they sending money and other support to family members at home? Are they making investments in Nigeria? And what about their children – is their Nigerian identity reproduced through the generations? Or is the maintenance of their Nigerian heritage less prevalent compared to those who live outside Africa?

These are the questions behind the ‘African diasporas within Africa project’, part of the ODP. It has been exploring the settlement of people from West Africa and the Horn of Africa in two distant cities – Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, and Kampala, the capital of Uganda. Through interviews with migrants and their families, the project is showing the different approaches adopted by these groups to establish their place in these two cities and the extent to which they seek to maintain their identification with the homeland and its people.

When it comes to West Africans in Lusaka, there have been small but distinctive populations of Nigerians and Malians in the city since the 1980s. The first puzzle is what brought these people to settle so far from home – the equivalent of moving from Nigeria to Spain, or from Mali to Scotland. The first Nigerians came as doctors, nurses and teachers, invited by the Zambian government through a scheme to boost the quality of public services in the late 1980s. When the scheme ended in 1990 with the change of government in Zambia, some returned to Nigeria but others stayed on, either to continue working in the public sector or to establish new businesses. Although most retain close connections with Nigeria, many of this group have become an integral part of the middle class in Lusaka, only distinguished from Zambians by their accents and names. However, they continually find themselves subject to wearying discrimination from Zambians, stirred by the popular stereotype of Nigerians as hustlers and crooks that means they constantly have to prove their
honesty and industry and can never feel they fully belong.

By contrast the Malians in Zambia are marked out by religion, language and dress from the Zambians among whom they live. The first migrants also came to the country in the 1980s, but far from being invited by the government, they came to trade Zambian emeralds on the black market. They were often arrested and liable to deportation; one man described how he pretended to be from the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo so he could avoid being sent all the way back to Mali. Today, they have regularised their position and no longer face this harassment.

The vast majority of migrants from Mali have been men, mostly Soninke people. In contrast to the Nigerians, they appear much more concerned with preserving their culture and religion in Zambia. Most have married Zambian women, who convert to Islam and adopt many aspects of Soninke culture. Although many live in a small Malian quarter in Lusaka, centred on a mosque and Islamic school, they are intimately linked with wider Zambian life through their in-laws. Despite these ties in Zambia, many of the fathers send their children 'back' to Mali to be brought up as Soninke by relatives in their home area. However, there is evidence of mothers resisting such moves and being able to keep at least some of their children in Lusaka. The Soninke heritage is on much more shaky ground in this second generation, with some of the children even converting to Christianity, bringing much shame on their fathers in the Malian community.

These two brief examples show how the extent to which diasporic connections are sustained depends on a range of factors. First, there are the different intentions of the populations. While some Nigerians wanted to pass on their traditions and culture, others were much more ambivalent, expressing little concern about their children becoming Zambian. For Malians, preserving the culture was given very high priority and fathers were prepared to go to great lengths to achieve it. Second, there are factors arising from specific conditions in which people settle. Despite the efforts of Malian fathers to preserve their heritage among their children in Lusaka, they can be thwarted by their Zambian families. Only in time will it be possible to see what is preserved of their West African origins among the children who leave their father's religion. In contrast, and ironically, the middle-
class Nigerians who have less interest in preserving difference through the generations are continually reminded of their status as outsiders by the petty discriminations built on a lurid stereotype.

It not yet clear how these processes of settlement will play out over time. However, the emerging findings do challenge any idea that people necessarily want to, or are able to, sustain and reproduce links with the homeland. Rather than simply assuming that African populations outside the continent form diasporas, we must start by asking why and how they may do so in any particular context. □
The ‘diasporas’ of Little Mogadishu

By Neil Carrier

Eastleigh is a Nairobi estate that over the last two decades has grown into a global Somali hub and a centre of commerce in East Africa: it has become Nairobi’s ‘Little Mogadishu’, as the media have dubbed it. Previously a quiet residential estate, an influx of Somali refugees in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought with them transnational connections and business acumen that transformed the estate into a hub for cheap clothes imported from Dubai. Since that time the continued expansion of Somali trade networks has dramatically altered the Eastleigh landscape, creating over 40 shopping malls. As I have found in my research on the estate for the ODP, Eastleigh is a fascinating example of how forced migration can bring all sorts of economic opportunities alongside the very real hardships of lives lived in exile. It is also fascinating for its substantial population of European and North American citizens who come to an estate that offers opportunities and experiences not easily available in the West. These are the Somali ‘diasporas’ of Eastleigh.

Somalis use the term buufis to refer to an all-consuming yearning to move to the West, a syndrome very common in the harsh conditions of such refugee camps in Kenya as Dadaab, as Cindy Horst has well described. Eastleigh too has its fair share of buufis, and many Somali and Oromo refugees living there hope it is only a stepping stone to a life elsewhere. However, the estate also attracts Somalis from the diaspora: it has become a place where those in the West suffering a reverse form of buufis – that focused on a return to Africa – can find a cure. For Somalis from southern Somalia, Eastleigh has become a part of their homeland transplanted to nearby
Nairobi, while there are many Kenyan Somalis too living in the West for whom Eastleigh has always been a home. During my fieldwork in Eastleigh I met many Somalis from Western countries in Eastleigh. Such visitors and residents give the estate a very cosmopolitan soundscape as their Western accents can often be made out. So common are such visitors from the West that they are referred to by other Eastleigh residents as diasporas (or diaspora in the singular).

These diasporas come to the estate for a number of reasons. While Eastleigh may not seem an idyllic location for a holiday, the estate offers much for a Somali visitor, especially ones with family in Kenya or in Somalia. Its new plush hotels such as the Grand Royal and Nomad Palace provide decent accommodation for those coming to visit family in Nairobi, or hoping to travel on to Somalia itself (Nairobi’s international airport now has many flights to Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia). Some come to find spouses: Eastleigh is an important hub for marriage ceremonies, often arranged transnationally, and even carried out transnationally. There are ceremonies that involve substitute brides or grooms in cases where the partner in the West has not yet secured documents with which to travel.

A proportion of Eastleigh diasporas are young boys and girls sent to the estate from the US, the UK and elsewhere to spend time with relatives for what is known as dhaqan celin (‘cultural rehabilitation’). This usually consists of spending months at a madrassa learning to be
better Muslims, as some of the children are regarded as having gone astray in their life in the West. Such children are sent to Eastleigh rather than Somalia itself as it is safer, yet ‘home-like’ enough, so that they might escape Westernisation for a while, while still living in a place that is dominated by Muslims. I met some young Somalis in the estate on *dhaqan celin* for whom life in Eastleigh was very different to that which they had known in the West. Its muddy streets were a shock to the system, although Eastleigh's many restaurants now stock the sort of food they were used to at home: Hershey’s chocolate and pizza played a role in helping them settle.

Many ‘diasporas’ invest in the Eastleigh economy. Such investors have not necessarily ever lived before in Kenya, although having family or clan connections is usually seen as important in navigating Nairobi. It is easy to find people who had lived for a long time in London and elsewhere, and have come to Eastleigh for investment opportunities. Some come with family while others maintain transnational families, with spouses and children remaining in the West.

Diaspora investors are motivated by a number of factors: some by the desire to invest in a boom before it ends, others to invest in a place perceived as more profitable than the West. One such investor, with a strong London accent, told me that I too should forget about the UK and set up business in Kenya, saying: ‘Listen mate, England is finished’. This links to a common sentiment that the West is already developed, so more opportunities lie in the likes of Africa. Establishing a business in Kenya is regarded as easier and cheaper than in the West too, with fewer overheads, cheaper labour costs, and the ability to speed up bureaucracy by exploiting the country’s endemic corruption. Indeed, one supermarket owner in the estate who also ran a business in the UK, told me that those from the UK appreciate the familiarity of Kenya’s bureaucracy, but also how a payment here and there can facilitate matters. In Kenya there are many regulations and restrictions, but ones which corruption has rendered negotiable. Also, as the cost of living is less than in the West, good lifestyles can be had, especially for the most successful, who have saved considerable sums. Such investors may have businesses in Eastleigh but often live in more salubrious residential estates like South C, another Nairobi estate with a sizeable Somali population.
Kenya has not proved the most welcoming place for Somalis in recent years. The country has offered Somalis a refuge, but increasing concern over security has led to profiling of Somalis and their scapegoating, as witness the screening exercises of 2014 under the name Operation Usalama Watch. But, for the diasporas of Eastleigh, Kenya still offers a place to reconnect with family, to educate children, and the chance to live more prosperous lives. In the words of one diaspora investor – a woman who had spent many years in the UK – successful Somalis from the diaspora can enjoy an *Out of Africa* lifestyle in Kenya, living in comfort with maids and drivers. A diasporic dream of a romantic life in Africa might thus be influencing a new generation of settlers to move to Kenya from the West. □
Fitting in by being yourself: Avenues Unlimited and youth work in the East End c. 1960s–2000s

By Eve Colpus

It was on ‘schizophrenic’ research for her book On Brick Lane (2007) that Rachel Lichtenstein first came across Avenues Unlimited. At the youth group’s Brick Lane headquarters, she interviewed three young men, Saleck (21), Atiqul and Bodrul (both then aged 19). The three friends had grown up together on the Wheeler House Estate; Bodrul had arrived in the UK as a baby, while Saleck and Atiqul were born in East London. Lichtenstein asked the young men about their earliest childhood memories. Derek Cox was the first person they mentioned: 'He made our childhood fantastic,' said Atiqul. 'He took us camping abroad and on many activities in the area… day trips every week from the age of six or seven… to the cinema, swimming, everything we wouldn't do with our families at home.'

Derek Cox had worked with Avenues Unlimited since it was set up in 1965. He began, in his words, as a ‘street worker’ in Spitalfields, working with young people when they were not in school or at home, or were homeless. Long-term projects on local housing estates, such as those in which Saleck, Atiqul and Bodrul lived, had been part of the work since the early 1970s, and had enabled him ‘to get to know whole generations of families’. When Cox met Lichtenstein, he told her about a recent project taking local Somali and Bengali boys on a day trip to the countryside: ‘They are both Sunni Muslim but from very different cultures, one African and one Asian, and both competing to adapt to a Western culture, and they don't mix well.’ He went on: ‘The Somalian community today are like the Bangladeshi community twenty years ago, and they need extra support.’

In the 1980s, Avenues Unlimited worked mainly with the
expanding first- and second-generation Bangladeshi populations of Spitalfields. The holidays and day trips Saleck, Atiqul and Bodrul remembered were one part of this work. Another project was ‘The Girls’ Room’, which opened in 1984 in a converted furniture factory on Brick Lane, offering Bengali language classes, music and dance, cooking, sewing, and painting. ‘The Girls’ Room’ was an important development in social provision for young second-generation Bangladeshi women, reflecting their demands for social and cultural facilities, demands which youth workers felt were largely absent in the 1970s. Avenues Unlimited worked to encourage community leadership in their projects. ‘The Girls’ Room’ developed a Women’s Support Group of local Bengali women and later a crèche: it became a success story.

When Derek Cox arrived in the East End in the 1960s he found a complex multi-racial community: fifth- and sixth-generation Irish families, alongside more recent Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Maltese families, Jewish communities, and Caribbean families. Before joining Avenues Unlimited, Cox was a youth worker at St. Hilda’s Youth Club, just off Brick Lane, where he set up a late-opening coffee bar that attracted local Mods and Rockers. The experiment indicated unexpected things about the bonds that young people might forge across racial and ethnic lines. Cox remembered the Mods (unlike the Rockers) as a mixed group: ‘a lot of Nigerian boys, one or two from the Caribbean, a lot of Maltese, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, white guys and many Irish… a couple of Jewish guys, a few mixed-race children, the latter of ‘Bengali wives’ – white women who had married Bengali seamen. The coffee bar pointed to the value of creative thinking about the forms (including pop culture) that integration might take.

‘You had all these kids, from a real variety of backgrounds sticking together because they were Mods and they lived in the East End’, reflected Cox. Many of these young people died young, he remembered, and had been drug users. But he was still in touch with Peter, a former Mod, who took over the running of the gardens Cox had set up around Christ Church in the early 1970s: ‘the only place (apart from maybe a few rare back gardens) where you can grow dodi and other vegetables from Bangladesh.’
The diverse faith communities within East London provided a distinctive set of opportunities for youth projects engaged in integration. In Brick Lane in the early 1960s, Derek Cox recognised St Anne’s Catholic Church was an important centre for the Irish community, while the Brady Centre (originally a Jewish boys’ club) and the synagogues in Cheshire Street provided for the vibrant Jewish communities. The pressing need for physical spaces to get young people off the streets worked against segregation and encouraged youth workers to be entrepreneurial. In Wapping in late 1970, during a period of sustained violent racial attacks upon the East London Pakistani community, an Avenues Unlimited youth worker organised a disco in St Paul’s Mission for Seamen in Dock Street, building on a long tradition of sharing space among local organisations (when the Mission was set up in the 1840s it worked with the London City Mission). What happened at the Mission for Seamen happened elsewhere, for instance the crypt of St Botolph’s church, Aldgate served in the early 1970s as a homeless shelter at night and by day the Avenues Unlimited club for Asian boys.

It is tempting to look back on the late twentieth-century history of youth work as a moment of optimism about integration that is now sadly obsolete. But instead, it is the complex process of adaptation that stands out in the story of an organisation like Avenues Unlimited. Saleck, Atiqul and Bodrul, the young men Rachel Lichtenstein interviewed in Avenues Unlimited’s office, described themselves as ‘British Asians’: ‘British first and then Bangladeshi’. Asked if they had mixed with any white people when they were growing up, they all shook their heads. Race was less interesting to them, however, than their family – all their grandparents had grown up and knew each other in small villages in Sylhet – and religion. Derek Cox converted to Islam in 2005 after 40 years working in the East End, and it was largely though his inspiration that the three friends were all training to become youth workers.

Rachel Lichtenstein’s conversations with the three aspiring youth workers reinforces how just as one race and faith doesn’t push another out geographically, nor is there an either/or choice between identities. But, as the longer history of Avenues Unlimited suggests, security in one’s own identity was at the heart of feeling a sense of belonging.
Whether as Mod, in ‘The Girls Room’ (‘NO BOYS ALLOWED’), or ‘British Asian’, paradoxically, cultural integration depends on the confidence and freedom to self-define.
Diasporic devotions and bodies in motion

By Alana Harris

Every Tuesday evening at 8pm throughout the year, a Catholic church in Forest Gate, East London is the scene of remarkable religious fervour. Most weeks at least two hundred people of diverse ages and ethnicities buy and light hundreds of candles, a knot of people gather around a plaster statue of the Franciscan Antony of Padua (rubbing their hands along the folds of his brown habit) or they place slips of paper in a large wooden box marked 'petitions'. Meanwhile a number of men and women walk on their knees from the back of the church to the altar, praying with moving lips with a lit candle between their hands, while others embrace and greet each other with kisses as they enter the church. This diverse congregation has come for the ‘Novena of Saint Antony’, but the two hour-long devotion of intercessory prayers, hymns, scripture readings, relics veneration and exposition of the Blessed Sacrament is unlike most encountered in other Catholic churches – for it brings together people from highly diverse faith backgrounds, including a substantial number of self-identified (and publicly acknowledged) Hindus.

One of those regularly present is 38-year-old Jeyachandra, who was born in Sri Lanka and fled to India as a Tamil Tiger refugee, before coming to East Ham in 2008. As he explains:

*I am Hindu but you know it doesn't matter, the thing is I like to pray, I love to pray. I like to take bread and wine, the body of Jesus… My parents were Hindu, we worship at Temple, but my father and mother also know Jesus, Mary, [and] they teach me like this.*
Introduced to St Antony’s parish in 2010 by a Tamil friend, Jeyachandra occasionally visits the highly elaborate Sri Murugan Temple in East Ham, but without fail now attends Forest Gate every Tuesday as a supplicant of St Antony. As he described the saint:

*He is one of the Masters… like a father. We can say ‘Why am I here? Where am I going?’ I have many questions inside of me. I put [them at] his feet… [in] everything he guide[s] and helps me.*¹⁷

For Jeyachandra, his Tuesday night homage to St Antony continues throughout the week at home – it is his custom to buy two candles, one for the church and the other for his own house shrine, where it burns for nine days (a novena) in front of his personal statue of St Antony.¹⁸ For this fervent devotee, there is a ritual and spatial continuity between his Tuesday night observances and his every day, home-based prayer life. Moreover, there is an emphasis for him – as for many of Saint Antony’s clients – on a material and imagined, incarnational and bodily encounter with their patron. Whether touching his statue, kissing his relic (contained within a crucifix) or metaphorically putting one’s worries and concerns ‘at his feet’, the embodied dimensions of these devotional practices are foregrounded and prioritised.

Devotion to St Antony is popular throughout all of India and Sri Lanka and inter-religious places of pilgrimage on the sub-continent are not uncommon (see Raj 2004; Raj and Harman 2007). The sharing of sacred space between Catholics and Hindus has its most famous example in the Marian shrine, Vailankanni, and visitation of this pilgrimage shrine, the ‘Indian Lourdes’, was mentioned by some of the Novena devotees.¹⁹ Alongside this, there is also an intensely popular, long-standing pilgrimage site to St Antony in Uvari, Tamil Nadu – the region of origin (alongside northern Sri Lanka) for a significant proportion of the Forest Gate congregation. Against this background, an openness to Catholic–Hindu common worship and the mutual, syncretic participation in religious experiences is a diasporic legacy brought to East London by these migrants – part of a shared cultural and post-colonial understanding, common to Tamils from southern India and Sri Lanka, which is re-enacted (and transformed) in
Forest Gate. The historic and shared diasporic identities of Tamil Catholics and Hindus20 (auspiced through St Antony) allow for the circumvention of differences of religion, class and caste and the identification of common intercessory needs in times of austerity in contemporary London.21

Drawing upon the insights of Mary McClintock Fulkerson in reading the exposed ‘wounds’ of those engaged in devotional practices
(McClintock Fulkerson 2007) – here expressed in the weekly prayer petitions read out within the service and ranging from economic privation to emotional dysfunction\textsuperscript{22} – it is possible to discern a radically reconfigured notion of religious belonging in East London.\textsuperscript{23} The conclusion to be drawn from examining the complexities of these weekly prayer evenings, with their rich repertoire of sensory stimuli and the enactment of an embodied, relational encounter (between saint and client, and between gathered devotees) is that ‘racialized, normalized and otherwise enculturated bodies and desire[s]’ must be acknowledged, cutting across exclusionary definitions of religious affiliation’ (McClintock Fulkerson 2007: 21). Within Catholic tradition St Antony is acknowledged as the ‘patron saint of lost things’ – a migrant from Lisbon to Padua remembered for his Franciscan commitment to poverty and passionate evangelism. Today in Forest Gate, he is patron saint to a diverse group of people from all over the world, not all of whom are Catholics, who identify with his legacy and are drawn to a form of popular piety that offers a fleshy, face-to-face encounter with a seemingly attentive, heavenly advocate. \footnote{\textsuperscript{23}}
Divergences and convergences between diaspora and home: the Somaliland diaspora in the UK

By Giulia Liberatore

The ability and inclination of diasporas to engage in the homeland depends on the degree and nature of connection between the diaspora and those that have been left or who have stayed at home (Van Hear 2014). As Van Hear argues in this collection, the disaggregation of diaspora engagement into three different spheres (the household, the ‘known community’ and the ‘imagined community’) can help to tease out these different orders of connection and disconnection, and explore some of the circumstances and conditions that generate these patterns.

In what follows I show how such convergences or divergences are shaped through dominant narratives about the diaspora, which are forged through government policies, or civil society initiatives, and how these narratives play out across the three different spheres outlined above. I explore these patterns drawing on my recent research on the Somali diaspora’s campaigning efforts to maintain remittance flows to the Somali regions in response to the shut-down of Somali remittance companies in 2013–14. Based on fieldwork conducted in the UK and Somaliland, this project also traces the responses and perceptions by the UK and Somaliland governments to the diaspora’s involvement.

Diaspora as community representatives

In protest at the decision by Barclays Bank in May 2013 to close the UK accounts of 250 money transfer operators (MTOs), including Dahabshiil, the largest in the Somali remittance market, Somali diaspora groups, remittance companies, NGOs and politicians
mounted a campaign against the bank and the UK government to find a durable solution to the issue. After several months of protest, the UK government recognised the potential humanitarian effect of the account closures and agreed to set up an Action Group on Cross Border Remittances. Part of this initiative involved a UK-Somali
Safer Corridor Pilot Project, coordinated by the UK Department for International Development in consultation with various stakeholders including three Somali community representatives and the coordinator of the Somali Money Services Association (SOMSA).

Over the last several years there has been marked shift in the ways in which the UK government has engaged with the Somali diaspora; the community representatives included in the pilot project were also selected due to their involvement in organisations which have recently begun to collaborate closely with the government. This change is partly guided by a growing threat of Al-Shabaab recruits, and the Home Office’s involvement of the diaspora in its various counter-terrorism and integration projects. It also coincides with the period leading up to the Somalia Conference of 2012 during which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) sought to engage with and consult diaspora groups. ‘We started to realise that there was this huge group of people, this big Somali community in the UK that was really involved back home… and that we needed to talk to them,’ a representative from the FCO’s Somalia Unit explained. One of the legacies of this consultation was the establishment, within the Somalia Unit, of the first and only ‘diaspora outreach role’ in the FCO.

The UK government’s attitude towards the diaspora throughout this pilot project can be discerned by untangling the way in which the diaspora’s engagement was viewed across the three different spheres. First, the involvement of the Somali diaspora through these community representatives was driven in part by a growing recognition by the government of the crucial role played by Somalis in the UK, at the level of the ‘household’, in sending remittance flows back home. This was also informed by various policy reports on remittances that had been commissioned preceding the crisis (e.g. Hammond et al. 2013; Hassan et al. 2013), and which pointed to the way in which remittance flows serve as a ‘lifeline’ to the region. Second, at the level of the ‘known community’, the representatives involved in the pilot were treated as the spokespersons of the Somali community in the UK. Their role was considered through the lens of a multicultural model which depoliticises the diaspora, and also conflates ethnicity, culture and notions of bounded communities (Baumann 1996). As community members they were regarded
as independent from business interests (a concern designated to SOMSA), as well as from regional and clan politics.

As noted by the FCO representative mentioned above, one of the main hurdles of the diaspora is its inability to work across regional and clan lines. Promoting unity is crucial to the government’s involvement with diaspora groups; the term ‘Somali diaspora’ is most often used to refer to communities sharing a group identity rooted in a national home (Sinatti and Horst 2014), and thus encompassing people from across the Somali-speaking territories. Similarly to what Horst describes with reference to the attitude of donor organisations (Horst 2013), diaspora organisations are expected by the government to engage at the nationwide level to alleviate the highest levels of suffering, rather than support their clan or region of origin. The ‘imagined community’ envisaged here is that of a national community engaged in a peaceful and unified Somali homeland. It is not surprising therefore, that the community representatives involved in the pilot project are also members of Somali organisations that, amongst other things, emphasise pan-Somali unity.

**Diaspora as skilled entrepreneurs**

Researching the remittance issue in Somaliland revealed a different attitude towards the diaspora. The diaspora’s political involvement around the remittance crisis was little known in the Somali regions, and the issue was framed as a problem for the money transfer sector to resolve. Part of the reason for this may be down to the ways in which the diaspora is viewed by the government. Many times when I interviewed public officials on the issue, I was given figures on the diaspora’s contributions at the ‘household’ level, and ‘known community’ level, emphasising their public and private investments; the diaspora brought skills and capital to the country, I was told repeatedly. Rarely did the diaspora feature as community activists or representatives, and no one had heard of the diaspora groups in the UK who had taken part in the campaign.

This conception of the diaspora is also related to the government’s recent shift towards the diaspora. In Somaliland, the election of President Axmed Maxamed Maxamuud ‘Siilaanyo’ – a British national – in 2012 marked a new chapter in the country’s politics, and
the government’s relationship with its UK-based diaspora (Hammond 2012). As an ‘absent but active constituency’ the diaspora had played a vital role in the election campaign and in determining the country’s political landscape and leadership (Hammond 2012: 157). Around the same time the Somaliland Diaspora Agency was set up and entrusted with collaborating with government institutions and diaspora host countries, creating a database of diaspora groups, and coordinating and supporting diaspora communities. The government’s attitude towards the diaspora is aptly captured by the current work of the Somaliland Diaspora Agency. Shortly after its launch, the agency organised in partnership with Somaliland Non State Actors Forum (SONSAF) the first meeting for diaspora communities in Somaliland entitled ‘Strengthening the Role of Diaspora in Economic Growth and Development’. The agency is currently developing a National Diaspora Policy and considering the implementation of a ‘diaspora fundraising for development account’, which involves a $1 tax on each remittance transaction. For the government, the diaspora are key economic and political players, who contribute not to an imagined Somali homeland, but to the building of the Somaliland nation-state.

In recent years African diasporas have emerged as the new ‘agents of change’ within development mantra (Turner and Kleist 2013). An emphasis on bottom-up approaches coupled with a depoliticisation and individualisation of development efforts has led governments, NGOs and civil society groups to celebrate diaspora for their remittance contributions, skills and knowledge transfers (Turner and Kleist 2013: 192). Following this trend, governments in both home and host countries have sought to work with diasporas in various ways, as illustrated by the examples presented above.

As we have seen, these efforts have taken different forms in the diaspora and the homeland, which have shaped and reinforced divergent understandings of what ‘diaspora engagement’ and ‘agent of change’ entails. In Somaliland, where many from the diaspora have returned to work in politics or set up their own businesses, the government approach the diaspora as skilled entrepreneurs and drivers of economic and political change. In the UK, the diaspora is viewed through the lens of a unified, depoliticised community, which contributes to the development of the homeland.
Disaggregating spheres of engagement has helped unpack and reveal contrasting narratives of diaspora engagement in the host and home countries. These narratives are important because they are shaped by, but also shape, the nature of diaspora activities in both settings. Analysing these dominant notions of diaspora engagement, therefore, is crucial to understanding the conditions and circumstances which generate connections and disconnections between those in the diaspora and those at home.
Architectural associations: memory, modernity and the construction of community in East London

By Jane Garnett

As part of the 1951 Festival of Britain, a showcase for post-war national revival, East London was chosen as the location for an exhibition of ‘live architecture’. Part of Poplar – a dockland area devastated by wartime bombing – was designed as an ideal neighbourhood, to be rooted in community needs rather than abstract aesthetic dogmas. Controversial, however, both in its original plan and in its subsequent development, the project highlighted ongoing political and economic as well as conceptual tensions between urban planners, architectural modernists and the local inhabitants who were the focus of social reconstruction. A key challenge was to reconcile new and old – ideals of improvement and affection for the past. This challenge of course is fundamental to the relationship between architecture and memory more generally. And ideal-types of neighbourhood change. In the early 1980s the Jagonari women’s centre, set up initially as a resource for local Bangladeshi women, teamed up with a feminist architectural co-op to design a building in Whitechapel Road. Part of a broader reaction against uncompromising modernism, this project was a particularly successful product of the contemporary community architecture movement, a key remit of which was to respond to growing ethnic and religious diversity. Designed through consultation, it had inclusive and secular resonances: window grilles evoking Islamic ornament, juxtaposed with London brick; a ‘South Asian’ courtyard and a fictive belltower echoing both Asian buildings and Victorian schools.

In East London from the 1950s to the present, extensive redevelopment and demographic flux have contributed to often heated
Jagonari Women’s Educational Resource Centre, Whitechapel Road.
©Jane Garnett
debate about how historical pasts should inform the futures to be constructed. Christian churches, historically symbolic markers in the landscape, have presented particular challenges in a changing cultural context. My focus here is on architectural projects related to faith tradition and ideas of community which have confronted modernity in East London from the second half of the twentieth century.

An important feature of the Poplar display was the rebuilt Trinity Congregational Church on East India Dock Road – a substantial structure of concrete and glass, with a tall brick tower. Replacing an imposing chapel on the same site which had been a local landmark, the new church incorporated the old church bell, the only thing to survive the Blitz. The church complex included a hall, offices and clubrooms, to embody its wider community role. This multi-functionality was to be characteristic of modernist church architecture in this period, which, in constructively emblematising the modern church’s social engagement, yet risked the visual merging of churches into a generic municipal landscape of public buildings. One critic claimed that Trinity Church was known locally as the laundry.

Robert Maguire and Keith Murray, the architects commissioned at the same period to rebuild the nearby Anglican church of St Paul’s, Bow Common, were well aware of this risk, and worked with the Anglo-Catholic, politically radical vicar to create a church which would be liturgically distinctive and symbolic of the spiritual as well as material character of the congregation and neighbourhood. They did not want the church to be confused with a community hall. Centrally-focused, with a corona and lantern over the altar, the church incorporated a processional path around the perimeter, in order to give a sense of movement, as well as recollecting the long-standing processional tradition of the parish. Industrial materials were used, not just for economy, but to root the church in its socio-economic context.

Praised for its conceptual sophistication when it was consecrated (1960), by the late 1980s its relationship with the local environment was more problematic, not least because of massive South Asian and predominantly non-Christian immigration into the area. What part could such architectural rhetoric play in constructing community? The vicar from the mid-1990s to 2013, himself Anglo-
Indian, re-imagined the church as a means of intercultural dialogue. Collaborating with the V&A to mount an exhibition of tent panels embroidered by British South Asian women, or commissioning a shimmer-disc installation to light up the facade, he recaptured in new circumstances and new idioms the architects’ original concern to ground the church in the particular culture of the place. These artistic projects revitalised the architecture, and by association the long-standing social and, indeed, anti-racist tradition of the parish whose processional culture had been deployed in the 1950s to paint over the first ‘Keep Britain White’ slogans. Since the 1980s the Anglican Church as a whole had been self-consciously reinventing itself as a counter-cultural and socially critical voice, building on its historical legacy as the church of the territorially-constituted parish, not of a particular ‘gathered’ religious community. This was emblematised by the moral and political critique *Faith in the City* (1985), which provoked the hostility of Margaret Thatcher, and by the intensification of inner-city neighbourhood renewal.

Out of this same critical climate in the 1980s came a series of architectural projects in East London, both religious and secular. Amongst Anglican initiatives, prominent was the rebuilt St Bartholomew’s, East Ham, consecrated in 1983 – a brick and glass church on a busy arterial road near the Edwardian town hall and the high street. Its deliberately understated architecture, merging into the street, and combining church with cafe, nursery, health centre and social housing, conveyed the message that the Anglican church was at the heart of the neighbourhood, not just for churchgoers. Initially the only external marker of identity was a sculpture of a family group. The font, the only element from the old church, was made visible from the street, the urban traffic from within. The architectural associations are with modernity and urban ministry for those brought up in Britain at any point from the 1960s, and with recognisably Anglican tradition for more recent immigrants from Africa or South Asia. Until recently the church shared its worship space with Coptic, Jamaican Pentecostal and LGBT churches, and the local Labour MP held one of his weekly surgeries in the cafe on what was acknowledged as community-orientated territory.

Bromley by Bow Centre, a conversion of a 1950s Congregationalist church and nineteenth-century Sunday school, bears intriguing
John Bridgeman, 'Family Group', St Bartholomew's, East Ham. ©Jane Garnett
St Bartholomew’s, East Ham, view to the street.
Paula Haughney, ‘Mythical Creature’, Bromley by Bow Centre.
Bromley by Bow Centre, church and nursery. All images ©Jane Garnett
comparisons to both the previous cases. Also on a major local route, it too combines the church with other community functions, including a cafe and studios for artists and craftspeople. Here the church itself was redesigned to incorporate a nursery. Visible from the street, stone angels carved in one of the newly-built workshops fly over the space. Upstairs is a ‘quiet room’, used by both Christians and Muslims. The Centre, formally separate from the church, though with crossover of personnel, has evolved around a reclaimed park to include a pioneering holistic health centre bound in with adult education, advisory services and social enterprise. A ‘connection zone’ with computers now forms the entrance foyer. The social production of art – sculpture, mosaic and stained glass – has been seen from the beginning as a fundamental agent of conversation and empowerment. Architecturally permissive, even disorientating, the Centre has responded to local pluralism by offering varieties of engagement, as well as explicit room for experimentation and dissent.

Each of these spaces of Christian association has reconfigured it in an increasingly religiously plural and secular context. Geographically situated on older sites, they evoke old and create new memories of Christian social and political activism. Building on their historically-rooted neighbourhood visibility, they set up freer associations – visually and conceptually – to resist hegemonic ideas of community and to encourage the forging of different connections. □
Parallel lives and scattered families: European immigration rules and transnational family practices between Africa and Europe

By Hélène Neveu Kringelbach

As an anthropologist, one of the first things one learns is that marriage and family come in very different forms in different social contexts, and even within societies. In much of contemporary Europe, nuclear, heterosexual families exist side-by-side with ‘recomposed families’ in which children from previous relationships are shuttled back and forth, de facto polygamous families, and same-sex families with children. Secret families from previous lives are much more common than is usually assumed as people try to protect relationships in the present from being overshadowed by the past. If diversity is the norm in human life, why, then, is there increasing anxiety around ‘immigrant’ family practices in European states? And given the growing proportion of transnational families globally, what are the effects of immigration rules on family relationships across national borders?

One of the practices that has generated rising anxiety in many European states is polygamy in its various forms (cf. Charsley and Liversage 2012). Of course, states have always sought to control family practices, so in a sense this is not new. But what characterises the contemporary period is the way in which family practices are explicitly invoked by European Union (EU) states to delineate ever more rigid external as well as internal boundaries (Fassin 2010; Anderson 2013). Among those family practices associated with immigrant populations, polygamy has become increasingly targeted in French public discourse, particularly in reference to Muslims of African descent. African men with several wives are invariably portrayed as individuals with low moral standards, who
are too attached to African traditions to deserve either residency or citizenship. In 2005, several politicians and public intellectuals thus blamed the French riots on the disenchantment produced by immigrant childhoods spent in poor, polygamous households. Meanwhile, marriage has become one of the few remaining routes enabling non-EU citizens to acquire long-term legal status (Beck-Gernsheim 2011; Wray 2011). Marriage to EU citizens or residents, therefore, has become increasingly treated with suspicion, in the name of the fight against ‘marriages of convenience’. In this context, it is essential to understand the role played by immigration rules in transnational family practices. Through my research with transnational families between France, the UK and Senegal,25 I have found that many Senegalese men found themselves in the paradoxical situation of having to establish a new family in Europe in order to fulfill expectations of care towards their families back home. As Charsley and Liversage (2012: 60) remind us, polygamy encompasses a wide range of practices, ‘some of which are new constructions arising from the specific conditions of transnational migration’. Indeed, whereas in some cases ‘transnational polygamy’ may be seen as a migration strategy, in others it arises as the outcome of the migration process.

Transnational polygamy as an extension of regional practices
Polygamy has a long history in the Senegambian region, and the practice has come in many different forms. In recent decades, polygamy has played an important role in facilitating translocal migration, with men simultaneously maintaining a household in a rural area of origin and one in a city. In some instances, therefore, the aspiration to have a family in Europe and another in Senegal may be seen as an extension of translocal practices.

This was the case of Amadou, a gifted musician who lived in Dakar with his wife of many years and their children. The international career to which Amadou aspired was often hampered by the difficulty of getting visas, especially given the suspicion of being would-be migrants which touring artists now faced with embassies. Amadou was therefore cultivating relationships with foreign women visitors. His wife did not seem to mind the frenzy of female activity around...
her husband. She expected to have a co-wife at some point, and said that a foreign wife living far away was less likely to cause trouble. Amadou eventually met a European woman who was keen for him to settle in her home country and teach at her music school, and they were soon married in Senegal. When I met her, she praised Amadou’s first wife, whom she found to be a wonderful person. Amadou eventually moved abroad with her. Since then, Amadou and his new wife have had a child, and having been granted settlement, he is able to travel back home every year.

Parallel families as the outcome of the migration process

In contrast with Amadou, Djibril, a young Senegalese man who arrived in France in the mid-2000s, had never intended to establish a new family. On the contrary, he expected to work for a year or two, save up and return home to his young wife and child. Djibril travelled with a short-term visa, and simply overstayed. He soon found small jobs, but with the cost of living and debts from the cost of the trip to repay, he was unable to save much. His family discouraged him from returning home empty-handed, for then the sacrifice of his departure would have been in vain. Moreover, there was fear that leaving before acquiring legal status would prevent him from being able to travel back to Europe.

Djibril eventually met a young French woman who soon became pregnant by him. A lawyer assured him that fathering a French child would likely entitle him to temporary settlement. A Muslim wedding was held in Senegal, *in absentia*, a common practice in the region. Djibril was eventually granted legal status on grounds of paternity, but he was now caught in a difficult situation: he had two wives, neither of whom knew about the other. Paradoxically, it was establishing a new family that made it possible for him to travel back to Senegal to visit his first wife and child. He told his Senegalese wife about the French one, but the French wife was not to know about the Senegalese one for Djibril believed (inaccurately) that a European woman would never go along with polygamy. Djibril often felt the strain of having to manage the flow of information about his past life in order to secure his future in France. Having arrived in France with the intention of caring for his wife and other relatives back home before returning to a monogamous
marriage, he also felt trapped in a situation in which either choice would mean leaving loved ones behind. Djibril’s case exemplifies the many situations in which polygamy is the result of a protracted period of irregularity, with little hope of acquiring a dignified life as someone able to care for his family back home. It also illustrates the mutual constitution of immigration rules and marriage practices.

The paradoxes of transnational polygyny
The contemporary period is marked by the increasingly transnational character of families. Social reproduction is therefore highly contingent on cross-border mobility. Migrants from African countries to Europe are often caught up between three forces in tension with each other: the moral economy of kinship back home, ideas about love and nuclear family in their new households, and European states’ intent on controlling marriage migration and family reunification by imposing rigid standards for what constitutes appropriate forms of love, intimacy, and family. In this confrontation, however, power lies squarely with states. New family arrangements and immigration rules are mutually constituted, but this mutual constitution is by no means a politically neutral process since destination states have the legal power to decide which family practices will be regarded as acceptable. Increasingly, sovereignty involves the simultaneous capacity to control human mobility and to impose specific family values and arrangements.

Transnational polygyny involving Senegalese men having a wife in Europe and another in Senegal appear in some cases as extensions of older practices. In other cases, however, it is the outcome of migration trajectories in an increasingly restrictive context. While these patterns seem to support current European discourses about African men trying to cheat the system to obtain visas, it is far too simplistic to criminalise those trajectories. Firstly, they may be explained by the absence of alternatives for regular migration. Secondly, marriage aspirations and ideas of love in Africa as elsewhere are almost always linked to hopes of social and geographic mobility. It does not make sense, therefore, to assume that these men do not care for their European families. There is often a strong emotional attachment to the new family abroad, especially when children are born. Men end up being caught up between two families among whom they must
share their resources, which inevitably leads to tensions. This is especially the case when they remain dependent on their European spouse to renew their initial residence permit. These competing demands put tremendous strain on the migrants, which is intensified by European social climates increasingly hostile to Muslim men. In the Senegalese context however, where polygyny has come to be associated with translocal migration, having a spouse and children in two places makes sense in moral terms. French public discourse condemns polygamy as immoral and incompatible with human rights, but French immigration laws actually reinforce the practice by pushing individuals into marriage if they want to stay. Ultimately, one may ask what the consequences will be for social cohesion in European nations when significant numbers of migrants, themselves often future citizens, are pushed into practices for which they end up being stigmatised. □
Transnational school-based networks: diaspora, mobilities, and belonging

By Mette Louise Berg

Formal education has been a central tenet in the quest for modernity and nationhood across post-colonial societies in the twentieth century. Schools have been harnessed to ‘inculcate the skills, subjectivities, and disciplines that undergird the modern nation-state’ (Levinson and Holland 1996) with the aim of producing national subjects. Yet education also fosters aspirations of geographic mobility beyond national borders. In Cuba this tension has proven especially challenging for the socialist government.

The Lenin School was founded in Havana, Cuba, in the early 1970s as an academically selective boarding school for the most gifted pupils in the Province of Havana. Its founding ethos was one of creating the so-called New Man (el Hombre Nuevo), a gendered and racialised subject who would serve the Revolution and work towards building a communist society. The school was built on the outskirts of the city and constituted a town unto itself with accommodation, educational, sports and leisure facilities all on-site, exemplary of a kind of ‘total institution’ as defined by the sociologist Erving Goffman (1968). The age range of pupils has varied over time, and is currently 16–18, but in some periods children as young as 12 were admitted. The school is thus an important formative experience in the transition from childhood to adult life for its pupils. A woman now living in New Jersey stated emphatically: ‘the school made me who I am.’ While not all alumni feel so strongly about the school, for many it is a very significant part of their self-identification, and continues to be so even decades after they graduated, and even if they have long since left Cuba.

The degree of identification is evident in a statement by a Lenin
graduate now living in Spain. For her, being an alumna of La Lenin is a vital aspect of her self-identification, to the extent that she claims it as her homeland: ‘La Lenin is my passport’ she said, and explained that when people ask her where she is from, she would say ‘I am from La Lenin’. This statement resonates with similar assertions by other alumni, who, like her, live in diaspora. For these La Lenin alumni, school-based identification is experienced and narrated as a kind of homeland identification, thus enabling them to sidestep the vexed issue of allegiance to or rejection of the Cuban government which otherwise dominates Cuban diaspora discourse.

Identification with the school manifests itself in a plethora of internet sites dedicated to the school, most prominent of which is www.lalenin.com (‘La Lenin’ is the name by which the school is popularly known). Offline, alumni maintain friendships forged at the school, often transnationally. Such affective networks of school-based friendships and family relations – the two are increasingly intertwined as alumni inter-marry, and recent graduates often constitute the second generation in their family to attend the school – constitute a transnational web of belonging, produced and reproduced on- and offline through memories, narratives, and embodied performances of alumni identity. Given the close links between education and the objective of constructing a modern, independent, socialist state, it is somewhat ironic that La Lenin has produced subjects who identify with the school over and above the nation. It also suggests a paradox: the Cuban government founded the school to produce political subjects who would serve and govern socialist Cuba. By definition, if the school was successful, its alumni would therefore stay.

These paradoxical practices of identification and belonging raise questions about how diasporas are formed and the degree to which diasporans identify with their homeland over and above other modes of diasporic identification. To illustrate, diasporans may identify first and foremost as someone belonging to a particular family or lineage, or as someone from a specific village, region, or city rather than as nationals of a country or imagined homeland. Or they may think of themselves primarily as members of a particular religious group or a profession. In his contribution to this collection, Nick Van Hear proposes a disaggregation of three different spheres of
diaspora engagement, namely the household or extended family sphere; the known community sphere; and the imagined community of the nation. Disaggregating diaspora engagement in this way can help us understand not only the connections and disconnections between diasporans and those ‘at home’, but also the social texture of the engagement. In this chapter I provide an empirical example of diasporic connectedness emerging from the sphere of the known community, specifically the networks of the alumni of the Lenin School. Their engagement in this sphere is however also entangled with engagement in the two other spheres, as I illustrate below.

The majority of La Lenin alumni go on to study within the fields of science, engineering or architecture, and they are therefore often well placed to help each other in the world of work. Because their children also often attend the school, the web of connections and the scope for support has widened and deepened over time. As an example, Beatriz, a woman in her fifties living in Havana, was a pupil at the school in the 1970s; several of her close relatives also attended after her. She married a schoolmate with whom she had two children, who also went to the school. After divorcing, Beatriz married another alumnus. These relations of kin, friends and marriage make up a dense web against which Beatriz’s life unfolds. When she moved to a new neighbourhood, a fellow alumnus introduced her and her husband to other neighbours, and she also secured her current job thanks to her alumni network. When alumni leave Cuba, this same web of affective relationships and material support extends transnationally with alumni staying in touch like other transnational migrants do, and helping each other in the new country.

Sometimes transnational mobility itself is facilitated with the help of other alumni. To illustrate, Andris, who was at the school in the 1990s, left Cuba with a scholarship to study at a Spanish university. A friend from La Lenin who was already living in Spain helped him during the application process and when he arrived his friends from La Lenin picked him up at the airport. The scope for mutual support is greater where La Lenin alumni are residentially clustered, principally in the US – in particular in Miami – and in Barcelona and Madrid in Spain. Gladys was at the school in the early 1980s, and is married to another alumnus. She works at a public university in
Miami where she often meets La Lenin alumni among the students. She said she spots them from their manner of speaking and, when she can, helps them find jobs through other alumni who are running businesses in the Miami area.

To conclude, school-based diaspora networks are common across many diasporic groups; they can command considerable loyalty, and often mobilise diasporans who are relatively well-educated. However, school-based diaspora networks and associations have not been studied systematically. Rather, they are often lumped together with hometown associations in diaspora literature, but are in fact quite distinct from these, e.g. in the class profile of their constituents. School-based diaspora networks highlight the intimate nexus between social and spatial mobility: social mobility through schooling often leads to desires for spatial mobility, while spatial mobility is often pursued or desired in order to facilitate social mobility. The case of transnational school-based networks centring on the Lenin School in Havana illustrates this nexus. Approaching diaspora engagement from the middle sphere of engagement in the known community, in this case a school-based network, opens up the possibility of problematising the relationship between nation/nationalism and diaspora. It pushes us to consider the social texture of diaspora engagement, its affective hold on diasporans, and helps us fine-tune our understanding of social differentiation within diaspora groups.27
New ICT and mobility in Africa

By Mirjam de Bruijn

My research experience as an anthropologist started in West and Central Africa: in northern Cameroon in 1986, in Mali from 1987 onwards, in Chad from 2001 and then in Cameroon again in 2006. It has always been difficult to pinpoint my research area due to the mobility of the people I work with, namely pastoralists, street children, refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and migrants, all of whom have a mobile lifestyle. Increasingly, I have been focusing on the connections between places, and have abandoned in-depth research in one place (de Bruijn and van Dijk 2012). I mean this literally. The 1990s were challenging and ‘mobility’ as a guiding concept was emerging among anthropologists. The idea that we could ‘find’ answers to the workings of society in places was replaced by the insight that we had to understand societies in space (Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Clifford 1992), which meant that societies were being defined as multi-sited and mobile (de Bruijn et al. 2001). These notions of space and mobility were boosted by the emerging digital environment, and globalisation has become a central paradigm. The arrival of mobile telephony and, more recently, high-speed internet has dramatically changed the spatiality of societies. This short essay reflects on mobility and the way we, as researchers, interact with our ‘field’ and how this ‘field’ is interacting with the world. When we view social change from a perspective of mobility we will need to reinterpret ‘othering’, one of the central concepts of anthropology. New identities and ethnicities are born out of this process, both for the researcher as well as for the researched.

Are these dynamics of identification changing or intensifying with
the advance of information and communications technology (ICT) in Africa? ICT influences notions of spatiality and distance. While spatiality in relation to mobile cultures was defined in the past in terms of distance and difficult communication, today it is part of the digital highway and that has given distance another meaning. But access to ICT also influences the way people send out messages about themselves and others and how these are received. It is important also to realise how ICT influences access to information, both about the other and about self in relation to the other. The notions of distance, portrayal and information are, therefore, three dimensions that influence identification in terms of ethnicity, othering and belonging in the era of new ICT.

These ideas can be related to my extensive experiences with Fulani nomads in the Sahelian area, specifically Central Africa – Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad – and northern Mali. The Fulani nomads form part of hierarchical societies in which they are or were a free group that roams with their cattle in an area that is protected of old by the hegemony of Fulani chiefdoms or rules relating to access to water points and pasture areas. In such a system, being informed about the condition of pastureland and markets is important. Travel itself has long been nomads’ main communication strategy and their identity is defined by their mobility and freedom to move. Nomads therefore identify with freedom. This is probably also expressed in the way in which they present themselves to others, by adopting specific ways of dressing and arranging their hair, since beauty is an important marker in their society. They claim difference from surrounding groups. However the converse of this attitude is that they are also seen as ‘the other’, the stranger, by the societies in which they settle for a while. Being in the position of ‘stranger’ may invite demarcations in times of conflict.

Possibilities for movement have changed tremendously in the last few decades, and increasing population growth and pressure on land have forced nomads to move to other pasture areas or to become sedentary. The droughts in the 1970s and 1980s had a marked effect. Not only were nomads forced to move on, but they became a group that needed defending, which led to the emergence of associations to defend the rights of the Fulani. These associations were headed by
Fulani elites who used the image of the Fulani nomad as a vehicle to fight their own causes. Freedom and beauty have become important parts of the defence strategy of the elites and their associations. They have put the Fulani on a special plateau. Examples of such organisations include the international Taabital Pulaaku and the Cameroonian association MBOSCUDA.

While the experience of physical mobility has changed, the era of mobile telephony has introduced new forms of mobility that have also been embraced by nomads. The mobile phone appears to fit the lifestyle of this mobile/nomadic society perfectly. The areas where they live may not be the best connected but this is changing rapidly and nomads without a phone or access to a phone are rare today in northern Chad, central Mali and Cameroon. They use their phones to be in contact with their mobile community. Communication by voice and increasingly through music and film clips has also reached nomads who are often illiterate but certainly in need of information about the state of their country. The process of accessing information and greater contact between family members means people are better informed and feel increasingly connected to each other. Ahmadou and I first met in 1990 when we were starting our PhD project in central Mali. His father became our host and, when he died, Ahmadou replaced him. Ahmadou was the first in his camp to acquire a mobile phone in 2007, and used it to contact me and people in the city, and to raise money for his campaign to become the political leader of his group, which was successful. Mobile telephony took a huge leap forward in 2012 due to the war in the region. Being the leader in this difficult period, Ahmadou was the spokesman for his people, getting information from everywhere by calling, but also receiving short videos on his son’s phone. I am still amazed by these rapid developments and the way Ahmadou’s position has changed, clearly as a result of what the mobile phone allowed him to do. Such developments were unimaginable in 1990, when messages were still being sent with travellers, on cassette or, in rare cases, by radio.

The Fulani associations have developed differently, accessing the internet space from urban centres in Africa and Europe, with their outreach growing enormously. Websites show their activities, networks are formed and lists are sent out and discussions take place.
about language, culture and political issues. These associations tend to portray stereotypical images of the group for which they stand. In the case of the Fulani, these associations are including political issues that relate to the troubles that nomadism is encountering in many parts of Africa today. They portray nomads as non-modern and as victims, while their sites use images of their beautiful clothes and jewellery and typical figures from the ethnic group. As such, MBOSCUDA has succeeded in winning indigenous status for the nomadic Fulani, and Taabital Pulaaku has become a huge organisation that unites Fulani all over the world.
These associations used to be disconnected from the nomads on the ground but this has also changed. Illiterate nomads are increasingly present in cyberspace. They are contacting people from MBOSCUDA and Taabital Pulaaku, and internalising their discourses. Nomads increasingly phrase their situation in terms of marginality. Ahmadou has become part of these internet discussions, not as a member as he does not access the internet, but as an acquaintance of people who do and with whom he is in contact by phone within Mali and abroad. He has become part of networks that largely bypass his old networks as a travelling nomad. Today he is involved in global discussions about the marginalisation of nomads. Also the nomads in Cameroon have become part of MBOSCUDA, which is defending their rights.

The individual adoption of the mobile phone and increasing connections with worldwide associations have given new meaning to the Fulani as an ethnic category. Processes of identification go hand-in-hand with ethnicisation and othering. Will these developments lead to the demarcation of borders that may end in conflicts? Or will the associations and ethnicisation lead to a different position for the Fulani in society, where ethnicisation becomes commercialised, is used in advertisements and, as such, definitively enters the global
idiom? (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009) These advertisements and symbols hide a history of strangers, othering and belonging, that can easily be placed within a reality of conflict. □
Life in refuge: across Rwanda’s camps and Uganda’s settlements

By Patrycja Stys

This is the view from the entrance to Rwanda’s Gihembe Refugee Camp. Getting here, like accessing any other camp in Rwanda or settlement in Uganda, entails a long journey over dirt roads and winding creeks. The seeming remoteness of these sites of refuge, however, is an illusion. They are connected by invisible links of mobile networks, as well as their residents’ physical mobility – be it to visit relatives or former neighbours, celebrate births and marriages or mourn deaths, engage in commerce or oversee lands and properties left in home countries. The spaces between are spectacularly vast, and just as incredibly overcome. ©Patrycja Stys
The camps themselves are akin to sprawling city-states, located far from host states’ own bustling towns. Like Rwanda’s Kiziba Camp, pictured here, they spill down hilltops in streams of buildings housing healthcare centres, schools, businesses, and people. They have their own boundaries, bordered with logs or rope. Security guards check your papers, ensuring you have acquired the proper documents to be granted access. ©Patrycja Stys
Once inside, it takes a few days to formulate a mental map of these city-states’ subdivisions, the quarters or districts into which they are partitioned. Broad streets crisscross narrow alleyways, running between buildings whose varied construction of round kitchens, square rooms, or vaulted hallways – each painted in all-coloured solids or elaborate patterns – betrays the diverse nationalities and regionalities of their occupants. This is one such road, in Nakivale refugee settlement (Old Congo Area, to be precise) in Uganda. ©Patrycja Stys
Within these subdivisions of refugee city-states, men and women live, struggle, pursue education and business, and care for their children. They do not merely wait for peace to come to their home countries, to return or be resettled; they build their futures with the scarcest of materials, surpassing the most trying of circumstances. This is Francine. She resides in Kyaka II, Uganda, and works as a seamstress in her own shop. Sophie, her daughter, likes to assist her mother after school. ©Patrycja Stys
Françoise also lives in Uganda, in Kyangwali Refugee Settlement. He and his friends raised money working in others’ fields, making bricks, and doing odd jobs in order to purchase a motorcycle, then others. Together, they run a motorcycle taxi service that carries passengers between the city-states’ districts, to market, to see the doctor, or visit someone who lives further away. Their colleagues run a similar bicycle service, and opened a repair shop where they mend punctured tires and replace rusted chains. ©Patrycja Stys
Different quarters and districts – across Uganda’s settlements and Rwanda’s camps – hold weekly markets. Vibrantly coloured and patterned fabrics are interwoven with stands of fruits and vegetables over which customers and merchants haggle. Goods on offer are produced by the city-states’ residents, or carried by truck or foot from the nearest towns. What is unavailable locally is imported by barter or bargain. The trade networks that make these exchanges possible and profitable belie the seeming isolation of these interconnected city-states. This is a market in Kiziba Camp, Rwanda. ©Patrycja Stys
Aline, following her trip to the market, waits her turn outside a salon in Kyangwali, Uganda. ‘My daughter insists on going first. So now I’m out here, talking to you, with my hair a mess.’ ©Patrycja Stys
When UNHCR funding ran out for secondary school scholarships in Gihembe Camp, Rwanda, students themselves founded and funded the Hope School. They raised money by making bricks, cleaning, washing clothing, and working in others’ fields. They recruited teachers from inside the camp. The project drew the attention of aid agencies, which contributed books and scholastic materials. Today, children from Nyabiheke and Kiziba make the long voyage to participate in the Hope School, which runs competitions to send its brightest students to university. ©Patrycja Stys
School-age children take the same journeys between Rwanda’s camps to participate in football championships in Kiziba, which has the largest stadium and club. Here, they are coached by Antha Banza, who used to work at the Rwanda Film Institute in Kigali before moving to the camp with his daughters. His teams encompass all age groups, boys and girls alike. ©Patrycja Stys
This is James. He was born in Kiziba, and had stopped crying shortly before this photograph was taken. He had recently broken his arm and had just had a cast put on it at the health centre. ‘It’s a good thing you had that camera with you. He’s more interested in playing with it now than in the pain in his arm. But don’t believe him when he tells you he broke it during football. He fell over his feet on his way to the pitch,’ his mother told me. James was far from pleased by her disclosure. ©Patrycja Stys
Meet Frankie. His mother and I were discussing the community organisations and clubs in which she participated in Nyabiheke Camp, Rwanda. When I asked about her children, Constance said Frankie had started karate, but quit shortly thereafter. ‘They hit me!’ Frankie retorted. The photograph captures his mother’s reaction. ©Patrycja Stys
Across these spaces and places of refuge, grandparents tell grandchildren tales they ought to know, of their origins and their countries in times before the conflict that precipitated their families’ flight. This elder is a Banyamulenge Community Leader in Kiziba Camp, Rwanda. He recounts memories of the Kingdom of Vyura in Southeastern Congo, whose three kings fled to three different camps, taking their communities with them. Their descendants continue to meet regularly, despite the distances that separate them. They teach youth about their culture and the life and lives long-lost, reviving their traditions in exile – along with so many other communities. ©Patrycja Stys
Whilst remembering the past, people embrace the future. Women, many for the first time in exile, have taken positions of leadership in camp governance. In addition to teaching their children of the lands and customs from which they originated, they instruct them in gender equality and human rights. Amongst themselves, they debate representation and service provision, programmes to counter and address domestic abuse, and mechanisms to encourage young girls to pursue higher education. This is Jeanette Buregiyeya, Women’s Representative in Kyaka II, Uganda. ©Patrycja Stys
Roma, statelessness and Yugo-nostalgia

By Nando Sigona

I have known A. for fifteen years, but only visited him at home for the first time in April 2005, in a nomad camp in Florence. His home was made up of two caravans and an old van, which he shared with his wife, three sons, a daughter, a daughter-in-law and three grandchildren. To join together the two caravans there was a tin-roofed patio. It is in this area that, especially during spring and summer, the family used to have meals and welcome guests.

When I arrived, A. kindly invited me to sit at the long table outside. His wife B. was kneading bread dough at the other end of the table with the help of her daughter-in-law. She briefly interrupted her work to serve us some tea and coffee. Before starting our conversation, A. apologised for the condition of the camp. It was my first time there and he wanted to make sure that I knew that this was not the kind of place he would like to live in, and that the camp was very different from their home back in Kosovo. He also wanted to show me something. I followed him inside one of the caravans. There was hardly space to step inside. The caravan was completely packed with papers, books, memorabilia from Yugoslavia and old and new photos. ‘This is my library’, he said with pride. We went back to our chairs; he had taken a folder from the library which he opened on the table. It was filled with newspaper articles, leaflets, and photos taken at demonstrations in Florence and of their home town, Mitrovica. One of the photos showed their family home, which was bombarded and looted during the 1999 Kosovo war. However, the centrepiece of the folder – at least with respect to the story I am going to tell here – was the cover page of an old issue of the weekly Paris Match. On the cover
there was a family portrait of Marshal Tito (1892–1980) and his wife sitting on a bench. A. commented:

*When Tito was in power, our life in Yugoslavia was by far better. Now we do not dare to go back to Kosovo; it is extremely dangerous for us. Here at least we can survive.*
This conversation and the striking contrast between the living conditions in the camp, Italian dominant discourse on Roma as stateless and nomadic, and the quest for dignity and respect exuding from the pile of letters, articles, and photos clustered in the derelict caravan prompted me to delve into the history of Yugoslavia and Kosovo, and to visit the villages and towns of some of my research participants.

In 2008, a few months after Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, I went to Kosovo to carry out fieldwork on the integration strategy for Roma and the role of Roma leadership in the transition to the new independent state (Sigona 2009, 2012). During my field research, I visited Roma settlements in southern Serbian enclaves, an Internationally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp and the Roma neighbourhood (mahala) in Mitrovica in the north where Serbia retained de facto control of the territory, and urban areas where the Roma lived in closer proximity to the Albanian speaking majority.

Romani people have lived in Kosovo for centuries. Since the nineteenth century, as a result of the process of dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, they have been under pressure to assimilate and align themselves to one or other of the main ethnic groups laying nationalist claims to the territory.

Compressed between two parallel social and political systems, Romani communities adapted and adjusted, developing various, and sometimes diverging, strategies of survival. Rather than looking at the 1999 war in isolation, when ‘[Roma] loyalty was bid over in a conflict which tolerated no neutrality’ and ‘[Roma] were forced to choose a side in a conflict in which there was no Romani side’ (Cahn and Peric 1999: 6), I saw the war and its consequences as part of a continuum in which periods of ethnic tensions and conflicts have been intercalated with periods of relative peace and cooperation.

This historical periodisation was present in the narratives of my informants. They often nostalgically evoked pre-Milošević era as a time of cultural, social and economic development for Romani communities. The death of Tito marks a crucial transition towards the polarisation of ethnic relations in former Yugoslavia and the surge of different nationalisms that gradually transformed the political power structure and as a result also everyday relationships between ethnic groups.
And the present, instead, is the era of international human rights but also of the arrival of foreign consultants and experts bringing their ‘pre-cooked recipes’, as one of them said, for Kosovo’s problems.

We sat in the common room of the Leposavic IDP camp, a room furnished with a few computers and a long table. The walls were decorated with a few photos, including two old portraits of Marshal Tito in white navy uniform and in plainclothes. D. spoke while peering at a leaflet he was preparing for a public event:

*I like the Socialist era because it was a time when everyone was equal and had equal rights and you didn’t think much about differences.*

The memory of Tito’s Yugoslavia is very much alive in Yugoslav Roma’s accounts, in Kosovo and in Italy alike. Many recall the contribution that members of their enlarged families made to the partisan victory over Nazis, a contribution that was publicly celebrated by the new Yugoslav republic born in 1945. In the 1950s, Romani activists became more and more involved in the ranks of the Communist Party. Cultural initiatives and associations flourished,
and a monthly newspaper in Romani language (Romano Lil) was established in Belgrade.

In 1974, the project of creating a common pan-Yugoslav identity that had guided identity politics for two decades was abandoned, and a more confederative state based on an ideology of national communism was established. The growing nationalisation of the federal system initiated in the mid-1960s crystallised in the 1974 Constitution, transforming the republican units and provinces into basic actors of the system.

An important corollary of this process was that the Roma were officially recognised as ‘ethnic group’ now that the ‘Yugoslav identity’ no longer existed as a communal political identity. This recognition in the 1974 Constitution marked an important departure for the Roma, who became assimilated into the ‘ethnic quota’ system governing access to key public resources and jobs. Importantly, too, they became officially recognised as peers among the kaleidoscope of Yugoslavian communities.

However, the mechanism designed by the new Constitution began to crack after the death of Marshal Tito in 1980. Without the unifying charisma of the founding father of Yugoslavia, the country was left under the control of the republican and provincial communist elites. In the process, the Roma were caught between conflicting national projects, and left socially and economically excluded.

A’s nostalgic reclaiming of Tito is crucial to his sense of belonging in Italy where he sees the history of his family and of many Roma refugees erased by Italian hegemonic discourse on the Roma as stateless and nomadic, with no roots other than some abstract and distant Indian ancestry, and to Roma IDPs in new post-Yugoslav states who battle for preserving a meaningful and politically viable presence for them there. □
Governance and mobilisation: old and new actors
The rise of diaspora institutions

By Alan Gamlen

Why do governments form institutions devoted to emigrants and their descendants in the diaspora? Migration policy is often equated with immigration policy, but every immigrant is also an emigrant with ties to a place of origin, and origin states are now far from passive in managing these ties. Formal executive and legislative government offices tasked with diaspora populations – diaspora institutions – have rapidly become a regular feature of political life in many parts of the world: only a handful existed in 1980, but currently over half of United Nations Member States now have one (see Figure 1), and many are fully fledged government ministries.

Diaspora institutions have existed as far back as the nineteenth century, but their recent rise is unprecedented. These institutions matter because they connect recent developments in the global governance of migration, with current patterns of national and transnational sovereignty and citizenship, and new ways of constructing individual identity in relation to new collectivities. They have been overlooked partly because of this newness, but also partly because they operate in the grey zone between domestic politics and international relations – a zone that is growing more dynamic and significant in world politics.

Existing research on diaspora institutions is mainly in the form of single country case studies, without much comparative analysis and almost no quantitative work, to the detriment of theoretical developments. The ‘Diaspora Engagement Policies’ project aims to address this gap, developing a new theoretical approach to explain the rise of diaspora institutions, based on new mixed methods research
Figure 1. The rise of diaspora institutions: Percentage of United Nations Member States with formal offices for emigrants and their descendants, by institution type, 1980–2014. Data source: Alan Gamlen
covering all states in the United Nations system over a period of several decades.

**Tapping diaspora resources and embracing lost members**

Conventional explanations for the rise of this phenomena fall into two main categories which I will call *tapping* and *embracing*. Perhaps the most common approach in this field is to argue that origin states establish diaspora institutions as they seek to ‘tap’ the material resources of their diasporas in pursuit of national interests. One version of this approach is economic: it suggests that the primary function of origin-state diaspora institutions is to help organise and obligate diaspora groups to remit, invest, donate, or travel to the origin country, or share their development-friendly expertise from afar, off-setting ‘brain drain’. Although they shun the word itself, such initiatives may serve the function of a tax aimed at compensating origin states for human capital lost through emigration.

Another version of the tapping perspective focuses on diplomacy and security interests. Almost every state has or wants an ethnic lobby group in Washington DC, and some diaspora institutions cultivate such groups openly. Still more cloak their lobbying in educational and cultural co-operation initiatives or efforts to protect and promote the welfare and interests of emigrants and their descendants – conventional consular activities which are possible so long as a state maintains a sufficiently extensive network of formal diplomatic ties. Conflict-torn states may also form diaspora institutions to disrupt hostile networks of exile militants, or to cultivate diaspora allies who may bring resources and influence to bear in peace-building and reconstruction processes.

A second common theoretical approach – the *embracing* perspective – focuses on state identities rather than interests, arguing that diaspora institutions indicate the emergence of what Rainer Bauböck calls external citizenship: the idea that the state represents a political community comprising more than just the population within its borders (see Bauböck 2009). When this community is an ethnic nation dispersed across multiple state territories, diaspora institutions may express ‘long-distance nationalism’ (Anderson 2002) or ‘trans-sovereign nationalism’ (Csergő and Goldgeier 2004) which can be
associated with right-wing politics in the origin state, or with the efforts of authoritarian rulers to shore up their strength at home and abroad.

On the other hand, diaspora institutions may aim to engage a multicultural diaspora rather than a mono-ethnic one, as studies have suggested to be the case in Germany and South Korea (see Brubacker and Kim 2011). They may be established to help states integrate into a supra-national polity, or convey the will of democratising governments to welcome back exiles of a past authoritarian regime. Indeed, diaspora institutions may demonstrate democracy in action, if they emerge where expatriate voting provisions and other opportunity structures permit emigrants and their descendants to gain an institutional foothold in the origin state. Here too the origin state embraces lost members of the nation, even if the nation is not imagined ethnically.

Diaspora institutions and diaspora governance

By focusing on state interests and the domestic identities underpinning them, tapping and embracing perspectives have worked well to explain the emergence of diaspora institutions in specific country case studies. However, explaining the convergence of so many countries on similar policy models requires more attention to processes at the international level, to show how state action is shaped by global norms. In particular, I advocate more focus on the role of international organisations promoting ‘diaspora engagement’ as a model of decentralised global governance in the area of international migration. I call this the governing perspective.

States and international organisations have long recognised the need for more international co-operation over migration, but been reluctant to form anything like a World Trade Organisation (WTO) for human mobility. Diaspora institutions have grown popular precisely because they facilitate co-operation but they do not require a centralised multilateral bureaucracy. Instead, they provide a focal point for direct collaboration between origin and destination states linked by specific migration flows. In this way diaspora institutions nominally allow origin states not only to recoup emigrant resources through financial and social remittances, but also to bear some responsibility for regulating international recruitment, combating
trafficking and money laundering, upholding migrants’ rights, and ensuring smooth integration or return migration – all tasks that would otherwise fall solely to destination states.

This responsibility sharing supposedly turns migration from a zero-sum game into a ‘win-win-win’ where migrants and states of origin and destination all benefit. For these reasons, diaspora institutions have been enthusiastically promoted by, among others, the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the International Organization for Migration, the United Nations High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, and leading think tanks like the Migration Policy Institute. Our project results reveal that, the worldwide proliferation of diaspora institutions partly results from their deliberate diffusion by international organisations in this way. From there, they have been adopted and adapted by an increasingly broad range of states.

**Researching diaspora institutions**

Diaspora institutions are the central focus of the ‘Diaspora Engagement Policies’ project, a five-year initiative within the ODP. The project uses mixed research methods, involving both quantitative and qualitative techniques. The quantitative component involves collecting and analysing a new dataset on diaspora institutions covering all United Nations Member States from 1980 to 2014, providing an overview of what kinds of states form what kinds of institutions. Meanwhile the qualitative element of the research directly asks a wide range of senior policy makers involved in diaspora institutions what they have done and why.

In this way, the research shows that the rush by migrants’ origin states to establish diaspora institutions is less about domestically formed identities and interests, and more about a wider search for means of international co-operation in the area of global migration. For example it shows that, contrary to the common wisdom, diaspora institutions are not more likely to emerge in states that depend on remittances, suffer ‘brain drain’, or those that are governed by right-wing political parties or autocratic regimes. Instead it shows that diaspora intuitions have often been established by senior origin-state politicians and policy
makers acting on advice from international organisations.

In this way, the research suggests that states’ diaspora initiatives are part of wider international efforts to govern global migration. Advised and urged by experts in think tanks and international organisations to seek ‘migration for development’, states are being steered towards an appreciation of how engaging diasporas furthers their own interests. What began as a good idea is gradually gathering the moral force of convention. Bound up with the reshaping of group identities and the re-framing of government interests, diaspora institutions are part and parcel of important shifts in the stuff of twenty-first century nation-states. □
The animators: how diasporas mobilise to contest authoritarian states

By Alexander Betts and William Jones

Our work aims to provide an in-depth and granular analysis of contemporary transnational politics. In order to do this, we examine how diasporas form to contest authoritarian states in Africa. How do they emerge and adapt? What determines the agendas they adopt and the institutional forms they assume? Under what conditions are they successful in having impact upon the politics of the homeland? It focuses on African examples, with two in-depth case studies: Zimbabwe and Rwanda, both of which are authoritarian states with two of the putatively most active contemporary African diasporas.

Based on extensive multi-sited fieldwork carried out over two years in South Africa, Botswana, Uganda, the UK, Belgium, and France, our project traces the recent historical evolution of these transnational communities. It shows how, far from being static or permanent, diasporas are inherently political entities that have dynamic ‘lifecycles’: they are born, they live, they die, and they even have afterlives. Their existence and the forms they take are historically and politically contingent. Crucially, these lifecycles, and the durability of the diaspora, are determined not by the inherent qualities of the diaspora but by the role of elite ‘animators’, who make resources available to the diaspora.

Overall, the project takes up the challenge made by other scholars of diasporas, recognising that they are dynamic rather than static, and that they are frequently mobilised by external actors for particular political ends. On an empirical level, we contribute two untold and important transnational political histories: of the Rwandan (2003–2013) and Zimbabwean (2001–2013) diasporas. On a theoretical level,
the project offers insights into how political science and international relations can better conceptualise transnational politics in the early twenty-first century.

Our work begins with an empirical puzzle, which existing theories struggle to address: namely, some diasporas exhibit ‘lifecycles’. They are born at particular moments, they may decline, dissipate, and die. And they may also exhibit afterlives, maintaining the external façade of existence even after their meaningful activities have long since ended. While this is by no means the case for all diasporas, some appear to have less durability and greater cyclicality than others. This observation leads us to a particular research question: how can we explain diaspora formation? In other words, what determines whether particular communities come to regard themselves and behave as diasporas in the first place? What determines the institutional form they take? What determines their agendas? What explains their relative durability over time or, alternatively, their decline and disappearance?

We examine this political process in a particular context: diaspora formation to contest competitive authoritarian states in Africa. Why? This is a context in which most of the relevant politics takes place outside of the state. By definition, opportunities for political contestation on the territory of the state are greatly restricted and so often take place transnationally. In Rwanda, 2003 represents Faustin Twagiramungu’s defeat in the Rwandan elections at the end of the transitional period, after which the main context of political contestation becomes transnational. In Zimbabwe, 2001 represents the formation of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, which is, similarly, a moment when the most viable avenues for political contestation become transnational. Both Rwanda and Zimbabwe are competitive authoritarian states in Africa in which during this period a significant amount of political contestation has been transnational. Both are among the most widely recognised contemporary African diasporas, and yet both also exhibit ‘lifecycles’ within which those diasporas are born, die, and have afterlives.

In both main case studies we engage in in-depth process-tracing to show the lifecycle of the two diasporas (our dependent variable) and we examine how the characteristics of the animators (our independent variable) have influenced those trajectories. We
structure both cases in a similar way in order to allow the case studies to be read both independently and comparatively. Both the Zimbabwe and Rwanda sections explore: i) the birth of the diaspora; ii) its death and political afterlife; and iii) its often neglected humanitarian role that endures even after avenues for meaningful political activity may have closed.

In the case of Zimbabwe, we argue that much of what we think of as the political organisations of the ‘Zimbabwean diaspora’ are a by-product of attempts by non-Zimbabweans to contest the Zimbabwean state up until the 2008 elections. In particular, we argue, a loose network of South Africa-based elites, keen to influence South Africa’s bilateral policy vis-à-vis Zimbabwe, mobilised donor resources to animate the diaspora. In other words, the diaspora was effectively an instrumentalised tool with which a small group contested ZANU-PF rule in Zimbabwe. However, once the structures of the Government of National Unity emerged in Zimbabwe from 2008, and the main site of Zimbabwean politics moved back to Harare, these external animators discarded the associations they had previously funded, and diaspora organisations were left to struggle onwards, denuded of the wider international structure of material resources that had made them initially meaningful. These residual structures have fallen into two categories: a group of sidelined political aspirants eager to attract further funding to retain status, and a small number of heroic humanitarians, continuing to do practically important but politically marginal work with exceptionally limited resources.

In the case of Rwanda, almost the opposite is true. The political organisations of the Rwandan ‘diaspora’, as opposed to the political organisations of other Rwandan extra-territorials, are confections of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) state apparatus. They are designed to fulfil certain important ends of states overseas, of which there are three big ones: contestation with Rwandan extra-territorial nationals unwilling to accommodate themselves to the present dispensation in Rwanda; the occlusion of that very contestation, and the discursive presentation of an anti-political diaspora. Although between 1994 and 2003 opposition – mainly Hutu mobilisation – took place, it was fragmented, incoherent, and institutionless, being violently smashed by the Kagame regime. Then, from around 2007, Rwanda began to play
the diasporic game itself, resuscitating a pro-regime diaspora. Against this backdrop, there has been a revival of transnational resistance since 2009. This has been based around two elements: elite political parties and a separate campaign of resistance related to refugee rights. Both have been largely unsuccessful, the former being constrained by its inability to attract external animators and the latter being co-opted by a different transnational network of external elites. □
Comparing and theorising state–diaspora relations

By Alexandra Délano and Alan Gamlen

Migration policy is usually understood as immigration policy, but formal state initiatives towards emigrants have also recently become widespread. What is happening in the realm of state–diaspora relations, and why? The question of when and why states engage their diasporas – and why their practices converge or diverge – still needs answers based on better comparisons and theorisation.30

These questions remain challenging partly because multiple factors are involved at various levels and stages. States’ positions are constantly changing, depending on, for example, the characteristics of the diaspora (including its economic and political importance), and the nature of the origin-country regime (including its perceptions of emigration as well as its citizenship laws and state capacities such as consular infrastructures and budgets). External factors also matter, including the nature of the destination state and the way it accommodates immigrants and relates to their origin states, and also the role of relevant international organisations and norms.

How can researchers make sense of all this? Which factors matter? When and where do they matter most? We highlight the importance of comparative and theoretical research in addressing these kinds of questions. Like many new research fields, state–diaspora relations grew out of in-depth single case studies that built theory from the bottom up rather than working deductively. This tactic still forms the mainstay of work in this area, but there is growing room for a wider range of approaches, and a need for more comparative and theoretically driven work.
Comparing state–diaspora relations

As diaspora policies become more widespread, research must focus less on the uniqueness of specific country policies but on the commonalities and contrasts among cases. What historical, geographic, ideological, political or economic factors explain the variations and patterns in policy design, implementation and timing? Are some types of policies becoming models and if so, who is promoting them, who is adopting them and why? What are the effects of these policies, both on the home state and the host state and on the populations that they target? How are these policies transforming the nation-state and the international system as a whole?

These questions call for more comparative work on state–diaspora relations. Qualitative comparisons based on ethnographic methods remain vital to understanding how different actors matter in the design and implementation of policies at different levels and in different moments, but quantitative comparisons are also necessary to measure and evaluate the drivers of diaspora policies and their effects. Quantitative studies have been particularly scarce, largely because data on diasporas and on diaspora policies is either unavailable or unsuitable for broad-sample comparisons. It therefore remains important to triangulate available sources and methods – including more mixed-method and multi-disciplinary studies this field.

Previous research on state–diaspora relations has successfully 'brought the state back in', particularly by focusing on the role of origin states in shaping diasporas' home- and host-country ties and even in creating (or attempting to create) diasporas. But key questions remain where comparative research can make important contributions: How and why does the state matter in shaping these relations and what motivates the states, institutions and elites carrying out the policies? Does the momentum come from states themselves, from diasporas, or from other actors such as international organisations? How do diasporas react to state influence? What variables explain similarities and differences across cases?

Future research on state–diaspora relations needs to broaden the scope of comparison beyond sending states themselves, and include other political actors and processes across a greater range of places and scales. We note three specific priorities:
• Comparing the roles of both origin and destination contexts in shaping state–diaspora relations. The field needs more studies comparing different diaspora groups in the same host state, and more studies comparing single diaspora groups across different destinations.
• Comparing the experiences of migrants with non-migrants. Systematically evaluating and comparing costs and benefits to migrants and non-migrants can provide perspective on both the scale and the success of state investments in diaspora policies.
• Comparing the experiences of groups included and excluded in official conceptions of diasporas. What do these patterns of inclusion and exclusion say about the wider legitimacy of these forums and discourses about diaspora engagement?

**Theorising state–diaspora relations**

We advocate these comparisons as a route to theory-building in an area that has sometimes been criticised as too policy-focused and a-theoretical.

First, we hope that future research builds on debates about de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation in order to theorise the spatialities of power involved in state–diaspora relations. Governmentality theory, for example, is a useful approach to frame the decentralised, marketised approach to global migration governance that engaging diasporas represents.

Second, we highlight the need for continuing work on the way that spatialities of power intersect with processes of identification and belonging in relations between states and diasporas. For example, links between transnational governmentalities and processes of constructing migrant identity and citizenship merit further development. Recent work focusing on citizenship as a lived experience and not just a legal institution pushes researchers to consider the various spaces and contexts in which multiple citizenship is practiced and enacted, beyond the formal granting of dual citizenship or external voting.

Third, this discussion of membership categories and practices inevitably links to long-standing debates about defining diasporas. Now that the term has been extensively adopted by policy makers
in municipal, provincial and national governments, as well as think tanks, NGOs and international organisations, the meaning of the word diaspora is shifting and stretching still further. Rather than seeking definitional consensus, future research should interrogate how and why the term is used by political actors, and to what effect. Where do working definitions used by state actors originate? How have these definitions travelled and changed over time? What do spatial and temporal differences in diaspora definitions reveal about the actors that use them, about their diaspora policies, about the groups included and excluded by these policies, and about the consequences for everyone involved?

Fourth, we encourage further research on the role of international norms in this area—a topic that has received very little attention, but is increasingly important as international forums and dialogues on migration proliferate, and promote diaspora policies in pursuit of international development. More work is needed to understand what kinds of development are being pursued, and what kinds of diaspora policy ‘best practices’ are being promoted, including where these policies come from, where they travel, and how mobility transforms them.

Finally, we encourage more comparative work on the short- and long-term impacts of diaspora engagement policies. On the one hand, precisely because of this focus on development, other potential short- and medium-term effects of state-driven policies, such as their contribution to integration in the host state, have been neglected. In the longer term, as with all forms of transnationalism, we also need to ask whether the current expansion in state–diaspora relations is leading to durable changes, what is new about them, and why they did not emerge previously.31
Disaggregating diasporas as actors

By Carolin Fischer

Much research on diasporas emphasises the ties between those inside and outside the country of origin, usually in connection with transnational flows of money, ideas, and goods. Diasporas are often represented as actors whose engagements have significant effects back home. The promotion of diasporas as a panacea to shortcomings in development or as players in home country politics triggered sceptical reactions of scholars. Many call the conceptual basis of such representations into question (Sinatti and Horst 2014).

In his contribution to this collection, Nicholas Van Hear makes a convincing case for a more nuanced approach to the involvement of diasporas in origin countries. He shows that transnational activities are not necessarily directed towards the home country as such. Rather they target different types of collectives or – in Van Hear’s terminology – ‘spheres of engagement’, which entail different combinations of the private and the public. However, it is rarely asked why (groups of) people living in the diaspora direct their engagement towards certain spheres in the origin country and how they are socially organised as actors.

Drawing on qualitative data from research among Afghan diaspora populations in the UK and Germany I suggest that we should not only disaggregate the spheres towards which transnational engagements are directed but also disentangle the social settings in which people take action. I discovered that social identities and the inter-personal ties, which connect people at a specific destination country and across borders, constitute a particularly important dimension of these ‘action settings’. Adopting a more actor-centred perspective that unpacks
the ‘inner workings’ of diaspora helps understand how members of diasporas come to engage with their origin countries.

The fact that diaspora populations are not homogeneous entities that engage in joint action towards shared goals is widely acknowledged. It is equally recognised that social identities within diasporas are often contested (Anthias 1998). Not everyone identifies with the local and globally dispersed population of co-nationals to the same extent and along the same lines. During fieldwork among Afghan diaspora populations in Germany and the UK I found that people rarely encounter each other simply as ‘Afghans’. Instead perceptions are filtered through a range of identity categories among which family and socio-economic backgrounds, ethnicity and political affiliations are prominent.

Families form an important dimension of people’s social environment in the receiving society as Razma32 (26), a young professional from Greater London, illustrates:

_We kind of keep mostly in the family. So I interact mostly with mum, dad, my cousins. I’ve got family abroad: New York, Canada… We have a close-knit family relationship but we never really get involved with anything outside of that._

Families also indicate people’s socio-economic backgrounds and thus reflect the social stratification of the Afghan society (Bourdieu 1984). Shabnam (25), a university student living in mid-west Germany, illustrates how family backgrounds shape the way people approach each other and navigate within social environments:

_‘I can tell you what happens if Afghans get to know other Afghans’, Shabnam claims. ‘They will say “oh, you are Afghan too… where do your parents come from, which city?” That’s how Afghans localise each other. It is like you would ask someone in Afghanistan “where do your parents come from?” It’s the same in Germany. You want to have an idea of people’s family.’_

Families in this sense are constitutive for self-identification and external categorisation. Likewise ethnic backgrounds not only inform
mutual perceptions and categorisation but also determine patterns of social organisation and principles of inclusion and exclusion (Jenkins 1994). Abdul-Samad (in his 60s) is representative of those who feel that Afghan diaspora organisations are not necessarily open and approachable for everyone:

*There are some organisations who have established a community centre, whatever, for certain groups of Afghans. For instance there is one for Pashtuns, one for Hazaras, probably one for Tajiks…*

As a result he frequently encounters people claiming ‘oh no, I can’t go to that one because I am not of that [particular group]’ or ‘I have been to that one [organisation] and I was not welomed’. Whether such perceptions are based on real antagonisms or merely perceptions is difficult to discern. Either way, what matters most is the divisive effect of real and perceived ethnic biases. Over time and through frequent reiteration, preconceptions can lead to the formation of social boundaries that delineate self-contained groups.

The boundaries delineating groups of characteristics based on family ties, ethnic origin, political affiliation or socio-economic background, are subject to temporal and local variability. Ethnicity, for example, only gained significance as a category of difference among Afghans in the diaspora after the onset of the ‘ethnicisation of politics’ (Schetter 2005) in wartime Afghanistan. Ethnicity as a subject of warfare and political rhetoric was extended to the diaspora, prompting instances of ethnic divisions and segregation of wider communities. Such contingencies reify continuous formation and re-formation of diasporas. It is important to note that individuals represent various identity categories and partake in various social collectives. They are part of distinct family structures, members of ethnic groups and representatives of political views. Yet they are also part of a wider imagined Afghan community (see Figure 1). Ferdaws (in his mid-30s), a PhD student living in Greater London, makes this explicit:

*I am part of the Afghans, so I cannot be disconnected, no matter where I live, no matter what I think. I am an Afghan and I am proud of that, so I want to be part of them, no matter where or no matter what.*
Ferdaws’ self-perceptions mark a stark contrast to the more narrowly defined ideas of belonging outlined above. The fractures of diaspora populations also shape the social settings in which people engage in transnational activities directed towards the country of origin. Engagements undertaken in a family context tend to be geared towards the support of family members in Afghanistan. By contrast, engagements undertaken by wider coalitions of actors in the diaspora tend to reach out to a target group that is defined in broader terms, such as ‘known community’. Hence respondents’ transnational engagements do not only derive from the ties they maintain with Afghanistan and their ideas and desires for change. They are also a response to the specificities of their social environments in the diaspora.

Notwithstanding fractured patterns of social organisation, the research discovered a general tendency among respondents to act in the name of an imagined community or an imaginary Afghanistan. This imagined community reflects crosscutting home country attachments and a widely shared sense of ‘being Afghan’. Moreover, similar ideas of change and development and taking action with the aim of reaching similar ends are expressed. However, social settings
of action rest on more narrowly defined social ties, which largely derive from the identity categories discussed. People may take action in the name of an imagined Afghan community, but the imagined community does not provide a basis for social mobilisation. Afghans in the diaspora do engage with Afghanistan but they do not act as a cohesive diaspora.

The specification of the nature and setup of diasporas as actors has important implications for the agency exercised in the context of transnational engagements (Kleist 2008; Mohan 2002). We do not learn much about the agency of diasporans if we focus on the outcomes of engagement (Raghuram 2009; Sinatti and Horst 2014). When trying to explain agency it is necessary to capture the ‘inner workings’ of Afghan diaspora populations. My examination of Afghan transnational engagements suggests that agency is an interactive response of actors to their specific relationships with the origin country and groups of co-nationals in the receiving country and beyond. □
From native informant to diasporic activist: the gendered politics of empire

By Sunera Thobani

During ‘Operation Protective Edge’ (2014), the Israeli war on Gaza, activist-writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali called for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Ali, a migrant from Somalia, has built her political career on denigrating Islam and Muslims. She hardly stands alone in this. In Reading Lolita in Tehran, Azar Nafisi excoriates what she sees as the small-minded, anti-intellectualism of Iranian Muslims. The book became an instant bestseller and was integrated into university courses across North America. In a similar vein Beneath the Veil, a documentary on Afghan women living under Taliban rule, was broadcast repeatedly after 9/11, and as the US launched its invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Kandahar, a ‘docu-drama’ scripted by Afghan-Canadian feminist Pilfer Pazira, was screened for President Bush to acquaint him with Afghan society.

In this essay, I explore a number of issues raised by this increasing array of highly publicised instances of diasporic women’s participation in the ‘new’ imperialism of the twenty-first century wherein the politics of war and occupation are articulated in the register of women’s rights. Most scholars studying such media and literary production focus on the question of women’s agency and their critiques of their communities of origin (see Dabashi 2011; Mahmood 2008). My interest is somewhat different. I am interested in studying the place of such diasporic activism in producing the knowledge that legitimises contemporary imperialist practices. My research finds that feminism now grounds such practices; indeed, it is only as feminists that these diasporic intellectuals stake their claim to subject status.
as they attempt to transcend their historical constitution as empire’s objects. The ‘War on Terror’, I argue, reveals the extent to which feminism is integrated into imperialist structures of authority.

**Empire’s (proto) subject**

With the Bush administration identifying its objectives in the war as fighting ‘terror’ and ‘liberating’ Afghan women, the question of ‘the Muslim woman’ moved centre-stage in global politics. Images of veiled Muslim women and bearded Muslim men brandishing the Qur’an became pervasive in news reports, signifying the ‘barbarism’ of Islam and the ‘fanaticism’ of its adherents. These images conflated the spatial and temporal status of Muslims, collapsing the diverse traditions articulated in the name of ‘Islam’ along with the heterogeneity within Muslim societies. Moreover, de-historicising and de-contextualising the relationship between the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’, the war’s politics hinged on the ideological construction of absolute enmity between the two.

Colonial expansion had earlier brought European powers in contact with Islam, transforming both in profound ways. Although Muslims were at the forefront of the anti-colonial struggles of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, secularising forces emerged dominant in the postcolonial order (Sayyid 2004; Crooke 2009; Asad 2003). Moreover, labour shortages in the West during the mid-twentieth century made migration indispensable to its economic expansion. As immigration policies and citizenship were reformulated to provide this labour, Muslim communities migrated there in significant numbers. Western states juggled their labour market needs with maintaining the ‘whiteness’ of their nations, casting immigrants as perpetual strangers (Lowe 1996; Bannerji 2000; Thobani 2007; Ahmed 2000). Yet, despite the prevalence of racial discrimination, Muslim immigrants experienced some measure of socio-economic mobility. It was in this context that the attacks of 9/11 occurred, and the films and literary texts that I studied were produced and distributed for mass consumption.

An overall trend in the award-winning documentaries and films made by Muslim filmmakers that I analysed was their grounding of imperialist ideologies of Western benevolence in the lives of Muslim
women. These texts typically focused on gendered violence and produced sensationalised images of the veil as signifier of Islamic misogyny. Their unrelenting descriptions of the veil as ‘suffocating’ and ‘imprisoning’ led me to categorise these texts as ‘veilomentaries’ for they obscured, rather than revealed, the complexities that shape the gender relations being depicted. So, for example, *Beneath the Veil*, *Return to Kandahar*, and *Faith Without Fear* use veiled Muslim women’s lives as the raw material, as it were, to argue Muslim women would benefit most from Western gender norms in a manner that advanced the Bush administration’s bid for control of the material resources – oil and natural gas – of the Middle East and Central Asia. Moreover, such portrayal of Muslim women as abject victims is matched by an equally disturbing portrayal of Muslim men as all-powerful misogynists. So in the feature film *Osama*, a Mullah allied with the Taliban is portrayed as a perverted paedophile who has fantasies about nymphs (‘boys who look like girls in heaven’); the old man already has a number of wives and children when ‘Osama’, a young adolescent girl, is forced to marry him. This depiction leaves little doubt that the saving of Muslim women requires the extermination of the Muslim male.

Anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod has studied the burgeoning industry of Muslim women’s ‘autobiographies’ in the war in terror. Abu-Lughod argues these narratives provide disturbing but titillating accounts of rape and sexual violence which are pornographic in style. Such fantasies of rape also permeate the documentaries and films that I studied; violence is invariably depicted here as sparked by the perversities sanctioned by ‘Islam’. In *Kandahar*, for example, the heroine-journalist on a rescue mission in Afghanistan depicts violence as the primary condition of life in this barren and lifeless space, ‘even in the children’s games.’ She describes how ‘everything is at war, dog fights dog, bird fights bird, human fights human.’ Nature is at war with itself here, such that the human beings are little more than animals. Deploying her (previous) Afghan identity as seal of the authenticity of her narrative, she legitimates Western domination while affirming her present ‘Western’ status in common with that of her audience.

The texts referred to above help crystallise images of the victimhood of Muslim women at the hands of Muslim men, they
simultaneously secure the constitution of Western subjectivity as superior by virtue of its alleged commitment to gender egalitarianism. Using her mobility as demonstrative of such commitment, the diasporic filmmaker traffics in the liminality of the space between ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘us’ and ‘them’. Her production of ‘the’ Muslim wo/man thus helps underwrite US foreign policy through her feminist condemnation of Muslims and Islam.

**Native informant redux**

Distinguishing the ‘native informant’ from the ‘native informer’, Hamid Dabashi critiques the writings and political activism of prominent immigrant intellectuals from the Muslim world. Whereas the category of native informant ‘credits comprador intellectuals with the knowledge they claim to possess but in fact do not’, he argues the term native informer is more appropriate to the present moment as it flags ‘the moral degeneration specific to the act of betrayal’ by these intellectuals (Dabashi 2011: 12). In this perspective, the intellectual labour of these diasporic subjects produces ‘...the public illusions’ that sustain the very empire waging war on their communities of origin (ibid.: 13).

Once valorised as indispensible to the anthropological project of categorising the cultural difference that colonial administrators sought to manage, the native informant came to be derided in the postcolonial era. With neoliberal globalisation, this figure became linked to the discourse of multiculturalism and increasingly integrated into the circuits of capital, speaking ‘in the name of indigenous knowledge’ to further biopiracy (Spivak 1999). My analysis of a number of films and documentaries recently produced by Muslims demonstrates these intellectuals have made no small contribution to advancing imperialist ideology. Embodying and grounding this ideology in Muslim women’s biographies is the means by which these filmmakers further their own status as the (proto) subject of Empire.

The ‘War on Terror’ has transformed the rights of Muslims by subjecting them to unprecedented surveillance and violence. My study demonstrates that the diasporic subject who services the imperial machine has, thus far, been indispensible to disseminating
the notion that such violence is necessitated by the lived experiences of Muslim women. While this subject’s agency is now much celebrated, the structures of authority within which such agency is exercised require far greater scrutiny. □
‘Know your diaspora!’: knowledge production and governing capacity in the context of Latvian diaspora politics

By Dace Dzenovska

Who is moving and who is staying? Why are they moving or staying? Are they likely to move or to stay in the future? These questions are asked by researchers and governments alike. In fact, it is often said that one of the defining features of the modern nation-state is the government of mobility. In conditions of freedom, when individuals are not forced to move or to stay, government of mobility entails regulating movement, influencing the behaviour of potentially mobile subjects, as well as knowing what the objects of government are up to. Inability to regulate movement, to influence behaviour, or to know the population to be governed conjures up the problem of what could be called ‘governing capacity’ and threatens to undermine state authority.

Outmigration that followed Latvia’s accession to the European Union in 2004 – estimated at about ten per cent of the population – presented just such a threat to the Latvian state. It exceeded the Latvian state’s capacity to govern its subjects, for the subjects had become mobile, yet the state’s capacity to govern was territorially bound. The initial reaction of the political elites – not unlike those in other states experiencing high degrees of outmigration – was to call those who left ‘traitors’ who had voluntarily removed themselves from the terrain of government of the Latvian state. However, the situation was not that simple. Outmigration gained force and became a mass social phenomenon. This outward migration questioned not only the authority of the Latvian state, but its very existence. This was due to the fact that the post-Soviet Latvian state had bound its legitimacy to the ability to safeguard the flourishing of the cultural nation of Latvians and thought of itself as a ‘national state’. Now that a
substantial part of the ‘nation’ was leaving, the very legitimacy of the ‘national state’ was called into question.

Consequently, talk of betrayal gave way to a more pragmatic orientation. Political rhetoric shifted to emphasise that migrants exercised their right to freedom of movement as European Union citizens. More importantly, these mobile citizens were no longer thought of as lost to the Latvian state. Rather, they were potential diasporic subjects – that is, members of the Latvian cultural nation that embodied state sovereignty and lent legitimacy to the state even as they resided outside the state’s physical boundaries. And thus the Latvian state embarked upon ‘diaspora work’, that is, the launching of a diaspora support programme and the institutionalisation of state–diaspora relations.

The Latvian situation is far from unique. Latvian diaspora work unfolds at a time when diaspora programmes are increasingly common tools of government (Gamlen 2014). Individuals charged with the responsibility of developing the Latvian diaspora support programme were well aware of this. During our first meeting in 2012, Kārlis, a civil servant working on diaspora affairs, showed me a pile of printouts of Irish, Lithuanian and other diaspora policy documents. He said that they were pretty good and that he could just copy them, if a programme document were all that he wanted. However, Kārlis wanted to base the Latvian diaspora support programme on sound knowledge of what was happening with the Latvians.

Soon thereafter, Kārlis and I sat on the same panel at a political discussion on the new Latvian diaspora in the United Kingdom. Kārlis’ central message was: ‘know your diaspora!’ For the still fledgling project of diaspora work that was ongoing in the corridors of ministries, embassies, church halls, informal meetings in cafes, newspaper articles, cheap airline flights and elsewhere, knowing diaspora was crucial. However, producing knowledge presented a unique challenge. There was a notable lack of information at the same time as many of Latvia’s citizens had direct experience with outmigration. They had either migrated themselves or knew someone who had. Outmigration was a massive social phenomenon that was not yet apprehended by the governing apparatus. Kārlis thus faced the challenge of having to govern in conditions where there was proliferation of experience of
migration, but little formal knowledge of it.

At this meeting, Kārlis presented some basic statistical data generated by Latvian economists who had recently turned their attention to migration, as well as results from a provisional survey conducted by Latvian geographers with the help of social media platforms. But mostly he recounted stories of his own encounters with Latvia’s mobile citizens on planes, at dinner tables, and in meetings. Some of the subjects of his stories longed for what they had left behind in Latvia, others had become successful entrepreneurs and wished to donate their time and skills to Latvia, and still others did not care about teaching the Latvian language to their children. Kārlis had many such stories, each illustrating a different or recurring migration-related problem. He used these stories to carve out the problem-space that diaspora work had to address.

Kārlis was a professional engaged in knowledge practices that resembled those of ethnographic work – a phenomenon George Marcus and Douglas Holmes have termed para-ethnography (Holmes and Marcus 2006). He spent significant amounts of time with the people whose worlds he wanted to understand, he talked with them on all possible occasions, he participated in social and political events, and he sought out experts who could help him to make sense of the emerging situation even as such experts were hard to come by. It could be said that in order to understand the terrain of government within which Kārlis wanted to act, he could not but engage in para-ethnographic knowledge production, because his work required understanding of an emerging situation whose contours were not at all clear. There was no published research available on the topic. Latvia’s researchers – economists, geographers, and anthropologists, such as myself – were also just beginning to turn their attention to the problem of outmigration. In a sense, we were all working to apprehend an emerging situation. We were all, in a way, co-ethnographers of an emerging problem-space.

At the same time, we were differently situated in relation to this problem-space. For me, the state’s governing efforts became part of the problem-space that I continued to engage with ethnographically. For Kārlis, once the problem-space seemed more or less apprehended, it needed to be governed. Ethnographic knowledge production
was not enough for that purpose. The state needed to scale up its knowledge production efforts. It needed to produce large-scale surveys about the mobile population that could be used to govern, as well as to create the impression that the state was capable of governing – that is, that the state had not only caught up with the mobile population, but that it knew more about it than everyone else. It was at this moment that Kārlis began to emerge as a governing actor rather than someone engaged in an effort to apprehend an emerging problem-space.

Kārlis was not the only one engaged in such an effort. Most civil servants, as well as mobile citizens, were engaged in collecting and analysing data about an emerging situation in order to orient themselves within it. I was continually challenged to think about how what I did differed from what they did. If we were all engaged in ethnographic or para-ethnographic efforts, what exactly was the difference between us? I comforted myself with the thought that the difference had to do with the analytical lens that I brought to my work. But it seems to me that the most consequential difference resided in aspirations to govern. While ethnographic work was crucial for developing an understanding of an emerging situation, it was not sufficient for cultivating and demonstrating the state's capacity for governing. Having more or less apprehended the situation, Kārlis sought to scale up in order to govern. I, in turn, remained within the ethnographic terrain, which I thought was most conducive for the kind of anthropology I sought to practice – namely, one that was committed to tracing emerging forms, including those of government. This is to say that disciplinary distinctions, as well as distinctions between subjects and objects of knowledge, emerged as significant in moments when understanding needed to be turned into knowledge for the purposes of governing. It is at this moment that diaspora also emerged as a meaningful category in the context of Latvian outmigration. □
The stateless speak back: Palestinian narratives of home(land)

By Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh

Since the 2000s, statelessness – a condition held by people who have no nationality and therefore are not protected by a state – has been ‘rediscovered’ by academics, policy makers and practitioners, who have highlighted that stateless people are vulnerable to marginalisation and human rights abuses. The United Nations, NGOs and government ministries recognise that the main way to ‘solve’ statelessness is for stateless people to secure a nationality and state protection from their country of origin or from the country where they now live.

However, little is known about how individuals and groups who are defined as ‘stateless people’ by ‘experts’ themselves understand such labels and policy categories. This article examines the meanings which statelessness holds for Palestinians based in France, Sweden and the UK, noting that these meanings often challenge the ways that academics and policy makers have defined the problem of – and solution to – statelessness. Centralising Palestinians’ voices in this way is particularly important given that statelessness is itself understood as both a condition and a label which erases the ability to speak, and be heard.

Multiple meanings of statelessness: home(land)less and voiceless

[Statelessness means being] homeless on a global scale. Not having an obvious place where you can seek your rights… states provide a voice to people. [They] are responsible for giving basic rights to people. So [statelessness is] having no place to claim those rights… On a collective level, people want to have a voice. And having a state, not being stateless, projects that voice.
The interconnected experiences of voicelessness and homelessness were central to Laith's understanding of statelessness. His account of disenfranchisement echoed two key absences: having no state to ‘project’ your voice and simultaneously having no home in the world and being unable to enjoy basic rights. This reference to voicelessness does not mean that individuals cannot speak, but rather that the support of a state is needed for this voice to be ‘projected’ and heard by others; having a voice, Laith asserted, means not only expressing an opinion, but ‘being able to enact change; to change ‘something that I don’t think is fair.’

Agreeing with the assertion that being stateless means that people are unable to change their lives or claim their rights, Miriyam suggested that:

_Not having your own homeland, your own state, is to be subjected to others' mercy, to be subjected to others' ferocity... You can't create the future you want, so you don't live life to its fullest._

Just as Laith drew attention to the absence of an internationally recognised Palestinian state, and of being ‘homeless’, Miriyam also argued that stateless people are ‘subjected to others’ mercy’ simultaneously because of the absence of the Palestinian state and of the Palestinian homeland.

In their accounts, statelessness is simultaneously a legal, political, and existential condition. Although legal definitions of statelessness centralise nationality and state protection, interviewees including Laith and Miriyam presented the Palestinian homeland – one of the key defining features of diasporic identity – as being as important to their understanding of statelessness, and at times even more important than the absence of a nationality and state protection. Crucially, Laith and Miriyam identified themselves as stateless even though they hold one or more nationalities: Laith, who was born in Nablus, is a British citizen who also holds a Palestinian passport and a West Bank identity document, and Miriyam, who was born in Nazareth, has both Israeli nationality and French citizenship. Legally speaking, they are not classified as ‘stateless people’ in the EU given that they are citizens, and yet they consider themselves to ‘be’ stateless on a collective level.
Highlighting the multiple dimensions of statelessness – the lack of rights and of state protection, the sense of being home(land)less and voiceless – they continue to identify themselves as stateless, therefore challenging policy makers’ assumptions that being granted ‘a’ nationality is the official solution to statelessness. Likewise, Mahmoud, who was born in Paris, argued that all Palestinians are stateless, whether they hold ‘a’ nationality or not. In his view, statelessness cannot be ‘solved’ by granting ‘a’ nationality since the relationship with the Palestinian homeland remains contested; rather, statelessness will only be resolved when a specific state (Palestine) grants a specific (Palestinian) nationality.

However, not all interviewees identified with the term ‘stateless’ on either personal or political levels. For instance, Feiruz – a Swedish citizen – was ambivalent towards this term: she recognized that Palestinians are stateless, and yet, she does not feel that she is stateless precisely because of her desire to return to the Palestinian homeland:

*When I think about statelessness, what comes to mind is being without rights and being deprived of my homeland. I understand that we Palestinians are stateless because we were expelled from our homeland but that is different from saying that I do not have any homeland at all since we still have Palestine. I am both stateless and not stateless.*

She was concerned that the concept of statelessness could be perceived to mean that the Palestinian homeland no longer exists and that Palestinians no longer belong to that homeland. Mahmoud also echoed Feiruz’s ambivalence: ‘I don’t really consider myself to be stateless. Because to consider myself as such would mean that we have lost the struggle, [that] the country doesn’t really exist any more, that there really isn’t any hope for return.’ Nonetheless, he recognised that ‘as a matter of fact, yes, I am stateless,’ but only if statelessness can be redefined to centralise the continued ‘connection to Palestine’:

*In our case the term stateless should mean that we are not on our land... what matters is the relationship to the land. Where one comes from. We are stateless because we are not on our land of origin and not because our state did not emerge.*
Redefining statelessness in this way provides a space to recognise that this concept and condition can hold multiple meanings: it can reflect an individual legal status or an ongoing collective dispossession from the Palestinian homeland.

Without such a redefinition, other interviewees explicitly rejected this term, with Nora considering that the label 'stateless' is itself a form of aggression since it denies a legitimate belonging to a particular space:

*As I became politically aware, I understood that I am stateless... but it’s not a term we speak about... It confiscates something from you, takes something from you by force. The whole terminology is imposed on you. I think it’s very aggressive as a term... It reflects the aggression that’s coming from the outside onto me: my legal status, being Palestinian, [...] not having the power to move... maybe the title of this aggression can be this statelessness.*

Even when she recognises that she and other Palestinians are stateless, Nora does not personally or politically identify with this concept; instead, she feels that this label has been ‘imposed’ upon her as an extension of the aggression that permeates her life. The label itself therefore prevents her from being able to define herself or define what is present and absent in her life.

**Conclusion**

The concept and label of ‘statelessness’ reflect the vulnerability of those who hold no nationality and have been left without state protection; however, they are also negotiated, redefined, embraced and/or rejected by those who are categorised through them. Importantly, although the Palestinian women and men who contributed to this study often expressed an ambivalence, or even resistance, towards ‘the stateless label’, this is not a rejection of individual claims to rights and protection. Instead, by repeatedly identifying that the label ‘stateless’ reproduces, rather than resolves, the invisibility, marginalisation and exclusion of Palestinians, interviewees highlighted that the label is not necessarily perceived as granting rights, but rather as potentially erasing existing identity
markers and forms of attachment and belonging, and, indeed, of negating the right to individual, collective and national self-determination.

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Diaspora as anti-politics: the case of Rwanda

By William Jones

Rwandans – often Tutsi – consider themselves as... I wouldn't say ‘the African Jews’, but they believe that their suffering is equal to that of Jews – that’s why Rwandans will tell you about ‘the Rwandan diaspora’. Others say ‘Me? I’m not part of the diaspora’. This is what they’ll tell you: ‘We are Rwandan refugees’ (Faustin Twagiramungu, Prime Minister of Rwanda 1994–5).35

Who a Rwandan is has always been a deeply tortured question. During the genocide of 1994, Tutsi bodies were dumped in rivers that would ‘carry them back to Egypt’. This was not a completely isolated incident, but a particularly extreme and grotesque instance of the ways in which political contestation in Rwanda revolves around questions of who is, and is not, a legitimate member of the political community. This is both a dispute as to who may legitimately claim Rwandan identity, and about what else, politically and socially, follows from that claim.

These debates take on new forms for those self-identified Rwandans (Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa) who have, for one reason or another, left Rwanda, where a fractured form of Rwanda’s polarised political scene reproduces itself. In our research (Betts and Jones forthcoming) we interviewed Rwandan refugees in Congo; exiled journalists in Uganda; in South Africa, former military officers now leading ostensibly civilian opposition political parties; in France and Belgium, remembrance organisations dedicated to overturning the dominant historical account of the 1994 genocide, alongside youth groups which want to avoid mentioning it as much as possible. What surprised us
was how resistant many of our informants were to the label ‘diaspora’, and their reasons for being so. A frequently heard refrain was ‘I’m not in the diaspora, I’m a refugee’. Slightly less common was the (usually hinted) suggestion that one could not be a member of the diaspora if one was not a supporter of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, or middle-class, or Hutu.

This is in stark contrast to how the Rwandan government itself deploys the term. The last ten years have seen a flurry of government-initiated activity directed at expanding and formalising the Rwandan state’s relationship with ‘its’ diaspora. There is a now a well-funded Diaspora Directorate operating out of Kigali, which – in collaboration with embassies and High Commissions across the globe – runs a raft of remembrance activities, cultural days, festivals, and fundraisers, promotes diasporic banking, remittances, and return trips to experience the new Rwanda. ‘The’ diaspora, rhetorically framed as ‘Rwanda’s Sixth Province’, is seen as an all-inclusive, unthreatening, apolitical label which applies to all and any Rwandans abroad. Its discursive content, if any, is merely a positive affirmation of Rwandan culture, and an aspiration towards ever-greater development.

Given the innocuousness of this, it might seem surprising that so many Rwandans abroad are vehement in their rejection of the diasporic label. However, this misses what is controversial in the seemingly bland advocacy of peace, unity, and prosperity. The language or ‘stance’ of diaspora, in this instance, is anti-political. The associational lives of diasporic Rwandans function to promote a specific, politically-loaded understanding of Rwanda’s current condition, its history, and its relationship to its extra-territorial nationals. By anti-political (Ferguson 1990), I mean that it is a bureaucratic discourse of subjectification (i.e. it constructs Rwandans as subjects in particular ways) which shut down certain discussions, promote others, and depoliticise the Rwandan state, its social conflicts with exiled Rwandans, and its policies. Unlike the DevSpeak of the planners of Lesotho, however, depoliticisation here functions through an endless discourse of amity, peace, happiness, (apolitical) developmentalism, and patriotic unity. The preponderance of the activities of the new diaspora is not perhaps the more obviously political protest activity or overt legal activism. That is the exception,
rather than the rule. The calendar of diasporic activity is stuffed, but with culture days, harvest festivals, development expos, and sports tournaments. The ‘model diasporan’, is not one that spends much time protesting outside embassies, but one that teaches their children Kinyarwanda, remits, attends the events put on by the embassy, and reinforces the normality of Rwanda.

None of this is necessarily insincere on the part of its participants, but it is fair to ask what political effects this has. The obvious answer is the promotion of a relentless banality: Rwanda as a ‘normal’ country, with a ‘normal’ relationship with its diaspora, who are themselves entirely happy with the current drift of the Rwandan state and its policies. The effect of this for the Western parliamentarians and journalists that witness this is clear: it grounds the claim that Rwanda is the sort of place one need not worry about. Worse still for the opponents of the regime, it makes them look hysterical.

There is a further apolitical aspect: discourse about Rwanda is transposed to a conversation about ‘development’. The category here is as amorphous as anywhere else, stretching to include bank liberalisation (Orozco 2009), the reconstruction of Kigali as an African Brasilia (Goodfellow and Smith 2013), and the destruction of the homes of ordinary rural Rwandans deemed insufficiently ‘modern’ (Newbury 2011). The elasticity of development is not accidental: it shifts with the priorities of the state. Simultaneously, it presents its object and techniques not as political, or the subject of reasonable contestation, but as uncontroversial products of technocratic knowledge. Finally, in so doing, it implicitly reinforces the authority of the state, in taking it to be the authoritative voice on what the content of development might be.

In this context, then, the hostility towards the term diaspora makes more sense. What is being rejected, along with diasporic identity, is the current Rwandan state, and it is therefore those communities which feel most excluded from Rwanda’s present dispensation that are the most unreceptive. However, this doesn’t mean that ‘diaspora’ could be refashioned as a more inclusive identity capable of encompassing the factionalised networks of Rwandans abroad, as it is precisely that bland discourse of inclusion to which many object. □
The Jewish diaspora and Israel: problems of a relationship since the Gaza wars

By William Safran

The relationship of the Jewish diaspora to its anterior homeland resembles that of many other diasporas, but in no other case has it been so durable and complex, despite the fact that for nearly two millennia the homeland was not a concrete reality. It existed in a narrative, imaginary, or eschatological sense and was reflected in religious ritual, including the celebration of festivals and the direction of prayers. It is only since the second half of the nineteenth century that the homeland has been viewed from the perspective of what came to be labeled Zionism – as a reality, ideology, and destination of physical return. This has been especially true since the establishment of Israel in 1948.

From that time forward the diaspora–Israel relationship has become more concrete, but also more complicated. On the one hand, the diaspora has continued to be committed to the principle of *kol yisrael arevim zeh bazeh* – the mutual responsibility of the Jewish people globally – and has supported Israel economically, demographically, and politically. The diaspora is linked to Israel by religion, history, and ethnic kinship ties, and it regards that country, which contains half of the world’s Jewish population, as a fount of living and dynamic Jewish culture.

On the other hand, the diaspora and Israel have diverged in terms of identity, orientation, and interests. Whereas religion was important in early modern Zionism, it no longer applies fully to the diaspora–Israel relationship. The diaspora and Israel differ on the definition of ‘who is a Jew’: while in Israel it is based on matrilineal descent or Orthodox conversion, in Western democracies it is largely a matter of voluntary
identification, and ethnicity-based Jewishness has been attenuated due to intermarriage. With increasing secularisation, Jewish religious observance has declined. For many years, Jewish collective identity was sustained by the memory of the Holocaust. But that memory is fading as survivors are dying. For these reasons, Israel became the most important unifying focus of the diaspora. That has continued to be the case, even though the majority of Jews have felt at home in their hostlands, and have identified with them politically, culturally, and socially. Finally, anti-Semitism has declined as a daily threat.

At the same time, Israel has become a more divisive issue. For some diaspora Jews, Israel has been too secular and has abandoned its role as the custodian of Judaism; for others, it has become too Orthodox and intolerant of religious pluralism. For still others, the decline of kibbutzim has signaled an abandonment of Israel’s commitment to equality. Furthermore, many diaspora Jews are embarrassed about Israel’s continuing occupation of the areas captured during the Six-Day War of 1967 and the unequal treatment of its own Arab citizens. Finally, there have been differences in policy priorities: while the diaspora has been concerned about anti-Semitism in its various hostlands, Israel has been fighting for its national security and its very existence.

The relationship between the diaspora and Israel has been heavily impacted by the global status of Israel. After the Holocaust, the traditional Christian view of the Jews as a permanently ‘wandering’ people, and therefore not entitled to their own state, yielded to a gradual acceptance of Israel. For some, that acceptance resulted from a guilty conscience; for others, it reflected an idealised vision of a socialist polity. For the first two decades of its existence, Israel had a largely favourable image globally; but its occupation of the ‘West Bank’ has alienated many non-Jews, who came to regard Israel as a colonialist oppressor, and Zionism as a racist ideology.

The image of Israel has deteriorated considerably since the Gaza wars of 2008, 2012, and 2014, especially in Europe. Israel's actions (including its response to rocket attacks) are equated with the Holocaust; Gaza is compared to a Nazi concentration camp, and its inhabitants are seen as facing genocide. Traditional stereotypes of diaspora Jews are recycled: the old myth about Jews killing Christian children for their Passover ritual is now used to charge Israelis with
killing Muslim children. Such comparisons function as a means of exculpating anti-Semites and even as a post factum justification of the Holocaust. The result has been the lifting of the post-Second World War taboo against the open expression of Judeophobia.

In the past, the attribution of guilt or blame to Jews was based by turns on variable principles: by traditional Christians, on theology; by Marxists, on ideology; by Nazis, on race. Today, because of Israel, it is based increasingly on anti-colonialism and anti-racism. Both the Christian and nationalist right and the secular left in Europe tend to be anti-Israel – the former because the country is identified with Jews, the traditional target of hostility; and the latter in the name of solidarity with the Palestinians. Attacks on Israel and Zionism quickly become attacks on diaspora Jewry; ‘Zionist’ is now a code word for ‘Jew’, and anti-Zionism is a euphemism for anti-Semitism, so that the distinction between the two, and between Jews and Israelis, is blurred. In short, the demonisation of Israel and of the Jews in diaspora feed on each other. Pro-Palestinian gatherings quickly degenerate into anti-Jewish rallying cries and calls for ‘death to the Jews’.

The diaspora response has been complex. While few have called for a complete break with Israel, many diaspora Jews have called upon Israel to change its policies. Some diaspora Jews are motivated
by what they perceive to be in the best interest of Israel; others have distanced themselves from Israel in order to assert their hostland patriotism, burnish their progressive credentials, or make them feel more comfortable in relations with their fellow citizens. Such attitudes are often a manifestation of traditional diasporic insecurity.

The demonisation of Israel suggests an inversion of positions and attitudes. The state of Israel, whose creation was expected as a solution to the ‘Jewish problem’ has become a major cause of its revival. The pariah condition of the Jews in diaspora, periodically facing genocide, has been replaced by the pariah status of the Jewish state, chronically targeted for politicide. Once envisioned as a utopia, Israel has become for many an unsafe dystopia, constantly exposed to terrorist attacks. For many gentiles, Israel is responsible for contemporary anti-Semitism; and they argue that Israel is not good for the Jews in diaspora. Many Israelis, once immune to anti-Semitism, now fear it: the paranoia of the diaspora Jew has affected them, and they feel that ‘the whole world is against us.’ While Israel continues to be a haven for persecuted diaspora Jews, it has also become a place of danger for them.

But a delinking of the diaspora from Israel is difficult, if not impossible. The two are now so closely entangled that without Israel the Jewish people qua diaspora (except for a tiny minority
of ultra-orthodox Jews for whom a pre-messianic Jewish state is anathema) would probably disappear as Jews become an increasingly undifferentiated ethnic group, and cease to be the only reliable ally of Israel in its fight for survival. □
Stalemate in the Armenian genocide debate: the role of identity in Turkish diasporic political engagement

By Cameron Thibos

The concept of diasporic engagement revolves around the idea that migrant groups can impact political and developmental projects. This entices policymakers because, among other reasons, it suggests migrants can be used as overseas lobbyists for their countries of heritage. However, the research I conducted as part of the ODP demonstrates that the potential of migrants to effectively engage with the politics of their countries of residence is limited. It further suggests that heritage-country control of migrant political activism is difficult to achieve. Even when the agendas of migrant activists and the country of heritage seem to harmonise, the motivations of the former appear to be rooted more in identity and personal experience than in concern for the politics of the latter.

My research focused on the conflict between Turkish-Americans, Armenian-Americans, and their respective allies over official recognition of the massacres and deportations of ethnic Armenians by the Ottoman forces in 1915 as genocide. The stakes are symbolically if not materially high, as the question of genocide is integral to the identities of both groups. For a large number of Armenian-Americans, many of whom descend from individuals who escaped the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, the events of 1915 are a central reference point in their understanding of history. The characterisation of the events of 1915 as genocide is fundamental to Armenian nationalist discourses, and the pursuit of genocide recognition is stated in the Armenian Declaration of Independence to be a core goal of the Republic of Armenia.

Turkish-Americans, who by-and-large were educated in Turkey,
received a very different history. The events of 1915 remained largely untaught in the decades after the war. It was only when renewed calls for recognition in the 1970s and 1980s mixed with the violence of a new generation of Armenian militants that Turkey began to develop a narrative of its own (Dixon 2010). Caught on the defensive, historians commissioned by the Turkish government constructed a strongly nationalist discourse that rejected all accusations of genocide. This narrative describes the events of 1915 as an unfortunate but legitimate response to a seditious and separatist internal population by a beleaguered state at war (Suny 2009). This framing of events now sits in diametric opposition to Armenian demands for recognition. Just as Armenian narratives weave the events of 1915 into the identities of many Armenians, Turkish narratives inscribe an instinctual opposition to recognition onto the identities of many Turks. This stance often becomes more pronounced when Turkish citizens move overseas, where their suddenly non-majoritarian views are more likely to be challenged.

The combination of Armenian and Turkish nationalisms and identities in the US has proved vitriolic. It has transformed an essentially historical or legal question – whether or not the events of 1915 constitute genocide using the internationally accepted definition found in the UN Convention on Genocide – into a political issue in the US. Nearly every year a recognition resolution is tabled in Congress. The fight that inevitably ensues pits two passionate diasporas against each other, attracts intense involvement from Ankara and Yerevan, and draws in the US President as well as members of Congress. As such, the recognition debate is an excellent case study for examining the ways in which diasporas act as extensions of their governments of heritage, pursue their own agendas, and affect policy in their countries of residence.

**Turkish migrant politics and the recognition debate**

The US, according to census figures, is home to around 170,000 Turkish migrants. My study focused on those living in Washington, D.C., the centre of American politics and epicentre of the recognition debate. Many of the Turkish-American organisations there are active in this area, expending great effort to prevent Congressional
recognition and to inhibit the (further) institutionalisation of the genocide label in American statute and discourse. Among other activities, they sponsor alternative publications, collect money for political campaigns, supply Turkish-American interns to government offices, and sue government entities (e.g. school boards) for treating the genocide narrative as fact.

Organisational leaders furthermore work to increase support amongst ‘ordinary’ Turkish-Americans. They are rhetoric-heavy with the themes of anti-Turkish racism and prejudice to cast recognition as an indictment of all Turks as genocidaires. They therefore argue that Turkish-Americans should resist the appellation of genocide, not so much because it is an inaccurate characterisation, but because it will be a source of shame. This message combines memories of the hate crimes of the 1970s and 1980s – groups such as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) bombed Turkish businesses and assassinated many Turkish citizens during this period – with the abundant anti-Turkish hate speech found on the internet and elsewhere, to form a potent cocktail of fear and personal insult.

There is a genuine belief among many, but not all, Turkish-Americans that the fight is about protecting their identities as Turks. Such sentiment harmonises with Turkey’s official policy and is therefore encouraged by the Turkish state. However, it is important to recognise that the popular sentiment powering their resistance exists because of personal understandings of identity and history. As such, this home-grown opposition to the recognition debate exists as a largely autonomous agenda that is pursued by Turkish-Americans themselves independent of direction from Ankara.

**Active, yet largely ineffective**

Despite all this, my research found that Turkish-American activists actually accomplish very little. Media analysis showed their voices were entirely absent from American print media coverage of the recognition bill tabled in 2009. Turkish-American political action committees fail to attract a wide donor base, and their reported campaign contributions seem insufficient for swaying votes. Indeed, without Ankara’s promise of retribution against America – including
threats to shut down airbases vital to American military adventures in the Arab world – the bill would have likely sailed through Congress with scant regard for the sensitivities of Turkish-Americans. Thirty-eight states had passed more than 110 statements of Recognition by 2008 (Evinch 2008), and any cursory evaluation of American media reveals a strong message that Turks are being futilely obstinate in their refusal to concede the point.

But those fighting from the Turkish perspective are not attempting to win this battle. Their more modest goal is to not lose it entirely. To maintain the controversy is therefore, in a sense, to win. The Armenian-American lobby has, despite widespread sympathy in the US for their position, superior numbers and financing, and 40 years of tabling recognition bills, failed to surmount the realpolitik considerations of US officials to attain recognition. Thus in the recognition debate, Turkish-American activists, with no small help from Ankara’s own efforts, have succeeded. ☐
Shifting forms of diaspora engagement among the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora

By Nicholas Van Hear and Giulia Liberatore

As argued elsewhere in this collection, the degree of congruence between the perceptions and aspirations of people in diaspora and the perspectives of those who remain in the country of origin has long been a matter of debate. The notion of a disjuncture between the diaspora and those at home has been hotly contested in the case of Sri Lankan Tamils, particularly in the wake of the defeat by government forces of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the annihilation of its leadership in May 2009. Many well-informed observers have held the view that the Tamil diaspora has long become somewhat divorced from the people left behind in the Tamil areas (e.g. ICG 2010; Rajasingam 2009). Others, particularly within certain sections of the diaspora, have argued that the connection between the diaspora and those at home remains strong (Advisory Committee of the TGTE 2010), or that the degree of disconnection has been overstated (Vimalarajah and Cheran 2010).

Analysis of evidence gathered over a decade or more in Sri Lanka, the UK, Canada and other diaspora locations reveals that this question may be at least partly resolved if we disaggregate different forms and spheres of diaspora engagement, and observe the ways in which the interrelations between these spheres have shifted over time. The degree of engagement has varied among the three spheres outlined elsewhere in this collection: that is to say the household or extended family sphere, the sphere of the ‘known community’, and the ‘imagined community’ sphere. The evidence also suggests a shift away from collective and public modes of organisation of diaspora engagement during and immediately following the end of the war.
in 2009, towards more individual and private modes, drawing on individuals’ networks rather than more formal organisations and associations.

The household/extended family sphere
In the sphere of the household and extended family, connections stayed resilient during much of the war and remained so in the post-war period. Remittances to those remaining in conflict areas were the main expression of such connection. After the defeat of the LTTE in 2009 such linkages remained strong, the more so now that physical as well as digital linkages were possible, and visits could be made to participate in religious festivals and life course events such as births, coming of age ceremonies, weddings and funerals. Exceptions are where whole families have moved out and away from Sri Lanka, and there is little interest in continuing links, apart perhaps for maintenance of the family house if it is retained. In the post-conflict Jaffna peninsula and other areas that were embroiled in conflict, remittance use has to some degree spread beyond everyday consumption to medium- or long-term investments in property and small businesses, as well as to fund additional migration of family members to join their relatives in diaspora locations.

The known community sphere
In contrast to the continued and intense engagement in the household sphere during and after the war, there appears to have been a significant shift within the ‘known community’ sphere of associational life towards increasingly fragmented forms of engagement after the defeat of the LTTE in 2009. During the war, the LTTE exerted pervasive influence on Tamil associational life in many diaspora locations, though this was more intense in some places than in others – the LTTE’s grip was stronger in places like Switzerland and Norway than in the UK and Canada which have larger Tamil populations that are more diverse in terms of class background, cohort of arrival, legal status and generation. Independently of the LTTE, diaspora members had influence on communities they had left in Sri Lanka through hometown and old school associations involved in recovery activities; this was particularly the case during lulls in
fighting and during a cease fire in 2002–04 (Brun and Van Hear 2012). However, this collective engagement appeared to subside in many diaspora locations after the end of the war, when fewer seemed to be active members of diaspora associations and efforts to help communities back home seem to have become more individualised: a pattern of fragmented diaspora engagement had emerged, characterised by predominantly ad hoc financial contributions, which were nonetheless highly dependent upon personal networks. Many said that they preferred to make financial contributions on an occasional basis towards humanitarian, educational, health and livelihood projects. They underlined their scepticism towards contributing through more formal organisations and their preference for channeling their contributions through informal networks of kin and friends. The apparent disengagement at the collective level was borne out by respondents in former conflict areas in Sri Lanka, most of whom said they had never heard of diaspora activities in their communities; those who did know of them said such activities were modest in scale and impact.

A partial exception to this story of collective disengagement was the position assumed by religious institutions, which played an important mediating role in the ‘known community’ sphere by channelling contributions from the diaspora through temples, churches and mosques in Sri Lanka. Thanks perhaps to their organisational structure, church groups seem to send more regular contributions, often used in rebuilding or sustaining other churches in Sri Lanka, or channelled towards various local poverty-alleviation, health and educational projects. Temples are also involved in collecting funds and in-kind contributions, but these are often organised through informal networks of devotees rather than by the temple management. Many of these forms of engagement, which might appear to be organised through formal institutions, are thus instead heavily reliant on informal networks which are created and sustained mostly (but not only) through these institutions.

The imagined community
Diaspora engagement within the ‘imagined community’ sphere has been seen most prominently in the mobilisation of sentiments and
political action connected with the idea of Tamil Eelam – a Tamil homeland. As already noted, during the war the grip of the LTTE remained tight, both among the Tamil diaspora and in the areas in Sri Lanka which it controlled. Support among the diaspora was generally strong, although it varied over time and by location, as already observed. Sentiment and support for Tamil Eelam was for the most part resilient throughout the war, although it weakened through war-weariness as the 2000s wore on, and surged again with a large-scale mobilisation in the diaspora at the war’s end (Brun and Van Hear 2012). This latter movement saw the engagement of second and ‘1.5 generation’ Tamils who in 2009–10 organised large demonstrations in most diaspora locations in Western countries to protest at the plight of civilians caught up in the final phase of the war and their detention in a holding camp in northern Sri Lanka afterwards. The post-war period was also marked by several significant institutional initiatives, which promoted the Tamil ‘imagined community’ in various ways: these included umbrella groupings such as the Global Tamil Forum (GTF) and an attempt at transnational government – the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), which was formed after elections in all the major Tamil diaspora locations in May 2010, a year after the defeat of the LTTE.

Not long after the end of the war though, disillusion and disenchantment began to set in as these efforts appeared to have little effect in Sri Lanka. Splits within these new diasporic organisations led to increasing scepticism among diasporans of the efficacy of these bodies. Many in the diaspora and in northern Sri Lanka expressed ambivalent attitudes towards the possibility of Tamil Eelam.

More than five years after the end of the war then, engagement in the ‘imagined community’ sphere pointed to a growing disillusionment with the LTTE and its legacy organisations formed in the wake of the defeat of the Tigers in 2009. These perspectives evidence a shift away from the politically active high-point involving second and 1.5 generation Tamils in the period between 2009 and 2010, and a counterpoint to the proliferation of political bodies and advocacy groups that emerged following the demise of the LTTE (Brun and Van Hear 2012).
Conclusion
It has been argued that in the wake of the LTTE’s defeat in 2009 the views of many in the diaspora on the future of the nationalist struggle seem to have been at odds with the views of those in Sri Lanka (ICG 2010; Rajasingam 2009). Many of the post-war initiatives, which had varying support among the diaspora (Vimalarajah and Cheran 2010), appeared to have little purchase among Tamils at home who were more concerned with rebuilding their lives at the household level than with pursuing the separatist cause (Brun and Van Hear 2012).

This divergence may be overstated, however. As suggested above, there are significant differences among the various diaspora locations. Partly because of their size, different composition and migratory history, more diverse views hold sway among the largest communities of diaspora Tamils in the UK and Canada (Brun and Van Hear 2012; Amarasingam forthcoming), than in other important Tamil diaspora locations such as Australia, Germany, France, Norway and Switzerland, which tend to be more LTTE loyalist (Hess and Korf 2014). Many in Sri Lanka and the diaspora emphasise the importance of peace, recovery and development as crucial priorities, rather than continuing support for the cause of Tamil Eelam – though the meanings of ‘peace’, ‘recovery’ and ‘development’ are contentious and politically charged.

New connections or disjunctures may well emerge among the different parts of the diaspora and between the diaspora and those inside the country. Disaggregating diaspora engagement in the three spheres that we have identified, and exploring the interplay among them is, we suggest, a productive approach for understanding current and future connections and disjunctures in this and other diasporas generated by conflict.

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International Development Research Centre for financial support. See Van Hear (this collection, pp. 32–35) for the conceptual framework underlying this piece, and Liberatore (this collection, pp. 116–121) for another empirical case which deploys a similar approach.
Weapons of knowledge construction: the Afghan-American diaspora and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

By Morwari Zafar

Beneath the billowing drapes of red, green, and black, Marilyn Monroe and a woman in a blue headscarf lean against the wall on the ground. A man peers closely at their painted faces. ‘I don’t think she was Afghan,’ he chuckles to his female companion, his shadow darkening the canvas of the actress’s unaffected gaze. It seems an apt assessment of belonging at the 5th Annual Afghan Culture and Arts Festival in Rosslyn, Virginia – one mile from Washington, D.C., 8,000 miles from Afghanistan, and a long-standing hub of the Afghan-American diaspora.

The Afghan-American population in the US numbers close to 300,000 (Embassy of Afghanistan, Washington, D.C.), with its greatest concentrations in the San Francisco Bay Area, California, and Northern Virginia. Although a few Afghans immigrated to the US in the early twentieth century, the migration en masse did not occur until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1978. Although Afghan migration trajectories resonated with other immigrants, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, cast a penetrating spotlight on the Afghan diaspora.

For many members of the Afghan diaspora, leaving Afghanistan not only meant leaving behind family, but also hard-earned education credentials, skills, and material resources. While some families were able to secure employment transfers to skilled positions in US organisations, many began life anew in America, starting from scratch in minimum wage positions that belied their status in Afghanistan. As the war progressed and the US military’s strategic paradigm shifted to winning hearts and minds, Afghan-Americans rose to sudden relevance as a
transnational reflection of their counterparts in Afghanistan.

At the core of the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign, the definitive feature of the US military strategy after 2006 was to gain the Afghan population’s support rather than emphasise conventional warfare (Nagl 2007). To do so, the US military needed to learn how to interface with Afghans in sociocultural contexts that presumably varied from their own. Afghan-Americans became *de facto* experts on Afghanistan – a critical assumption that coincided with a massive effort to recruit members of the diaspora as proxies and interlocutors. Effectively, the diaspora’s social memory, history, norms, values, and religious expertise collectively became a highly sought-after commodity. While the knowledge supply chain reinforced the military-industrial complex, the context within which such highly prized cultural information was developed often received less than a secondary consideration. S.M. Hanifi (2006), an Afghan-American historian, argues that:

*Knowledge transfer from the Afghan-American diaspora may be hampered by the replication of social patterns of division and enclaving. Domestic divisions based upon location/region, ethnicity, class, gender, and ideology continue to pervade Afghan communities and structure intra- and intercommunity relations in diaspora settings.*

The context of the diaspora’s cultural knowledge is therefore significant because it situates their narratives across a spectrum of transnational experiences and social memories, challenging the perception that the diaspora constitutes a culturally and ethnically homogenous group. Afghan identity – or *Afghaniyat* – varies particularly among the cohort of Afghan-Americans who were either born or grew up in America. As that segment began to redefine ‘Afghan’ and ‘Muslim’, the global War on Terror struggled to make sense of the very same categories in Afghanistan. An American army officer, who had undergone two pre-deployment cultural training programmes offered by separate defense contractors, noted that some of the materials presented by Afghan-American experts either varied or were actually contradictory:
Overall, it was great to get some kind of familiarization. But there wasn't much consistency. Some of the instructors seemed to have a certain bias or maybe even a dislike for certain ethnic groups and tribes… The story you got depended on who was talking.

To elucidate ‘Afghanistan,’ Afghan-Americans filled roles as cultural advisers, interpreters, translators, and subject matter experts. At Fort Polk, Louisiana, and Fort Irwin, California, Afghan-Americans also served as role players in training centres composed of replica Afghan villages for a 25-day programme to simulate an environment similar to what soldiers could expect in Afghanistan. The role players helped soldiers negotiate Key Leader Engagements (KLEs) and navigate social and tribal dynamics; interactions the military deemed vital to COIN. Fara, a 33-year-old role player, who moved to America prior to her third birthday, recounted:

*It's fun to do the role-playing. I didn't know much about Afghanistan, but I learned a lot from the older Afghans with more experience… I learned about the culture as I was teaching it and acting it out.*

The reconstructions were staged to reflect the reality of Afghanistan, as observed by military servicemen and women. Afghan-Americans acted according to the scripts provided, although they were invited to offer feedback on the scenarios. The scripts defined their performance of Afghan heritage and identity. Thus corruption, as an issue, became explicable within the framework of Afghan social structure, patronage networks, and tribal and ethnic politics – despite the country’s track record of relevant government efficiency and oversight prior to the civil war. In fieldwork interviews with military personnel who took the trainings and were deployed to Afghanistan, many echoed the inconsistencies apparent in the presentation of what was supposed to be a culturally authentic experience. As a US navy officer reflected in an interview:

*At [Fort] Polk, there were two guys that were old-timers. They had worked in Afghanistan and they knew what they were doing. I found out later that a couple of the other folks had no clue and they were
learning about their own culture on the fly... Some of the stuff they told us about, like not using your left hand, I found it confusing when I deployed because the Afghans used both hands... It felt like they would tell you what they thought you expected to hear.

Through such iterations, ‘Afghanistan’ as a concept could be revised and reproduced. For the US military, Afghanistan became something one could know, classify and experience by performing accordingly. ‘Cultural intelligence’ as an element of COIN therefore conformed to what soldiers had been trained to expect. Some scholars have cautioned against diasporic engagement since ‘diasporas opportunistically find common ground with the host country’s foreign policy goals’ (Kapur 2010). The fundamental issue seems to lie in the commodification of cultural knowledge by the US government. America’s military-industrial complex created a pressurised commercial environment in which expertise was treated as a product. As such, expertise had to be profitable, differentiated, and meet the demands of the market. In the process of repackaging cultural knowledge, the community itself has experienced the fluctuations of what it means to be Afghan, and reconstituted its identity and position in America.

At the festival in Rosslyn, Afghan culture is represented in a scattering of booths furnished with clothing, jewellery, and a few paintings, along a horseshoe loop. Traditional food and music accompany the experience, and as the band breaks into a staccato rendering of an Afghan dance song, a young girl hops on the grass in a mirrored Afghan dress and pink cowboy boots. The tabla picks up and the MC bellows in English over the percussive pulse:

Tell me, friends, do you want fast Afghan songs or slow songs today? We’re here for you. We can play whatever you want."
Endnotes

1. See Van Hear and Liberatore (this collection, pp. 211–216) and Fischer (this collection, pp. 180–184) for cases which deploy the conceptual framework set out in this piece.

2. This approach has been variously critiqued (cf. Bruquetas-Callejo et al. (2008); Aja and Arango (2006); Solanes Corella (2006)).

3. Throughout this essay, pseudonyms have been used to protect the research participants’ privacy.

4. This mountain, where, according to the Bible, Noah’s Ark landed, has symbolic value for Armenians. Since 1920, it is in present-day Turkey, but can be seen clearly from Yerevan.

5. The use of the term ‘return’ in this case is to some extent problematic in the narrow, personal sense, especially because the ancestors of most of the diasporan returnees that I interviewed were not born in the territory of the present Republic of Armenia. They were from the Armenian provinces of the Ottoman Empire (now in eastern Turkey), the region of Cilicia (south-eastern coast of present-day Turkey), or, in the case of most Iranian-Armenians, the area of Nakhijevan (now an exclave of Azerbaijan). To the diasporan returnees, the present Republic of Armenia is only part of their much bigger geographical homeland, the cradle of Armenian civilisation, which is governed today by ethnic Armenians, and where the Armenian language and culture prevail. This fact, along with other characteristics, makes the Armenian case interesting to explore in its own right.

6. Like many diasporan Armenians, I use the classical Armenian orthography, and not the simplified version adopted in Armenia during an orthography reform first devised by the Soviets in 1922 and partially revised in 1940.

7. Armenians from Armenia (whether they live in the country or have emigrated) use the Eastern Armenian dialect. Western Armenian is mostly used by diasporan Armenians in long-established communities, with the exception of Iranian- and the smaller in number Indian-Armenians. The differences in the two branches of Armenian go back to the parallel development of two slightly different but mutually intelligible vernacular languages among the Armenians of the Russian and Ottoman empires in the nineteenth century.

8. ‘We’ refers to the team that undertook the ‘Vernacular Religion: Varieties of Religiosity in the Nepali Diaspora’ project [AH/HO15876/1] funded by the AHRC-ESRC ‘Religion and Society’ programme, headed by Linda Woodhead. We are very grateful for their support. Apart from myself, Sondra Hausner, Bal Gopal Shrestha, and (from the Centre of Nepal Studies UK) Krishna Adhikari, Chandra Laksamba, and Rajubabu Shrestha contributed. A summary of the project can be found here: http://www.religionandsociety.org.uk/uploads/docs/2013_01/135885418_Gellner_Phase_3_Large_Grant_BlockLW.pdf
9. This historic policy no longer holds and the MOD’s official position is that recruitment today is ethnicity-blind.
10. One of the lower strata in the social hierarchy.
11. A descendant of the Prophet.
12. Data derived from https://www.deceasedonline.com
13. Materials used in this article: Lichtenstein (2007); Tower Hamlets Local History Library and Archives, Avenues Unlimited papers (TH/I/AVU); London Metropolitan University, ‘Britain at Work: Voices from the Workplace, 1945–1995’ collection, ‘Interview with Derek Cox by Jamil Iqbal, Abdul Shahid and Shanaz Shahid, 22 March 2006”; University of Warwick Modern Records Centre, Papers of the Young Women’s Christian Association, Update, issues 1 and 3 (Winter and Summer 1990); White (1973).
14. For an extended discussion of the religious landscape in East London, see Garnett and Harris (2013a).
15. Ethnographic material within this chapter is based on fieldwork undertaken over various Tuesday evenings throughout 2009, 2012, and Tuesday evenings in February and March 2014.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
20. On Tamil diasporic identities generally, see David (2008); David (2012); Van Hear (2010); Van Hear (2012).
21. See also Garnett and Harris (2013b).
22. For an extended discussion of the prayer petitions of devotees, see Harris (2015).
23. Ibid.
24. See Van Hear (this collection pp. 32–35) for the conceptual framework underlying this contribution, and Van Hear and Liberatore (this collection pp. 211–216) for another empirical case deploying a similar approach.
25. This contribution draws on an Oxford Diaspora Programme project entitled ‘Multinational families, creolized practices and new identities: Euro-Senegalese cases’.
26. All names have been changed to protect the anonymity of research participants.
27. For further reading see Berg (2015).
28. For publications from de Bruijn’s project on mobile telephony and social change see https://mobileaficarevisited.wordpress.com
29. I worked together with Han van Dijk on this project. See de Bruijn and van Dijk (1995).
30. Authors listed in alphabetical order. This paper is based on Délano and Gamlen (2014).
32. To protect the identity of informants pseudonyms are used throughout this chapter.
33. The films I have studied include Beneath the Veil, Return to Kandahar, Daughters of Afghanistan, and Faith without Fear. I have also studied the feature films Kandahar, Osama and Slumdog Millionaire. See Thobani (2009); Thobani (2010); Thobani (2008).
34. Drawing on Michel Foucault (1991), this mode of government is thought of as governmentality.
35. Author interview, 8 November 2013, via skype.
36. For more on the developmental orientation of the Rwandan state in general, see Jones et al. (2013).
37. See Van Hear (this collection, pp. 32–35).
38. This contribution draws on some 80 interviews in northern Sri Lanka and about the same number in the UK conducted in 2010–14, under the rubric of the Oxford Diasporas Programme.
39. See Van Hear (this collection, pp. 32–35).
40. This article stems from the author’s dissertation research on the narratives of ‘Afghanistan’ and ‘Islam’ in the Afghan-American diaspora that shaped the accounts underpinning US military counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Through a broader lens, it examines the development and commodification of cultural knowledge by the US military through private-sector enterprises, and compels a reassessment of diasporic engagement.
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