Necessary Abuse: The Mirror as Metaphor in the Sixteenth Century

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Abstract: Metaphor, or translatio, is one of the most prominent figures in classical and medieval rhetoric, and the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries inherited both a sense of its importance, and a complex admixture of attitudes about its cognitive and linguistic functions. This was enabled by the teaching of imitatio (μίμησις), ‘the study and conspicuous deployment of features recognizably characteristic of a canonical author’s style or content…’, which emphasised intimate knowledge of as large as possible a library of texts.¹

The close analysis involved necessitated memorising and internalising a wide variety of authorial models, which makes Renaissance authors ideal for a historical examination of one of the key tenets of an influential modern theory: that metaphor is fundamental to cognition. In this paper I survey some sixteenth-century uses as a metaphor of the mirror for counsel, against the background of Lakoff and Johnson’s ‘invariance principle’.

The mirror was a metaphor for many things at once in sixteenth-century literature: in John Lyly’s 1591 play Endimion the mirror is associated with Vanitas, Superba, Luxuria, Veritas, Prudentia, and Contemplation.² Recent work on vision metaphors in European literature details the centrality of the mirror as a metaphor in the Renaissance.³ At the

same time as improvements in crystal glass technology allowed for ever clearer and more frequent self-regard, mirrors were seen as spiritually and psychologically distorting. But this was not necessarily a bad thing. The mirror metaphor was not only an established topic for political criticism and self-reflection (as it is now called: a case in point), but also for the juxtaposition of ideals and realities and dialogue between them. The loci classici of the mirror metaphor can be seen in the mirror of St Paul, through which we see divine perfection ‘in aenigmate’, and the mirror of Narcissus, symbol of vain (in both senses), and ultimately fatal, self-regard. Both of these traditions reflect Platonic doctrines of ideal forms of knowledge. This study examines how the mirror of St Paul and the mirror of Narcissus worked together in sixteenth-century counsel.

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argued in *Metaphors We Live By* that metaphor is central to cognition: we think by mapping metaphors from one domain of experience to another. For example we speak, and think, of cognition in terms of vision, as people did in the sixteenth century (speculation, reflection, perception). As vision requires a degree of illumination, a viewer, an object, and an eye or lens, these

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5 Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate: tunc autem facie ad faciem. Nunc cognosco ex parte: tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum: ‘For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.’ I Cor. 13.12.


elements are mapped on to intellection: we understand something ‘dimly’ or ‘clearly’, the person attempting to understand is the viewer, the topic to be understood is the object, and the means of understanding (sometimes the mind, sometimes the theory or medium) is the lens. While such ‘conceptual metaphors’ are not universal, once such a metaphor is established, it tends to persist.\textsuperscript{9} New ideas, and indeed new metaphors, are mapped on to the sum total of previously existing meanings. To explain how this happens, Lakoff and Johnson proposed the invariance principle:

Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain [in this case vision], in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain [intellection].\textsuperscript{10}

While cognitive linguistics has advanced since the early 1980s, the invariance principle remains an influential idea in the discipline.\textsuperscript{11} With the influence of the linguistic turn on historiography, a renewed interest in metaphor among historians is shown in several recent studies, such as Judith H. Anderson’s study of three

\textsuperscript{9} For example, some societies conceive of time as a circle, others as linear.


metaphors in the English Reformation, *Translating Investments*.

In extrapolating the theories of metaphor in the Renaissance, scholars have taken issue with cognitive linguistics’ universalising premise. One way to address this issue is to simply avoid applying modern theories to early modern material on grounds of anachronism. This may be one reason why cognitive metaphor theory, despite its universalising goal, has not so far been historicised. In this article, I would like to explore some similarities and differences between Renaissance theories of metaphor and cognitive metaphor theory. Although cognitive metaphor theory has of course developed and broadened beyond Lakoff’s initial text, this article focuses on the invariance principle as an important tenet of that theory, comparing the invariance principle to the treatment of metaphor in Renaissance rhetoric. I will examine how this conceptual resemblance was used in the idea of counsel as a mirror for princes (and other individuals), and for Elizabethan society more broadly. For Aristotle, just as for Lakoff and Johnson, the creation of meaning through metaphor is a universal human capacity and a universal human pleasure:

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13 Judith Anderson finds Lakoff and Johnson’s theory ‘lacking a historico-cultural dimension’ (*Translating Investments*, pp. 183, 212 n. 110). Similarly, Miranda Anderson finds that ‘Both evolutionary psychology and cognitive linguistics literary approaches tend to operate without due attention to the historical (and geographical) variables also involved in literary and linguistic constructions’ (Miranda Anderson, *The Renaissance Extended Mind* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 63), and in particular ‘Lakoff and Johnson’s concept of language has overly universalising and homogenising tendencies’ (p. 25). Raphael Lyne’s work finds cognitive metaphor theory useful for early modern literature: see for example *Shakespeare, Rhetoric and Cognition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) and *Memory and Intertextuality in Renaissance Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). I would suggest that any attempt to describe a cognitive and/or linguistic phenomenon (such as metaphor) that is assumed to be universal, requires the explanation to be applicable across times and places. If so, an attempt to apply it therefore constitutes a useful litmus test for such a theory.
metaphor especially has clarity and sweetness and strangeness [... A]ll people carry on
their conversations with metaphors [...] for people are admirers of what is far off, and
what is marvellous is sweet.¹⁴

This passage also introduces the idea that ‘clarity and sweetness and strangeness’ are
not mutually exclusive qualities; the appeal of the ‘marvellous’ and the clarity of the
familiar work together in metaphor. Mark Turner credits Aristotle with something
like a proto-invariance principle, citing ‘Aristotle’s apparent characterization of [...] 
metaphor as the perception of similarity in dissimilar things’.¹⁵ Aristotle originally
noticed that a metaphor is constrained not to violate various things about the target.
He expressed this by saying that the source must fit the target in certain ways,
including what appear to be conceptual ways.¹⁶ For Cicero, although ‘metaphors were
first established because of a shortage of words’, metaphorical expression ‘clarifie[s a]
resemblance between this thing and the thing that we evoke by [...] the metaphorical
word [...] Other metaphors [...] introduce some splendour [...]’ (my emphasis). This
appeal leads to common usage, where metaphors ‘c[o]me to be used frequently
because of their charm’.¹⁷

In Institutiones Oratoriae, Quintilian classifies metaphor as:

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¹⁶ Turner, pp. 54–5, paraphrasing Aristotle, Rhetoric 1405a.

A noun or a verb is transferred from the place to which it properly belongs to another where there is either no literal term or the transferred is better than the literal. We do this either because it is necessary or to make our meaning clearer or, as I have already said, to produce a decorative effect. When it secures none of these results, our metaphor will be out of place.\(^{18}\)

Thus, for Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, three of the major influences on Renaissance rhetoric, metaphor adds clarity, significance and/or charm through interdependent resemblance and difference between the two terms. While metaphors foreground ‘resemblance’ between one thing and another (in modern terms, between source and target), it is the distance between them that confers splendour and therefore creates new meaning — provided there is sufficient existing resemblance to be recognisable and sufficient distance to strike the imagination. Lakoff defined this resemblance as ‘topologically consistent image-schemata’, as in the vision-intellection metaphor.\(^{19}\) Any new metaphorical transference must clarify or reinforce some aspect of the source \textit{at the same time} as it clarifies some aspect of the target. In this, Lakoff’s invariance principle echoes classical metaphor theory.

These ideas remained current throughout the sixteenth century, as can be seen in English rhetorical textbooks that translated and engaged with the classical sources. For Thomas Wilson, Henry Peacham and George Puttenham, as for Aristotle, Cicero


\(^{19}\) Cf. Lakoff, ‘Conceptual Metaphor’, p. 199.
and Quintilian, metaphor works by transferring meaning from a ‘natural’ to an
‘unnatural’ domain, but this is only possible because of some [existing and
recognisable] ‘likeness’, ‘nearness’ or ‘affinity’. Metaphor is:

an alteration [...] from the proper and natural meaning to that which is not proper and
yet agreeth thereunto by some likeness that appeareth to be in it.\textsuperscript{20}

 [...] from the proper signification, to another not proper, but yet nigh and like.\textsuperscript{21}

a kind of wresting [...] from his owne right signification, to another not so naturall, but
yet of some affinitie or conueniencie with it.\textsuperscript{22}

This sense of a proper signification and one ‘like’ it, appear cognate with Lakoff’s
source and target domains.

However, where no such resemblance seems to exist, the figure is called not
metaphor but catachresis, ‘abuse’. For Peacham, this is a ‘\textbf{necessary abuse}’ of like
words’ where no ‘proper’ term exists (my emphasis).\textsuperscript{23} Puttenham omits ‘necessary’,
and indeed the lack of necessity is the reason he calls it abuse.\textsuperscript{24} Erasmus echoes the
sense of necessary impropriety: a word used metaphorically ‘is transferred away from

\textsuperscript{20}Thomas Wilson, \textit{The Art of Rhetoric, for the Use of All Such as Are Studious of Eloquence}, ed. by Nicholas
Printed in 1553, 1560, 1562, 1563, 1567, 1580, 1584, and 1585.
\textsuperscript{21}Henry Peacham, \textit{The Garden of Eloquence} (1593) (Delmar, New York: Scholars’ Facsimiles &
Reprints, 1977) <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.03.0082%3Apart%3DTr
opes+of+words> [accessed 22 October 2016]. Printed in 1577, 1591, and 1593.
\textsuperscript{22}George Puttenham, \textit{Arte of English Poesie}, 3.17 <http://ota.ox.ac.uk/text/3181.html> [accessed 22
October 2016]. Printed in 1589 and 1590.
\textsuperscript{24}‘without any iust inconuenience’: Puttenham, 3.17.
its real and proper signification to one which lies outside’.25 In Angel Day’s English Secretary, the same distinction, and the same similarity, is made between metaphor and catachresis. Metaphor is the transference of a word ‘from the proper or right signification [...] to another neere unto the meaning’, and catachresis ‘where wee accommodate a name to a thing that is not proper’.26 Judith Anderson notes the occasional conflation of metaphor and catachresis in early modern rhetoric, and suggests that the difference seems to be in degree of ‘nearness’ to the ‘proper natural signification’.27

Lakoff and Johnson refute what they call the ‘Naming Position’: ‘that a metaphor is the use of a word to mean something it doesn’t “properly” mean’, because ‘the position has the false consequence that metaphor has no conceptual role. In other words, it cannot be used in reasoning, conceptualizing, and understanding’.28 However, subscribing to this position did not hinder Renaissance authors from using metaphor to reason, conceptualise, and understand. ‘In cases of indeterminate target structure’, Mark Turner allows:

the metaphor has exceptionally wide power to impart meaning to the subject [...] by imparting to it through metaphor the image-schematic structure of a source. Much of

28 Lakoff and Johnson, p. 124.
our abstract reasoning may or may not be a metaphoric version of image-schematic reasoning.\textsuperscript{29}

As Lakoff and Johnson put it:

To the extent that we use a conceptual [...] metaphor, we accept its validity. Consequently, when someone else uses it, we are predisposed to accept its validity. For this reason, conventionalised schemas and metaphors have \textit{persuasive} power.\textsuperscript{30}

In this, Lakoff and Johnson’s explanation of metaphor’s appeal seems to echo Wilson’s:

Thus as necessitye hath forced us to borowe wordes translated: so hath time and practice made theim to seeme moost pleasaunt, and therfore thei are muche the rather used.\textsuperscript{31}

It is worth noting here that Wilson and his contemporaries were very conscious that \textit{translatio} is the literal Latin translation for the Greek word ‘metaphor’, and in the sixteenth century ‘translation’ was a common way of referring to metaphor, the ‘carrying over’ of meaning from one referent to another. Here Wilson, Lakoff and Johnson describe the appeal, and centrality to cognition, of metaphors as they become familiar through usage.

\textsuperscript{29}Turner, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{30}Lakoff and Johnson, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{31}Wilson, p. z3r <http://ota.ox.ac.uk/text/3153.html> [accessed 25 October 2016].
However, Aristotle’s ‘strangeness’ was also an important part of metaphor’s appeal and power. This aspect was much more heavily emphasised in the Renaissance schoolroom, which trained writers for public and professional life, than in modern linguistics. Students were urged to become familiar with a wide variety of models so as to be able to coin new usages that would be strange enough to give splendour, but ‘yet of some affinitie’. I would argue that metaphorical ‘abuse’ was found necessary in the Elizabethan period less for lack of words — there are many ways to neologise; for example loan words, calques and backformations were common — than because sufficient distance between image-schemata was needed for the metaphor to appeal to the imagination. As Peacham cautions ‘that the similitude be not greater then the matter requireth, or contrariwise lesse’ (my emphasis).

The key to developing this skill, and to developing this affinity, was *imitatio*, the imitation of canonical authors, in particular stylistic characteristics, such as metaphor. For Erasmus:

> not polish alone but all the dignity of language stems from its metaphors [...]. Of the other ornaments of style, each makes its own peculiar contribution to its charm and flexibility; metaphor alone adds everything in fuller measure [...].

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32 Puttenham, 3.17.
Therefore, metaphor was one way that conceptual frameworks were transferred (or as Shakespeare’s Bottom would say ‘translated’) from one author to another. In *De Copia*, written for John Colet’s St Paul’s School, Erasmus exhorts the student to ‘provide himself with extensive lists of striking metaphors culled from the best authors [...]’. These I myself have laboured to collect. Erasmus’ *Parabolaet,* or *Parallels,* are a collection of metaphors taken from Greek and Latin authors for the embellishment of writing exercises and letters. In the preface to this text, Erasmus hinted: ‘It will not be found out of the way to attach this book to my *Adagia* or, if so preferred, to my *Copia* as a kind of supplement’. Both books were enormously popular throughout sixteenth-century Europe. It is easy to see why metaphor dominated Renaissance rhetoric. Perhaps not too surprisingly, then, it was also instrumental in early thinking about cognition: ‘For the Greek *parabole,* which Cicero latinizes as *collatio,* a sort of comparison, is nothing more than a metaphor writ large’. Comparing and being able to imitate many styles is a similar mental operation to that demanded in the comparison of different ‘strange’ yet ‘like’ qualities, or in Lakoff’s terms, image-schemata consistent with the topology of the target domain (in itself a metaphor: understanding as map-making). The way this comparison worked...

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35 *A Midsummer Night’s Dream,* III. i. 12–13.
36 Erasmus, *Copia,* CWE, p. 335.
38 Betty Knott, ‘Introduction’ in *Copia,* CWE, pp. 281–3. Knott comments: ‘*De copia* was before long adopted as a textbook of rhetoric in schools and universities throughout northern Europe; so widespread did its use become that it was worth pirating, summarizing, excerpting, turning into a question-and-answer manual, and making the subject of commentaries. Editions, both authorized and unauthorized, of the work in its various forms poured from the presses of Germany, the Netherlands, and Paris.’ She then lists the main editions.
39 Erasmus, *Parallels,* p. 130. Raphael Lyne has explored this further, particularly in *Shakespeare, Rhetoric and Cognition* and *Memory and Intertextuality in Renaissance Literature.*
40 Lakoff, p. 199.
in practice can be seen in the metaphor of the mirror, particularly in the way the mirror was used as a metaphor in Elizabethan notions of counsel, that is, the giving, receiving, and soliciting of advice. As we will see, counsel was based on the image-schema of ‘the mind as possessing one or more figurative mirrors [...]

This image-schema of the mind as a mirror allowed for different kinds of mirrors. Erasmus’ *Parabolae* included references to the mirror as a reflection to be held up to an angry man (456B), an example (85B), and a ‘flatterer’ that ‘reproduces whatever is set before him’ (53A). *Mirror* was a ‘splendid’ (in this context, boastful), book title, like *Summa* or *Jewel*. In fact, as Herbert Grabes has shown, the mirror as a title denoted several recognised kinds of ‘splendour’ by the sixteenth century. Printed ‘mirrors’ could be encyclopaedic, showing everything: fantastic, showing imaginary things; prophetic, showing things as they would be, or didactic, showing things as they should (or should not) be. Some of the earliest texts called mirrors were encyclopaedias and compendia, such as Vincent of Beauvais’ thirteenth-century *Speculum maius*, a monumental work setting out to describe the nature, doctrine, and history of the world. Conduct manuals such as, the mirror for princes that showed rulers models of right and wrong behaviour, were also popular throughout the

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42 Erasmus, *Parallels*, p. 199.
43 Erasmus, *Parallels*, p. 188.
44 Erasmus, *Parallels*, p. 144.
medieval period. Throughout the sixteenth century, a text called a ‘mirror’ or ‘glass’ could be a conduct manual,47 biography,48 textbook,49 or social satire. These different literary functions and conventions were often combined and influenced one another, as the practice of imitatio helped to ensure. For example, in the Mirror for Magistrates (1559), biography functioned as a didactic mirror to those in office, as well as holding up an encyclopaedic, or all-encompassing, mirror to a changing society.

In 1602, Sir Richard Hawkins, a sea captain and explorer who had commanded one of Queen Elizabeth’s ships against the Armada, wrote to the Queen, addressing her as a ‘Mirror for Princes and my dread Sovereign’.50 Elizabeth would have understood him to be invoking her as a mirror in the sense of a model or example, as Edmund Mather did when he addressed her as a ‘Mirror of Clemencie’.51 Elizabeth

47 Thomas Salter, A mirrhor mete for all mothers, matrones, and maidens, intituled the Mirrhor of Modestie no lesse profitable and pleasant, then necessarie to bee read and practiced (London: J. Kingston for Edward White, 1579).
48 Anthony Munday, Palmerin D’Oliua The mirrour of nobilitie, mappe of honor, anotamie of rare fortunes, heroycall president of Loue:... Presenting to noble mindes, theyr courtlie desire, to gentles, theyr choise expectations, and to the inferior sorte, howe to imitate theyr vertues... (London: I. Charlewood for William Wright, 1588).
49 The mariners mirrour wherein may playnly be seen the courses, heights, distances, depths, soundings, flouds and ebs, risings of lands, rocks, sands and shoalds:.... (London: John Charlewood, 1588).
described herself as a mirror for princes in more complex terms, when in 1586 she wrote to James VI of Scotland to advise him against forming an alliance with France:

Only natural affection [...] stirred me to save you from the murderers of your father and the peril that their complices might breed you. Thus, as in no counterfeit mirror you may behold without mask the faces of both beginners.\(^{52}\)

Here Elizabeth evokes the mirror both as a false counsellor, and at the same time as a true reflection of the world and a tool for self-reflection and self-knowledge. She posits herself and her counsel as a mirror in which James could see his political dilemma and the lords surrounding him in their true proportions, while simultaneously implying that the lords are ‘counterfeit mirrors’; counsellors that flattered a prince’s vanity and led him, and the realm, into peril. Likewise, in Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar*, Cassius positions himself to Brutus as a true mirror that will show Brutus his own ‘hidden worthiness’, a plain-spoken friend, and therefore, a good counsellor.\(^{53}\)

Thus, we can see several image-schemata (in Lakoff’s terms) common to mirrors and to counsel, whether directly in letters or more broadly in literature:

- A mirror reflects a situation as it is, without bias.
- A mirror reflects everything there is to be seen of something.
- A mirror reflects a situation only partially.

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\(^{53}\) BRUTUS: ‘The eye sees not itself/ But by reflection…’ CASSIUS: ‘... you have no such mirrors as will turn/ Your hidden worthiness into your eye… I your glass, Will modestly discover to yourself/ That of yourself which you yet know not of.’ *Julius Caesar* I. ii. 51–58, 66–70. Cited in Hunt, pp. 31–2.
A mirror reflects the surface appearance of things, encouraging narcissism and ignorance.

A mirror reflects the person looking into it.

A mirror can be distorting.

A reflection is always inverted.

All of these disparate resemblances were simultaneously consistent with, and indeed constitutive of, the topology of the mirror image-schema, and the domain of counsel. I suggest that this was possible by mapping the mirror onto a number of other image-schemata and thence onto the image-schema of counsel (that is, of the giving and receiving of advice) through the practice of literary *imitatio* and *collatio* of metaphors.\(^{54}\)

Key to this process was the double tradition of the Pauline mirror and the mirror of Narcissus. Mather makes explicit reference to one such image-schema when he refers Elizabeth to her own ‘dread Sovereign’:

> your Majestie [...] being a Mirror of Clemencie, will, [...] deal herein, as it shall please God, the Director of Princes to inspire your Heighnes with his devine Grace and Goodnes.\(^{55}\)


In the chain of command of Elizabethan office, each person, including the monarch, was a mirror (reflection) of their superior, and a mirror (example) to their inferiors.\textsuperscript{56} Through the influence and imitation of Aristotle, Neoplatonism, and medieval authorities such as St Bonaventure, the chain image-schema was blended with the Renaissance concept of vision:

all of creation, including humankind, was thought of as so many specula, or mirrors, catching the rays of divine light/love as they stream from godhead and reflecting them downward to the creature beneath in a Great Chain of Being.\textsuperscript{57}

This chain of mirrors has obvious echoes in that of the Pauline mirror, in which light corresponds to wisdom. How this worked in the practice of Tudor counsel is shown in William Baldwin’s \textit{The Mirror for Magistrates}, a collection of verse tragedies narrated by various unfortunates in English history, introduced by short prose links. The audience of ‘magistrates’, that is, any office-holders, are counselled to see themselves as deputies of God:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See Arthur O. Lovejoy, \textit{The great chain of being: a study of the history of an idea: the William James lectures delivered at Harvard University, 1933} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), and E. M. W. Tillyard, \textit{The Elizabethan World Picture} (London: Chatto and Windus, 1943), noting that they focused on continuities between classical, medieval and Renaissance thought.
\item Joseph Mazzeo, \textit{Medieval Cultural Traditions in Dante’s “Comedy”} (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1968), pp. 15–16, 20–21, quoted in Hunt, p. 23.
\end{enumerate}
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For as justice is the chief virtue, so is the ministration thereof, the chiefest office: and therefore hath God established it with the chiefest name, honoring and calling kings, and all officers under them, by his own name, Gods. Ye be all gods [...] 58

As in the source texts, the tragic figures are also, for the most part, noble. The Mirror is intended to remind its readers of the right way to behave, particularly in offices of authority, and of the divine origin of individual responsibility. The choices of historical persons in each succeeding edition are cited as evidence of this didactic message. 59 The individual tragedies for the most part are negative examples. Maurice Hunt suggests that the exemplary mirrors in the Mirror, or at least the kings that are mirrors (Richard II, James I, and Edward IV in the 1559 edition), are ‘warnings for readers (especially princely ones)’ because ‘their virtues are few, or nonexistent’. 60 The metaphorical sense of ‘mirror’ as ‘negative example’ in political counsel persisted throughout Elizabeth’s reign, as when Sir Francis Walsingham, Elizabeth’s principal secretary, warned the Lord Chancellor of Scotland that the fate of:

Don Antonio [King of Portugal] may serve for a lively example, wherein as a mirror he [Maitland] may behold his fortune falling into the like hard and distressed estate. 61

60 Hunt, p. 87.
61 Walsingham to [the Chancellor of Scotland], March 1587. Cotton Caligula D/I f.133. Don Antonio was at the time in exile and attempting to garner support from England against Spain, however he ‘was in despair of the Queen’s giving him help to undertake any enterprise himself, and was almost starving.’ Bernado de Mendoza to King Philip of Spain, 26th March 1587 <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/simancas/vol4/pp43-59> (no. 48) [accessed 10 November 2016].
The same meaning occurs in a letter to Walsingham dated five years before, which shows the process Wilson described: ‘time and practice’ made ‘words borrowed’ ‘the rather used’.62

Grabes classifies the *Mirror for Magistrates* as an admonitory mirror and it appears Baldwin intended it as such.63 In the introduction, Baldwin’s ‘chiefest ende’ was that the reader:

[... here as in a looking glas, [...] shall see (if any vice be in you) howe the like hath bene punished in other heretofore, whereby admonished, I trust it will [...] move you to the soner amendement.64

This illustrates an extra dimension to the metaphor. In Lakoff’s terms, the chain image-schema is topologically consistent with the reflection image-schema. This combination allows each link in the chain of mirrors, that is, each reader, to be both positive and negative examples. This is evidenced in Duke Humfrey’s exhortation to the reader in the *Mirror for Magistrates*: ‘Note well the cause of my decay and fall, / And make a mirror for magistrates all’.65 This ‘decay and fall’ is a negative example with the reader urged to become a positive mirror, in the sense that Elizabeth was asked to be a mirror of clemency.

was a plot at the time to murder Don Antonio by poisoning his fortnightly enema: indeed, a hard and distressed estate.

62 The abuses of Catholic armies are presented ‘for a mirror [to the people of Flanders] not [to] let themselves be led over a precipice[...]’. Rossel to Walsingham, Feb 4 1582. SP 83/15 f. 19.

63 Grabes, p. 82.

64 Baldwin, ed. Campbell, pp. 65-7.

The chain image-schema also allows for simultaneous notions of counsel, as both a false and true mirror. The reader could see, as in a (true) reflection, the negative consequences of being deceived by Narcissan mirrors of false counsellors: ‘Whereby the world may see, as in a glass, The unsure state, of them that stand most high, Which than dread least, when danger is most nigh’.66 They also saw the consequences of being such a mirror:

Where Judges and Justices may see, as in a glasse,
What fee is for falshode, and what our wages was
Who for our princes pleasure corrupt with meed and awe
wittyngly and wretchedly did wrest the sence of lawe.67

As Edmund Spenser reminded Elizabeth in *The Faerie Queene*:

[...] true curtesie,
Its now so farre from that, which then it was,
That it indeed is nought but forgerie,
Fashion’d to please the eies of them, that pas,
Which see not perfect things but in a glas:
Yet is that glasse so gay that it can blynd/ The wisest sight [...]68

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67 Baldwin, ed. Campbell, p. 73.
Thus, the Pauline mirror, through which we see ‘through a glass darkly’, was usefully combined with the annihilating vanity of Narcissus. While explicitly addressing an audience of noble individuals, the *Mirror* is also positioned as a conduct mirror for the nation more broadly. The poems in the *Mirror for Magistrates* are referred to as tragedies and their sources are chronicles, thus mapping the mirror onto two established genres in the domain of history. National and/or world history was one of the most popular forms of the encyclopedic mirror. Of the three parts of the much-reprinted medieval *Speculum Maius*, which described the nature, doctrine, and history of the world, the *Speculum Historiale* was the most popular. In England, William Caxton’s *Mirror of the World* (1481 and 1490) and John Swan’s *Speculum mundi*, which went through four editions by 1670, were equally popular translations of chronicles. John Lydgate’s 1430s *Fall of Princes* proceeded chronologically from Adam and Eve to the Battle of Poitiers (1356). The *Mirror for Magistrates* was printed as an accompaniment to a new edition of Lydgate, continuing Lydgate’s chronicle ‘since the tyme of kyng Richard the seconde’. Subsequent editions added later individuals as well as more English historical figures. Each successive edition also left out particular figures. It is clear, however, that the chronicle form remained, in the sense of a comprehensive history of the nation from Adam and Eve to the time of publication.

The *Mirror for Magistrates* draws explicitly on chronicles, and on *De Casibus* tragedy; that is the fall of the great, either as divine punishment for hubris or just

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69 According to the title of the first edition: Baldwin, William, ca. 1518–1563, *A memorial of suche princes, as since the tyme of king Richard the seconde, haue been vnfortunate in the realme of England*, (London: In ædibus Iohannis Waylandi, cum priuilegio per septenniam, 1554?).

70 The principal editions (1559, 1563, 74, 78, 87, 1610) are surveyed in Lily Campbell’s ‘Introduction’, pp. 5–19.
through the fickleness of fortune (or indeed, as divine punishment for having too much faith in fortune). As well as extending the admonitory mirror into chronicle form, the *Mirror* also constitutes a larger tragedy of ‘mundane irrationality’; that is, of the inescapable absurdity of the world. Its models, Lydgate’s *Fall of Princes* (c. 1431–9) and Boccaccio’s *De Casibus Virorum Illustrium* (*On the Fates or Misfortunes of Famous Men*, c. 1358) were collections of tragic biographies that showed in microcosm the postlapsarian trajectory of the human condition: ‘the instability of fortune; and […] the certain death of men’. It is not surprising, then, that literary critics, and to a lesser extent historians, have seen the element of tragedy in the *Mirror for Magistrates* as reinforcing the notion of obedience to orthodoxy.

The multiplicity and intersectionality of different linguistic modes in English history and their effect on shaping English identity is a major theme of recent scholarship. Catherine Nicholson suggests that early sixteenth-century English authors’ sense of nationhood depended on a sense of balance between resemblance and strangeness learned from their studies of rhetoric:

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72 Grabes, pp. 172–3.

even as [English authors’] study of ancient rhetoric and poetry taught them to recognise their estrangement from antiquity, it also taught them to perceive in that estrangement — or any estrangement of language — the essence of literary value.\textsuperscript{74}

Without the cultivation of a certain degree of alienation — without translation and metaphor — eloquence collapses into mere talk; taken too far, the exoticism of eloquence becomes affectation and absurdity.\textsuperscript{75}

As noted earlier, Peacham and Puttenham speak of metaphor in exactly these terms, a translation:

\textit{[...] from the proper signification, to another not proper, but yet nigh and like.}\textsuperscript{76}

a kind of wrestling \textit{[...] from his owne right signification, to another not so naturall, but yet of some affinitie or conueniencie with it.}\textsuperscript{77}

That is to say, for sixteenth-century authors, their sense of ‘self and other’ was predicated on how they understood metaphor.

Borrowing genre conventions from the established historical forms of chronicle and tragedy lends the \textit{Mirror} the authority and scale of history. Similarly, explicitly calling the text a mirror maps other established meanings of the mirror, performance,

\textsuperscript{75} Nicholson, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{76} Peacham, \textit{The Garden of Eloquence} (1593).
\textsuperscript{77} Puttenham, \textit{Arte of English Poesie}, 3.17.
true and false counsel, positive and negative example, on to the domain of national history.

While the *Mirror for Magistrates* is a cornerstone of the history of sovereignty and of literary history, particularly the history of drama, the change in title has rarely been discussed. In the first edition, which appeared in 1554 or 1555, but was suppressed, the title was *A Memorial of Suche Princes, as [...] have been unfortunate in the Realme of England*. Only the title page and one leaf of this edition survive. *A Memorial* did not appear until after the end of Mary I’s reign in 1559, with a new title: *A Myrrour for Magistrates, wherein may be seen by example of other, with howe grievous plages vices are punished and howe frayle and unstable worldly prosperity is found, even of those, whom Fortune seemeth most highly to favour*. The prefatory material explicitly called it a mirror while it was still titled *A Memorial*. Whether or not the preface was rewritten between *A Memorial* and *A Mirror*, the new title did place the emphasis on the text as a form of mirror. Whereas a memorial is a static image-schema, a mirror is dynamic, interactive. Bart van Es argues that ‘Historical collections such as the [...] *Mirror for Magistrates* were “mirrors” precisely because the message they bore changed in relation to their reader’,⁷⁸ and that ‘it was this continual effort of updating’, this capacity to reflect the reader’s political reality at whatever time it was read ‘that gave the endless mirror expansions and collections their long lives.’⁷⁹

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Once established, genres can be combined in various ways, mapping conventions from one genre on to another: as we have seen in the *Mirror for Magistrates’* combination of *speculum principis*, tragedy, and national history. As with conceptual metaphors, the very establishment of genres prompts readers to question and complicate them. Much as Lakoff said of conceptual metaphors,

Genres order and transmit history, but they can also alter the perception of real events or produce dissonance, especially where they disrupt expectations or compete with adjacent forms for interpretive authority (my emphasis).\(^80\)

The emphasis on Fortune’s fickleness in chronicles, when combined with the chronicle-as-mirror, lends itself not only to the tragedy of ‘mundane irrationality’ as noted by Grabes and Budra, but also to the exploration of ideas of deliberate false counsel and of performance.\(^81\) Recent scholarship has questioned earlier criticism of the *Mirror for Magistrates* as a simplistic admonitory mirror reinforcing obedience to either Marian or Elizabethan orthodoxy, seeing in it both ‘a conversation about power’ and a conscious performance.\(^82\) Baldwin was an experienced printer and publisher. As editor, the choice of the new title may well have been his: but whether or not he chose it, it is likely that it was chosen advisedly. It was a dangerous time to be a Protestant printer, writer, and preacher, but Baldwin was good at adapting to the fast-

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changing circumstances, for example, working for the same publisher under Protestant and then Catholic management. He was also a shrewd artist: ‘Even before *A Mirror* he had experimented with multiple frames for his texts and the interplay among authors’ and printer’s perspectives’.

The prose links in the *Mirror for Magistrates* display the pragmatic circumstances of the text’s composition. The printer, Wayland, asked Baldwin to coordinate the work and Baldwin, somewhat unwillingly, agreed, finding seven fairly prominent contemporary authors to compose the tragedies. The work was done collaboratively, and historical figures appear in dreams to the group of assembled authors to ‘make their moan’ in the first person. Whether these circumstances are fictionalised or not is less important than the verisimilitude on display. The *Mirror* is a frame within a frame within a frame. It exploits the elements of ‘counterfeit’ and ‘reversal’ that the mirror image-schema shared with the dream vision and false encomium, genre conventions common in satires such as the medieval *Piers Plowman* or Alexander Barclay’s 1509 *Ship of Foole*s. Grabes sees the *Mirror for Magistrates* as satire in the *de contemptu mundi* tradition of the *Ship of Foole*s, because of its emphasis on tragedy and the fickleness of Fortune.

However, for the authors and printers of the *Mirror*, satire was a fundamentally worldly imperative, as the poet Collingbourne states in the *Mirror*: ‘I am that Collingbourne / Which rhymed that which made full many mourn: / The Cat, the

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83 Skura, p. 75.
84 As invited by Baldwin (Baldwin, ed. by Campbell, p. 69), and as described in the complaints of Sir Roger Mortimer (Baldwin, ed. by Campbell, p. 81), and Richard Chaloner (p. 111).
85 Grabes, p. 90.
Rat, and Lovel our Dog, Do rule all England, under a Hog.’

The poet was put to death for this rhyme, but posthumously pleads his loyalty:

For where I meant the king by name of Hog,
I only alluded to his badge the boar:
To Lovel’s name I added more our dog,
because most dogs have borne that name of yore.

These metaphors I use with other more,
As Cat, and Rat, the half names of the rest,
To hide the sense which they so wrongly wrest.

As hinted by the conflation of metaphor and catachresis in the work of Peacham, Puttenham and Day, such ‘wresting’ from the ‘proper’ or ‘right signification’ was ‘necessary abuse’. Collingbourne argues that his metaphors were closer to the ‘right’ or literal meaning of the boar, the dog, cat, and rat, than to the ‘further’ pejorative meanings of these animals which his readers found (and executed him for). ‘Satire, like tragedy, is a way of taking seriously man’s condition’, a constructed realm for negotiating between ideals and expedients. In the case of the court poet Collingbourne, the satirical mirror is negotiating between the ideals and the expedients of several of the king’s subjects: Lydgate, Boccaccio, and the chroniclers, who were no strangers to the vagaries of patronage and fortune; the nobility ‘and all

86 Baldwin, ed. by Campbell, p. 349.
87 Baldwin, ed. by Campbell, p. 357.
89 Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (1593); Puttenham, Arte of English Poesie, 3.17.
Jenny Smith, ‘Necessary Abuse: The Mirror as Metaphor in the Sixteenth Century’

other in office'; and finally, authors and poets in general. As Ellen Leyburn noted: ‘The appropriation of the same figure of the mirror by both satire and metaphor, with the implied extension to allegory, indicates a fundamental affinity in the need for indirect communication’.92

This need did not disappear with the succession of Queen Elizabeth. The Mirror was reissued eight times, the last in 1620.93 It was a popular work referred to by Ben Jonson and Shakespeare, and the title was frequently copied in the late sixteenth century: Grabes notes an explosion of mirror titles after the publication of this text.94 The mirror and the multiplicity of meanings it was accruing in this text and its ‘progeny’, through the contemporary emphasis on *imitatio* and comparison and the prominence of metaphor in rhetorical education, created a space for cumulative image-schemata.95 At the same time, the Aristotelian idea of ‘sweet strangeness’ and subsequent conflation of catachresis and metaphor in rhetoric, kept the emphasis on difference and contrast between image-schemata. This in turn enabled the indirect communication that was so necessary for sixteenth-century writers, not just in literary creativity, but at the intersection of literature and the practice of counsel, as many of them were.

In 1572, the courtier George Gascoigne was refused admission to Parliament on the grounds that he was ‘a common rhymer, a notorious ruffian, an atheist, and a

92 Leyburn, p. 9.
93 *The first part of the mirror for magistrates* (1574), *The seconde part* (1578), *The mirrour of Mutabilitie, or Principall part of the Mirrour for Magistrates* (1579), 1587, A Mirror for Magistrates… Newly enlarged, with … a Poem annexed, called Englands Eliza (1610), The Falls of Unfornitate Princes (1620).
godless person.’ In 1576 Gascoigne published *The Steele Glas*, a verse satire on contemporary society that contrasted the old-fashioned steel mirrors with the new *cristallo* glass mirrors exported from Venice. Like Elizabeth, Gascoigne evokes the tropes of ‘true’ and flattering mirrors. Unlike the *cristallo* mirrors then dominating the English luxury market, which merely enabled vanity, his steel glass was made of tougher stuff, and the constant effort and polishing (that is, reading and thinking) required provided a truer reflection of the reader’s soul. In this, Gascoigne made use of the long established metaphor of the Pauline mirror, all the more valuable the more oblique it was: ‘For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known’. Obscurity, then, was not only narcissist artifice — though it was also that — but also had a Pauline mystical function. Mirrors were a means to vanity, to self-understanding, and also to spiritual development.

Gascoigne’s literary mirrors succeeded in gaining him patronage and diplomatic work. His masque in 1575 at Kenilworth drew Elizabeth’s approval, as did his didactic play *The Glasse of Government*. In August 1576 he was sent to the Low Countries to report on affairs directly to William Cecil, Lord Burghley, the Lord High Treasurer. Walsingham and others of Elizabeth’s councillors also read Gascoigne’s reports, and his literary style passed into standard rhetorical textbooks: Puttenham

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97 Kalas, pp. 107–10.
quotes him in the *Arte of English Poesie*. The Queen’s cousin also understood the spiritual value of mirrors in the same way as Gascoigne. In a 1578 letter to her priest, Mary Queen of Scots describes the priest’s letters ‘as a mirror or picture to represent to me daily [...] both the defect of my actions and the grace required for the accomplishment’ of her royal duties. For Mary, as for Elizabeth and for Gascoigne, the mirror of counsel was both an object of ideal and inversion, showing the audience what they should, and what they should not, be, as well as reflecting who they so imperfectly were.

The same applied to the stage. In 1579 Stephen Gosson, ex-playwright, published the *Schoole of Abuse*, in which he acknowledges the stage as a flattering mirror, in the same way as Gascoigne’s crystal glass or Elizabeth’s counterfeit mirror. Plays are ruinous to society, he wrote, not just a mirror of vice but a ‘school of abuse’. And yet, plays can also teach virtue, representing to society a clear picture of their ideals and in Mary’s words ‘the defect of [their] actions’. Whereas ancient Roman and contemporary Continental theatre was a notorious hotbed of flattery and licentiousness, explained Gosson in enthusiastic detail, ‘Nowe are the abuses of the worlde reuealed, euery man in a play may see his owne faultes, and learne by this glasse, to amende his manners’. Thus, the stories enacted on the Elizabethan stage

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were understood, or at least advertised, to function in the same ways as the biographies in the *Mirror for Magistrates*. The connection between history and performance was often direct: it has been argued that ‘Holinshed’s *Chronicles* gave rise to more plays than any other work, old or new, in the early modern period’.\(^{103}\) Social mirrors like *The Steele Glas* and *The Schoole of Abuse* are generally considered satirical,\(^{104}\) as mirrors for princes could also be.\(^{105}\) In a mirror for princes, satire was intended to develop a prince’s sovereignty over both his personal weaknesses and over the realm. The *Steele Glas* and the *Schoole of Abuse* suggest that literary mirrors functioned for society in the same way. Thus, mirrors in counsel could be encyclopaedic, reflecting society as it was; didactic, showing what the audience should, or should not, be; fantastic, showing things that did not exist; and prophetic. That they could be all of these at the same time suggests that these metaphorical meanings cohered.

Discussing the then prominent role of satire at the time *Hamlet* was written, Maurice A. Hunt complicates Grabes’ acceptance of drama as a mirror of nature:

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Through Hamlet’s satire, Shakespeare implies that a literal mirror must replace the mirror of drama when an age’s diction, the language that makes up the dialogue of drama, is so artificial that it cannot reliably perform language’s role in making drama reflect “the form and pressure of the age” without results beneficial to theatre-goers.¹⁰⁶

This passage highlights the importance of language and drama to Elizabethans as mirrors, but as appropriate mirrors of ‘the form and pressure of the age’ with ‘results beneficial to theatre-goers.’ Rayna Kalas has suggested that English Protestant writers had to be particularly careful of the material and potentially idolatrous nature of language.¹⁰⁷ The established metaphor of the Pauline mirror simultaneously reinforced the idea of the mind as a false mirror, which distorts what it shows, as Francis Bacon formulated it in Novum Organum, and as a true mirror of its divine creator.¹⁰⁸ Ironically, the plethora of images and image-schemata available for the mirror metaphor allowed writers to make a case for the truth, and the falsehood, of their counsel at the same time. Such mirrors of ‘mundane irrationality’ seem far less irrational from this point of view.¹⁰⁹

They were not necessarily mundane either.¹¹⁰ A 1518 letter from Erasmus throws another, less worldly, light on the subject, showing the mirror as a conceptual

¹⁰⁶ Hunt, pp. 48–56.
¹⁰⁷ Kalas, p. 2.
metaphor for spiritual as well as literary *imitatio*. The letter is to Conradus Mutianus Rufus, a graduate of the University of Erfurt and at the time a canon of Gotha after having studied in Italy.\textsuperscript{111} It is a short thank-you note both for a letter from Mutianus, ‘the mirror of its fair-minded writer’, and for a recent visit by Helius Eobanus, another Erfurt alumnus, who had brought letters from members of their circle and some writing of his own. The reference to Mutianus’ letter as ‘the mirror of its writer’ here evokes a Renaissance commonplace, derived from Socrates; that of language as the mirror of the soul. In light of this, Erasmus’ praise of Eobanus’ poetry is telling. He shows ‘an original vein of talent [...] you would think him a poet born, not made by practice. He has the same gifts in prose [...]’.\textsuperscript{112} Despite Erasmus’ copious exposition of how style is made by imitating the best authors for example, ‘I think of him as Ovid reincarnate’, this also reflects another aspect of the metaphor of language as a (Pauline) mirror, with lower forms reflecting the light of higher forms in the Great Chain of Being.\textsuperscript{113} Language is the mirror, the means of reflection, but also the light reflected by the mirror. This apparent violation of the invariance hypothesis clarifies the relationship of stylistic talent and practice in Erasmian *imitatio*. Erasmus praises his friend as:

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uniting in [yourself] all I had previously loved or admired in others separately [...] 
your great gifts [...] you owe partly to hard work and partly to heaven [...]\textsuperscript{114}
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\textsuperscript{112} Erasmus to Conradus Mutianus Rufus, Ep. 870, in *The Correspondence of Erasmus*, trans. by R.A.B Mynors and D.F.S Thomson, vol. 6 in CWE, p. 132.

\textsuperscript{113} Erasmus to Johannes Draconites, Ep. 871, in *The Correspondence of Erasmus*, p. 133.

\textsuperscript{114} Erasmus to Helius Eobanus Hessus, Ep. 874, in *The Correspondence of Erasmus*, p. 142.
This passage is a neat encapsulation of the prevailing view of metaphor and linguistic meaning in the sixteenth century: an innate human capacity and indeed a divinely inspired imperative to give clarity and ‘splendour’ to their world through linguistic innovation, and the conviction that this originality could best be achieved by close reading, comparing and internalising the styles of a wide variety of models.115

For Elizabeth and her courtiers, Mary, the writers and readers of the *Mirror for Magistrates*, Gascoigne, Gosson, playwrights and playgoers, and Erasmus, abuse was therefore necessary politically, creatively, historically, and spiritually. Certain resemblances between established image-schemata were repeatedly stressed and embroidered upon, others less so. The mirror metaphor and its many current meanings in sixteenth-century counsel is an example of how the source domain, the ‘prevailing meaning’, shaped the target domain through cumulative image-schemata, giving rise to new domains of meaning while — and because — they preserved the old meanings. The search for sweetness and strangeness, and the habit of comparison and *collatio*, both cemented conceptual metaphors and exploded them. This sense of ‘the proper and natural meaning’ as a background, foundation, or parent of new meanings by way of *imitatio*, allowed for a Renaissance theory of metaphor, and arguably of cognition, as cumulative. Lakoff and Johnson’s invariance principle also shows a cumulative understanding of metaphor and cognition, however, it could be argued that the sixteenth-century practice of *imitatio* regularly violated the invariance

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principle, failing to ‘preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain’. The same mirror, and the same counsel, could be a tool for self-knowledge and for self-deception.

As Mark Turner hypothesised:

There is a system to imagination. Although infinitely variable and unpredictable, imagination is grounded in structures of invention either wholly unoriginal or with an originality that consists of exploitations within a known and unoriginal space. Were imagination free, we would take its products as unintelligible, meritless caprices rather than as significant, valuable achievements. Metaphoric imagination, including [...] in those poems we regard as most original, suggestive, and demanding, appears to be guided and made meaningful by an utterly unoriginal constraint so unrecognized in criticism and so daunting in its complexity that it cannot even be formulated, but must be gestured toward, with a heavy reliance upon the reader’s intuitive sense of what it means: the image-schematic structure of the target is not to be violated.¹¹⁶

As we have seen, sixteenth-century rhetoricians conceived of imitatio not as a constraint, but as a system: a system of such robustness and complexity that it allowed for the image-structure of the target domains of its metaphors to be violated deliberately, and often. These violations of Lakoff’s invariance principle formed some of the literature ‘we regard as most original, suggestive, and demanding’. They also formed a cumulative array of conceptual frameworks that shaped both early modern

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¹¹⁶ Turner, p. 64.
and contemporary experiences of phenomena as universal and abstract as counsel, national identity, and language.