Deciphering deportation practices across the Global North

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FROM THE PANOPTICON TO THE BANOPTICON

Across the liberal and social democracies of Europe, North America and Australasia, deportation or removal[i] of rejected asylum seekers and of non-citizens who have breached immigration and/or criminal law is becoming a widespread means of population control. Academic commentators speak of the 'deportation turn' taken by these governments (Gibney 2008), point to the exploitation of insecure and 'deportable' groups by governments, employers and communities (de Genova 2002; Kittrie 2006; Coutin 2010), and characterize the impetus to exclude outsiders as a form of 'enemy penology' (Krasmann 2007). Increases in the use of administrative detention and deportation (Welch and Schuster 2005), sometimes accompanied by convergences between criminal and immigration law (Stumpf 2006), point to contestation over the boundaries of belonging (Anderson, Gibney and Paoletti 2011) and suggest that governments are using these exclusionary techniques to 'govern through migration control' (Bosworth and Guild 2008). As a technique of contemporary governance, the widespread urge to exclude problematic populations has been described by Bigo (2011) as the replacement of the 'panopticon', based on institutions that promote containment and visibility, with the 'banopticon' which aims to separate public enemies from protected populations. Techniques of banishment may include the use of detention as a form of internal containment. But in the case of non-citizens, the possibility exists to effect the ban through physical expulsion from territory.

The increasing recourse to the supposedly 'last resort' technique of deportation, and concern about its social impacts, extends well beyond academia. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights campaigners have documented instances of asylum seekers or minors being returned to situations of danger (Edmund Rice Centre n.d.; Fekete 2005, 2007; Jimenez 2009; Human Rights Watch 2013), noted the human cost of separating individuals from families and communities (Human Rights Watch 2007; Institute of Race Relations 2010; Migreurop 2010) and identified the large-scale deportation of non-citizen offenders as a significant human security issue from the point of view of receiving nations, whole regions, and for the uprooted individuals themselves (Pereira 2011). In response to increasingly strident deportation programs, NGOs have formed in many countries to resist individual expulsions and protest deportation policies (Anderson, Gibney and Paoletti 2011; Barker 2014 forthcoming), and groups as varied as French schoolchildren ('Scuffles in France over Roma girl deportation' 2013) and Glasgow grandmothers (Stevenson and Grant 2008) have mobilized in support of a more inclusionary vision.

The increasing use of deportation appears to be a universal phenomenon across the Global North, driven by uncertainties arising from globalization and the ubiquity of 'the governmentality of unease' (Bigo 2002). However, against this broad backdrop of apparent uniformity, it is important to ask what differences can be discerned between localities, countries and regions so that the factors that promote and moderate the will to exclude can be better understood. Researchers have begun to take on this task through in-depth studies of deportation in individual countries, e.g. Khosravi (2009) in relation to Sweden, Gibney (2008) and (Bosworth 2011) in relation to Britain, Pratt (2005) in relation to

Canada, and various contributions in the collection by de Genova and Peutz (2010). Others have engaged in comparative research which analyses deportation trends and practices in two or more countries, e.g. Broeders (2010) in relation to Germany and the Netherlands, Schuster (2005a) in relation to Germany, France, Italy and the UK, and Ellermann (2009) in relation to Germany and the United States. The use of deportation has also been studied from a historical perspective (Walters 2002; Schuster 2004; Bloch and Schuster 2005; Nicholls 2007), while other studies have focused on sub-national variations in migration control practices (van der Leun 2003; Provine 2013).

In this chapter I add to this body of tightly focused research by conducting a broad survey of statistical trends in deportation practices across ten European countries plus Australia and the US, using official data that was collected to provide comparative context for The Australian Deportation Project.[ii]

GLOBALIZING THE CRIMINOLOGICAL STUDY OF DEPORTATION

Viewed within the context of globalization, deportation is a response to increasingly unsettled relationships between people and territory, in which governments seek to assert their prerogative to put individuals into their 'correct' place (Walters 2002). Applying a globally aware perspective to the study of contemporary deportation seems to call for research methodologies that also embody new conceptions of the locatedness and determinants of human action. Pakes (2010) contrasts the emphasis on the rich exposition of the particular that characterizes traditional comparative criminology with an emerging globalized criminology that attempts to take the interconnectedness of the world into

account. Since they occupy different analytical dimensions, he argues that criminological research can be both comparative and attentive to the exigencies of a globalizing world. In practice, this can mean attending to the influence of the supra-national level on the practice of individual states – which in the present case would include membership of the European Union, bilateral relations with other countries, and international human rights norms; and to sub-national nodes of governance or social relations – such as differences in practice between towns, counties or federated states. Pakes (2010: 20) notes that globalized criminology, in contrast to traditional comparative criminology, is more about "agility than stamina" as it requires an ability to move deftly between these levels of analysis.

Rather than travel to another country, learn the language and become deeply immersed in its history and culture (following Pakes' description of classic comparative research), this study mobilized an international network of researchers to access basic data about deportation law and practice in 14 countries of which data on 12 countries is reported here (France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK, US and Australia). Researchers with relevant language skills, many of them graduate students studying migration control,[iii] collated official data on annual deportations from their allocated country from 2000 to 20011/2012. An expansive definition of deportation was applied, namely: "any departure from territory which is required by government" (see also note 1). The researchers also provided briefings and reference material on policies, practice and the legal framework for deportation.

The analysis in this chapter presents basic quantitative data on deportations, as a first step towards building a more complete understanding of practices and trends. Much more 'stamina' would be needed to fully understand the significance of some of the observations and provide adequate answers to questions about why certain practices or trends have emerged in some countries but not others. This would require a protracted period of study of a much narrower selection of countries of the kind pursued by Pratt (2008a, 2008b) and later Pratt and Eriksson (2013) in their comparative study of imprisonment in selected Nordic and Anglophone countries. As a purported example of globalized criminology, this chapter is further limited by its focus on the nation-state as a whole. This is still the level at which most information is reported, although the need to conceptualize deportation as an international practice involving dynamic relationships between state actors, and also consider local variations in practice, was immediately apparent once the analysis of the data began.

As Pakes (2010: 20) has noted, "official statistics, particularly when taking a comparative perspective, hide as much if not more than they reveal." Clearly, statistics are a product of specific social and institutional processes, the details of which cannot always be known to the end user. Unfortunately, it is difficult to see an alternative starting point for an exercise such as this, and the processes leading to the final figure can sometimes remain a matter for speculation or become the object of inquiry themselves. While every effort was made to collect the statistical data in a comprehensive and consistent manner, inevitably significant variations persist. Appendix 1 shows the types of exclusionary practice that have been included in the overall deportation figures for each country. These practices range from the unsupervised, assisted and forced removal

of rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants, to summary returns at the border following refused entry or expedited asylum claims, to the deportation of previously legal residents following criminal convictions.

A basic rule of thumb in any type of comparison is that comparing apples with oranges is to be avoided. Appendix 1 reveals that attempting to compare deportation figures across so many jurisdictions has produced not just apples and oranges, but a metaphorical fruit salad. Within a particular country different national agencies may have responsibility for each of the disparate functions identified in the table, or several agencies may share a similar function and each collect their own (often different) data. Within federal systems, some border control responsibilities may be devolved to local levels and, to complicate the picture still further, recording practices may have changed during the collection period, with or without clear documentation to pinpoint the change. In some jurisdictions data is publicly available and published regularly; in others special requests had to be forwarded to authorities in order to obtain the data.

The annual deportation figures collected by the research team are included at Appendix 2. An inclusive approach has been adopted towards the data, with rejections at the border (which could be classified more as border control than deportation) and so-called voluntary departures that involve some kind of state intervention (and are often arguably less than voluntary) counted in the overall figure when available. Since 2008, data on third country nationals expelled from a wide range of European countries has been available from the Eurostat website. The Eurostat data for each of the countries included in the study is also presented in Appendix 2 for comparison. Of course, the Eurostat data is compiled from

data submitted by EU member states and is open to all the vagaries that are inherent in this kind of process. Nevertheless, significant discrepancies between the two data sources are immediately apparent. Rather than view this merely as an 'error', the task of explaining the differences yields some interesting insights into differences in state practice, and raises questions for further investigation.

As an example of the former, the figures obtained by the researcher for France are significantly and consistently higher than the figures reported by Eurostat. This discrepancy probably arises from the highly controversial practice in France of deporting EU nationals in large numbers – notably Roma of Romanian or Bulgarian origin, using exceptional measures available to declare individuals a burden on the welfare state. Since Eurostat only reports the expulsion of third country nationals, these exclusionary practices – often mass expulsions resulting from the dismantling of Roma encampments – are excluded from official EU data, and thereby hidden from view. They are, however, included in national data collections. In Norway, the consistently higher figures reported by the country researcher probably arise from the inclusion of 'transfers' to other EU countries under the Dublin Convention, which form a very high proportion of deportations from that country (discussed later), but which are reported separately in Eurostat data.

The comparison also yields examples of disparities that require further investigation. In 2008, for example, the Eurostat figure was more than three times the number of deportations reported by the Greek researcher for that year, so the Greek data used in the analyses that follow should be treated as undercounted, possibly due to the omission of returns at the border. The convergence to something much closer to parity between

the two data sources by 2010/2011 is suggestive of some significant change in reporting practices or on the ground over that time. Furthermore, the data collected for Sweden is consistently higher than the Eurostat record throughout the collection period, for reasons that are yet to be explained but may concern the recording of voluntary departures.

Internal disputes may also occur about the recording of deportation practices. In Italy, the figures reported by Eurostat are closer to the data produced by the Department of Civil Liberties and Immigration, whereas the researcher involved in this study has opted to use figures from the Department of Public Security which are significantly higher but are more comprehensive and include refusals at the border. It was also necessary to take an 'educated guess' about which of the disparate sets of data provided by various government departments in Sweden best represented the overall incidence of deportation. Deportation statistics provided by the Swedish National Police and the Swedish Migration Board differ significantly, but a particular dataset produced by the Migration Board was finally settled upon. Although there is no Eurostat comparator for the figures produced for the US, it is a matter of public record that the inclusion of voluntary (but required) departures in publicly released deportation statistics has been controversial, with critics accusing immigration authorities of doing this to deliberately inflate the figures (Becker 2010; Dinan 2012). On the other hand, we have chosen to include these figures in our collection, where available, in order to present the most comprehensive picture.

While maintaining a healthy scepticism about the capacity of official data to represent complex practices, there is no choice but to bear in mind these ambiguities when trying to decipher what these coded traces of official practice are telling us about the use of deportation powers. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to this task. Given the heterogeneity observed in the data, I approach the examination of deportation practices across the Global North as if I were looking through a kaleidoscope rather than a microscope. In other words, rather than presenting a forensic, in-depth examination, the discussion focuses selectively on some colourful patterns that catch the eye and provide a series of glimpses into what must be understood to be highly elusive and dynamic official practices.

SOME GLIMPSES OF DEPORTATION PRACTICES ACROSS THE GLOBAL NORTH

Is the use of deportation on the rise?

In 2008, Gibney (2008: 146) noted that: "Deportation has been on the rise as a way with dealing with failed asylum seekers, as well as foreigners convicted of crimes, in many Western countries, including the United States, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada and Australia." He dubbed this phenomenon the 'deportation turn.' Despite the difficulties inherent in interpreting deportation data that were canvassed in the previous section, the data collected by our team should be relatively robust in monitoring trends *within* countries – as opposed to the more complex task of comparing rates *between* countries. The main complication in this case is that significant changes in recording practices within a country could create misleading impression of actual practice on the ground. With this caveat in mind, on the basis of the data reported in Appendix 2 it can be seen that trends in deportation from 2000 to 2012 do not show a relentless rise in all jurisdictions, but that the patterns are more mixed. For ease

of discussion, the countries have been grouped into three categories according to whether their deportation figures are showing an upward,

downward or variable trend.

Figure 1:Deportations 2000-2011 in selected countries with clear upward trend

The data presented in Figure 1 does indeed confirm that deportation continues to be on the rise in France and the US. While there has been concerted international media attention on the record-breaking number of deportations carried out by the Obama administration in the US (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrero 2013), overall deportations have actually risen more sharply in France, where more than three times as many people were deported in 2011 than in 2000, compared with a doubling of deportation numbers in the US over the same period. For some countries, the 'deportation turn' may be yet to arrive. Although the 2012 data was not made available to our researcher, deportations from Greece could be expected to increase significantly from that year onwards following the establishment of the ironically named 'closed hospitality centres' and the instigation of Operation Xenios Zeus by Greek police which is aimed at arresting irregular migrants. While the Eurostat data on total returns from Greece (Appendix 2) is difficult to decipher, Eurostat figures in Appendix 4 show a marked increase in transfers out of Greece under the Dublin Convention in 2012.

Figure 2: Deportations 2000-2011 in selected countries with clear downward trend

|	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Germany	183000	110000	100000	92000	73000	46000	45000	29000	25000	24000	20000	11000
Italy		75000	88000	65000	60000	55000	46000	27000	24000	19000	20000	25000

Legend: Germany, Italy

In some countries, however, there is a consistent pattern of steadily reducing levels of deportation from 2000 to 2011 (see Figure 2). This is not to say that a longer time series of data would not reveal earlier periods in which, statistically at least, these countries also experienced a 'deportation turn'. This is particularly noticeable in relation to Germany where the data suggests that much of the serious work of divesting the country of unwanted populations may have occurred before the study period. According to earlier data supplied by the German researcher, particularly high numbers of departures were reported in 1999 and 2000 on the 'voluntary development' program alone – 61,332 and 75,416

respectively. In the Netherlands (where the trends from 2000 to 2011 appear to be more mixed) data not shown in Appendix 2 also suggests that much higher levels of deportation were sustained in the late 1990s. Broeders (2010) has attributed the subsequent drop largely to reductions in the numbers of asylum applications received after that time.

Practical and legal difficulties in effecting expulsions are another possible explanation for declining, or at least stabilising, levels of deportation in many countries. This is an explanation that does not require a change in government attitudes or political communications about the desirability of excluding unwanted populations. For example, the capacity for detaining migrants was observed to be increasing in Germany and the Netherlands around 2010 at the same time that the number of expulsions was decreasing, which Broeders (2010) attributed largely to the growth of undocumented travel and the associated phenomenon of 'undeportable' migrants.

The third group of countries have a more fluctuating pattern of deportation figures across the data collection period (see Figure 3). For illustrative purposes, only the data for Spain, Hungary and Australia is included in Figure 3. In these cases it is interesting to speculate on what legal, political or economic factors might account for sudden drops or spikes in deportation levels. In Spain, a rapid increase in deportations up to 2004 was suddenly reversed thereafter – probably because an amnesty for irregular migrants in 2005 significantly reduced the deportable population. In Hungary, a sudden drop in recorded deportation figures is evident from around 2007. Closer examination of the figures reveals this is mainly due to reductions in rejections at the border. This would appear to coincide with Hungary's accession to the European Union in

2004, the passing of its first asylum legislation in 2007 and entry into the Schengen agreement in 2008 – all factors which are likely to result in changes in border control practices.

Figure 3: Deportations 2000-2012 in selected countries with variable trend

The undulating pattern of deportation from Australia over this period is also possible to explain. After a particularly zealous period of immigration enforcement in the early 2000s, a scandal erupted concerning the wrongful detention and deportation of hundreds of overseas-born Australian citizens. Following the publication of several highly critical inquiry reports in 2005 (McMillan 2005; Palmer 2005), extra procedural safeguards were imposed along with a change of government that promised, at first, to put a more humane face on immigration control. After an initial dip, deportation numbers once again began to rise, driven by a shift towards less coercive approaches to encouraging 'voluntary' departure (Pickering and Weber 2012).

Is the USA the world leader in deportation?

The sheer numbers of non-citizens deported from the United States eclipse all other countries included in this study. The rush to expel unwanted populations from the US seems to coincide with the 'punitive turn' that has been observed within the criminal justice sphere, as most clearly evidenced by the mass incarceration of criminal offenders (Garland 2001; Simon 2001; Bosworth 2010). Even taking into account population sizes, the imprisonment rate in the US dwarfs that of other advanced democracies. However, standardizing the deportation figures reported in Appendix 2 by overall population size reveals the deportation rates of other countries in this collection in a new light.

Figure 4 shows that the United States has company at the top of the deportation league table. On the basis of this data, the small countries of Hungary, Sweden and Norway, are revealed to deport non-citizens at a higher rate per capita than does the United States. Since the Greek figures

do not include returns at the border, it is possible that this country might also have a higher rate of deportation relative to population than is apparent from this analysis. Moreover, at the height of Germany's deportation drive in 2000, the deportation rate was a massive 229 per 100,000 population rather than the more modest 14 per 100,000 that applies a decade later.[iv]

Figure 4: Deportations per 100,000 population (latest available year)

| Country	Deportations per 100,000
Sweden	258
Hungary	136
Norway	133
US	126
Greece	105
UK	82
Netherlands	60
Spain	57
France	50
Australia	50
Italy	45
Germany	14

While standardizing by general population figures is a routine practice when making statistical comparisons between countries, a more accurate measure of deportation rates would take into account only that section of the population that is 'deportable.' Unfortunately, it is not an easy task to assign figures to this socio-legal concept. Some categories of potentially deportable non-citizens, such as asylum seekers awaiting the outcome of their applications and foreign-born criminal suspects awaiting the outcomes of prosecutions, may be under the close scrutiny of the state. Other categories, such as clandestine entrants or overstayers, may not be under the surveillance and control of the state and their numbers are notoriously difficult to quantify. The data provided for some of the study countries includes expulsion orders that have been issued but have not led to a departure; however this is not available for all of the countries included in the collection and in any case only reflects the number of deportable people who have come to the active notice of authorities. To add further complexity to an already complex picture, deportability is an inherently unstable descriptor, since individuals may move in and out of legal status (Schuster 2005b) due to individual changes in law or circumstances, or may benefit from mass amnesties such as those enacted at specific junctures in France, Spain, Hungary and the Netherlands, and on a more regular basis in Italy.

Due to these difficulties, the number of residents in each country living outside their country of birth as published by the World Bank, has been used as a proxy measure for the deportable population (see Appendix 3). Both the population data and the deportation data used in this analysis relates to 2010. Clearly, it is not the case that all foreign-born residents in any given country are deportable. This would be an alarming suggestion, as it takes no account of differences in legal status and the special protections offered by citizenship. It might also be argued that

when standardizing deportation figures by population size, whether referring to legally or illegally resident populations, rejections at the border should be excluded from the count since these practices are not directed towards populations already present in a particular territory. However, disaggregated deportation data is not available for all jurisdictions, so the overall figures in Appendix 2 have been used for all the analyses presented in this section. With all these caveats in mind, the rates of deportation per 100,000 foreign born population are presented in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5: Deportations per 100,000 foreign born population (2010)

| Country	Deportations per 100,000
Hungary	3135
Sweden	1955
Greece	1531
Norway	1181
US	899
UK	866
Netherlands	672
Italy	455
Spain	437
France	419
Germany	182
Australia	160

The data displayed in Figure 5 retains a very similar ranking of countries as the previous analysis, with Scandinavian countries, Hungary and Greece all deporting a much higher proportion of their foreign-born populations (bearing in mind that some of these deportation figures may include returns at the border) than other countries included in this study.

Arguably the most appropriate measure of all in terms of the efficiency with which countries identify and remove deportable populations would be achieved by standardizing deportation figures by the unlawfully present population. The overall size of the irregular migrant population across the 27 member states of the EU has been estimated at between 1.9 million and 3.8 million for 2008 (Vogel, Kovacheva and Prescott 2011). This figure is minute compared with the estimates of more than 11 million in the USA – and Vogel, Kovacheva and Prescott note that it is significantly less than figures quoted rather loosely in 2007 by the European Commission. After conducting a thorough examination of the data collected by the pan-European Clandestino Project, these authors concluded that the irregular migrant population had been in decline in Europe since 2002, influenced by EU enlargement and legalization programmes.

Focusing on irregular migrant populations takes us closer still to a representation of deportable populations, although these figures are still subject to inaccuracy due to the dynamic nature of 'legality' and 'illegality', and to the immense difficulties of enumerating a largely hidden population that were identified above. Estimates are available for the unauthorized populations of all the countries included in the study, although their accuracy is inherently questionable. For the majority of European countries the most authoritative source is the Clandestino Project (see Appendix 3). Even though they are considered to be the best available figures, the numbers are often published as very wide ranges rather than as a precise figure, and some of the estimates date back as far as 2005. For standardization purposes the mid-point was used as the estimate where it was expressed in the Clandestino data as a range. For consistency with the previous analysis, deportation data from 2010 was

used, although this will not align in all cases with the date of the irregular population estimate. Moreover, the interpretation of this analysis is also affected by the inclusion of returns at the border in the deportation figures as discussed above. For the purposes of standardization, publicly notified estimates of undocumented migrants published by the Pew Center were used for the US; Statistics Norway was the source for Norway; and official figures published in annual reports by immigration or statistical authorities were used for Australia and Sweden.

Figure 6: Deportations per 100,000 estimated irregular population using 2010 deportation data

Country	Value
Sweden	56747
Norway	31850
Australia	15111
Netherlands	13369
UK	9748
France	9342
Hungary	9230
Spain	8743
Germany	7813
Greece	4446
US	3469
Italy	3116

Irregular population figures from latest available mid-point estimates from Clandestino Project except Norway, Sweden, Australia and US

The deportation rates obtained by standardizing the deportation figures in Appendix 2 by the best available estimates of the irregular migrant population of each country are presented in Figure 6. Given the multiple caveats applying to the data the precise figures must be regarded with caution (and indeed, substantially different figures were obtained by substituting deportation data from other years). However some tentative

observations can be made based on the relative rankings. This time, Australia and the Netherlands join the Scandinavian countries as jurisdictions where the expulsion of the deportable population seems to be at its most efficient. At the other end of the scale, Italy and the US seem to be making relatively little impact on the pool of potentially deportable people in their territory.

Does Nordic exceptionalism apply to deportation?

In their detailed study of imprisonment rates in selected Scandinavian and Anglophone countries, Pratt and Eriksson (2013) contrasted the punitivism of the latter with the non-punitive approach to criminal justice that is apparent in the former. In the face of sky-rocketing imprisonment rates and the imposition of deliberately harsh prison conditions in English-speaking countries, the Nordic zone shines out as a beacon of social democracy, maintaining a commitment to rehabilitation and social inclusion. If there is any hint of a 'punitive turn' in Scandinavian countries, Pratt and Eriksson locate it in the increasing cultural heterogeneity of what were previously relatively homogenous societies, united by their cultural solidarity. It is therefore particularly interesting to consider whether the so-called 'Nordic exceptionalism thesis' holds in relation to coercive practices carried out against those who are not members of these close-knit social democracies. Barker (2013), for example, argues that the cultural solidarity underpinning Nordic exceptionalism leaves others – particularly foreign nationals – vulnerable to social marginalization and exclusion.

The statistical data presented in the previous section suggests that the inclusionary ideals that characterize Norway and Sweden in relation to criminal justice practices are not replicated with respect to non-members. Although there are many limitations on the data, deportations relative to the various population measures suggest that these countries are very efficient at expelling non-members. This conclusion is supported by arguments made by Ugelvik (2013) that the pressures of maintaining a social democratic form of governance in the face of the new demands of globalization has led to a fundamental practical and philosophical shift. According to Ugelvik, and in line with Barker's analysis, this tension has produced a bifurcated system based on inclusion within the safety net for members, alongside strident efforts to exclude non-members.

While the statistical evidence seems strong, questions about relative punitivism can also be asked in relation to deportation practices. This concerns more than just deportation numbers. Alongside imprisonment rates, Pratt and Eriksson (2013) also considered the quality of prison environments and commitment to rehabilitative regimes, finding Nordic countries, once again, to be far less punitive on these measures than English-speaking ones. Exploring these questions in relation to Norway and Sweden would require a much more in-depth analysis than can be attempted here, but there are some glimpses from the available data and literature that we can draw upon. The Norway researcher working on this project observes that detention in that country is very rarely for more than one night, with forced deportations generally being carried out through arrest and overnight detention. This contrasts markedly with practices elsewhere. In the Netherlands, deteriorating detention conditions, the threatened criminalization of undocumented residence and the indefinite detention of individuals who cannot be deported have attracted considerable criticism on human rights grounds (Amnesty International 2008). Despite repeated admonition from the United Nations Human

Rights Committee, Australia operates a mandatory detention policy that applies in law to all illegally present individuals, but in practice is directed mainly towards criminal deportees and asylum seekers who arrive without visas by boat (Crock and Berg 2011). The UK is now the only EU member state not to designate a time limit on administrative detention and NGOs have documented abusive treatment of deportees by security personnel during deportation (Granville-Chapman, Smith and Moloney 2004; Wistrich, Arnold and Ginn 2008).

Deaths during deportation have been recorded in a number of EU countries, with accelerated removals policies in many countries identified as the main factor driving the increasing use of force (Institute of Race Relations 2010). The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) has expressed increasing concern over the violence of deportation across Europe, and the European Court of Human Rights has found living conditions in Greece both inside and outside detention to be so deplorable that it ruled in 2010 that asylum seekers should not be returned there under the Dublin Convention (MSS v Belgium and Greece [2011]). In the US the inhumanity of splitting families (Human Rights Watch 2007) and concerns about abandoning unaccompanied minors across the US-Mexican border (Jimenez 2009) have been the particular focus of criticism. There is therefore mounting evidence that deportation and the infrastructure of arrest and detention that is needed to support it is producing a level of harm that can only be described as punitive.

The Nordic exceptionalism thesis might encourage us to speculate that, while deportation rates are relatively high in Norway and Sweden, the process by which those deportations are carried out will be less punitive in nature than elsewhere. A full exploration of this hypothesis is beyond

the scope of this chapter, but there are some reasons to challenge this view. Both Norway and Sweden make use of charter flights, where the treatment of deportees cannot be monitored, although not to the extent of some other EU countries, notably Spain, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands. Norway's expeditious deportation operations described earlier as involving arrest and overnight detention might be thought to be less punitive than the protracted and sometimes open-ended use of detention elsewhere. On the other hand, it is impossible to say without further research whether the urgency of such operations might involve the use of 'surprise tactics' such as the dawn raids deployed in the UK which have attracted high-level criticism there (Travis 2010). In Sweden, Khosravi (2009) reported average pre-deportation detention periods of around 18 days in 2005, noting that longer periods were allowable in law. Both Khosravi (2009), in the case of Sweden, and Ugelvik (2013), in the case of Norway, have argued that efforts to reduce detention to a minimum are driven primarily by considerations of cost, in order to direct state expenditure for the well-being of citizens.

In Norway, the percentage of deportations described in official data as 'forced' has remained above 80 per cent since 2003, with a slight drop to 72 per cent in 2011. By way of comparison, forced deportations reached a peak of 84 percent in 2007 in the Netherlands, but were significantly lower at other times in the study period, with an average of 65 percent from 2000 to 2012. In Sweden, the percentage of forced returns seems to be rather lower at around 33 per cent over recent years. However there is good reason to look beyond the veneer of apparent 'voluntariness'. Following intensive ethnographic research, Khosravi (2009) concluded that efforts to manufacture 'voluntariness' within the Swedish system occurred alongside particularly harsh treatment of those who resist deportation, including humiliation through the removal of clothing and other

human rights abuses in detention. It is important also to consider the techniques through which apparent consent to expulsion is achieved. In the UK, NGOs have for many years criticized what they describe as policies of immiseration, whereby failed asylum applicants have been so marginalized from any capacity to meet their basic needs that decisions to return to their country of origin can barely be seen as a choice. More generally, voluntary return programs such as those organized by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have been criticized as being less than voluntary since decisions are often made in the context of misleading information and against a backdrop where forced deportation may be the only other alternative (Webber 2010).

How is geo-political context reflected in deportation practices?

If we dig beneath the surface of the aggregate figures shown in Appendix 2 it is immediately apparent that geo-political factors shape deportation practices in a dramatic fashion. Italy, Spain and Greece at the southern perimeter of the EU have been the primary focus for offshore measures such as FRONTEX patrols aimed at preventing irregular arrivals. But their frontline status is also reflected in the relatively high proportion of their deportations that are a result of refusals of entry at the border. In Spain, for example, the proportion of total deportations that arise from apprehensions at the border (i.e. *retornos* and *devolunciones*) reached a peak of 78 per cent in 2006, although it has varied widely from year to year. Hungary performed a similar role previously as the eastern buffer of the European Union until their accession to the EU in 2004 shifted the gatekeeping role further east to the Ukraine. As reported earlier, deportations that arose from border refusals dropped significantly from 2007 onwards, reflecting these altered geo-political circumstances.

In the relatively more insulated countries of Sweden and Norway, transfers under the Dublin Convention to other countries that are points of first arrival in the EU are a prominent feature of the mix of deportation practices. Although it is not a member of the EU, Norway participates in the Dublin process, and so-called 'transfers' to EU countries (a bland bureaucratic term that seems designed to neutralize the misery that these processes create) account for a particularly high proportion of deportations. In 2011 for example, Dublin Convention transfers accounted for 23 per cent of all deportations (according to national, not Eurostat records). Using Eurostat records, it is apparent that countries that are further removed from the main points of irregular entry into Europe are the most able to take advantage of the Dublin Convention to return asylum seekers back to countries of transit or former residence, without considering their asylum claims. If the figures in Appendix 4 can be relied upon (and, once again, discrepancies with national data identified by researchers raise significant questions about reliability) then they tell a story in which Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands were able to reduce their population of asylum applicants significantly in 2010, while the asylum seeker populations of Italy and Greece were increased in the same year due to transfers under the Dublin Convention.

Where deportation statistics are disaggregated by nationality and legal category, they give some indication of who is perceived as 'the enemy.' In Greece, while it has become the entry point for the majority of asylum seekers and irregular migrants trying to enter Europe, data supplied to the project shows that deportations are overwhelmingly enforced against Albanian nationals from the neighbouring state. In France, the mass expulsions of Roma to Eastern Europe have been highly controversial because of their openly discriminatory character. In the US, the massive

deportation effort has been mobilized primarily with undocumented Mexican and other Latin American workers in mind. While in Norway, Ugelvik (2013) argues that a particularly sharp line is drawn between deserving refugees and undeserving groups of rejected applicants and criminal aliens, suggesting that illegality and criminality are powerful definers of enemy status. Migrants who commit crimes are a relatively small but politically significant target for deportation in many jurisdictions (e.g. see Pratt 2005, on Canada). Van der Leun and van der Woude (2013) have argued that this is particularly so in the Netherlands, where it is no coincidence that a proposal to criminalize illegal residence has been hotly debated.

Influences below and beyond the state

While deportation seems to be an archetypal expression of sovereign will, it is important to acknowledge its inherently transnational character (Walters 2002). Efforts to exclude may be thwarted by the refusal of alleged countries of origin to accept undocumented returnees. The importance of international cooperation has given rise to an explosion of bilateral agreements for the return of rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants (see Table 1 in relation to the EU). These readmission agreements are often brokered by the promise of easier visa access for the citizens of the country of return, or through other incentives, although even formally concluded agreements can be thwarted by obstructionist measures by the receiving state (Ellermann 2008). According to Cassarino (2007), individual EU countries, notably Italy, France and Spain, are increasingly opting for informal arrangements that are more flexible than formal readmission agreements and enable operational adjustments to be made in response to shifting security concerns, developments that reflect the ongoing tension between national autonomy and a more

coordinated EU-wide approach. While regional arrangements are very different in Australia and the US, these countries also rely on bilateral agreements to broker the return of citizens of other states. The US has extant agreements with Mexico, Vietnam, Cambodia and Cuba, while Australia has concluded a range of memoranda of understanding, the most important of which were to facilitate the return of Vietnamese criminal deportees and rejected Afghan asylum seekers.

Table 1 EU and Bilateral Return Agreements	
Country	Number of Agreements
France	70
Germany	38
Greece	21
Hungary	26
Italy	52
Netherlands	35
Norway	33
Spain	36
Sweden	24
UK	26
EU*	14+6

*6 agreements under negotiation at 10 Feb 2014

Source: http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/

The legal landscape for deportation has also been irrevocably altered by the advent of the EU and other regional bodies, and the increasing reach of international human rights law. An example in the European context is the EU Return Directive. Adopted in 2008, the agreement encourages member states to participate in voluntary return programs run by the IOM. Attempts to harmonize procedures, such as the use of detention during deportation, have reportedly resulted in many states increasing their detention limits (Migreurop and New Internationalist 2012). Although the bilateral approach is still dominant, the EU has had the competence to negotiate readmission agreements with non-EU countries on behalf of all member states since 1999. At the time of writing EU Readmission agreements had been concluded with Macao, Sri Lanka, Albania, and Russia. Ukraine, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Moldova, Pakistan, and Georgia, while agreements with Turkey, Morocco, Cape Verde, Armenia, Azerbaijan were pending. Migreurop note that there is often an expectation on receiving countries to subsequently negotiate their own return agreements so as to create a 'cascading effect' sending migrants further and further from Europe, a practice which the French NGO argues creates 'even greater inequality for EU "partners"' (Migreurop 2013: 98).

In recent years, the pan-European border agency FRONTEX, established initially to mount perimeter offshore patrols, has assumed a role in coordinating mass deportations via charter flights. This enables groups of member states to band together to deport individuals of a specified nationality on the same flight, achieving cost efficiency and also insulation from possible interference or public scrutiny. Information supplied by researchers on this project suggests that Germany, Spain and the Netherlands have participated actively in this program, while Hungary has been limited by budget constraints. The Dublin Convention is another supra-national influence on state deportation practices in Europe, which

was discussed in a previous section. The US and Canada have a similar arrangement entitled the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement that enables each country to return asylum seekers who venture across their common border.

The influence of the European Court of Human Rights has also been felt in the field of deportation. Following the decision in MSS v Belgium and Greece, which was mentioned earlier, many EU countries began to suspend their Dublin Convention returns to Greece. The sharp drop in recorded returns to Greece is reflected in the Eurostat figures for 2011 and 2012 (see Appendix4). With human rights courts at the European level thwarting efforts to return asylum seekers to Greece, it seems that the UK has sought to tackle the issue in a different way, by funding an IOM 'voluntary returns' program in Greece on the rationale that this will prevent onward travel through Europe (Webber 2014).

This research has not explored sub-national influences on deportation practices, but it is highly likely that the national deportation figures reported here obscure significant regional differences in many countries, particularly where immigration enforcement functions are devolved to local level. Van der Leun (2003) found differences in local responses to the *Linking Act* in the Netherlands which was aimed at increasing detection rates by recruiting service providers into immigration enforcement roles. And in the United States Provine (2013) charted differences in state-level legislation restricting the rights of undocumented migrants.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has barely scratched the surface of the complex web of local, national and supra-national factors that influence deportation practices across the Global North. Moreover, the figures cited should be treated as indicative only, given the doubts over comparability explained in detail throughout the discussion. Still, the 'kaleidoscope' approach to analysing the data has revealed some interesting patterns that are worthy of more in-depth exploration. Although deportations appear to be declining in number in some countries included in this study, the banopticon consisting of arrest, detention, deportation and soft power techniques of persuasion appears to be gaining momentum in others. Even where deportations are declining in frequency, significant numbers of people are caught up in this machinery of expulsion, and lasting changes are occurring in institutions and official practices that will also affect resident populations well into the future. A globalized criminology of deportation needs to address these developments by combining the intellectual agility to decipher the complex interplay of local and global forces that drive both the will and the capacity to exclude, with the stamina to examine detailed practices on the ground.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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APPENDIX 1 –CATEGORIES OF EXPULSION INCLUDED IN DEPORTATION STATISTICS FOR EACH COUNTRY

	France	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Italy	Nether-lands	Norway	Spain	Sweden	UK	USA	Australia
Departure required following breach of immigration law - voluntary/unsupervised	Yes*	Yes*	Yes	Yes*	Yes	Yes*	Yes	No	Yes	Yes*	No	Yes*
Departure required following breach of immigration law - supervised/forced/escorted	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Asylum seeker required to leave after rejected refugee application - voluntary/unsupervised	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes+	Yes	Yes+	Yes+	No	Yes+	Yes+	No	Yes+
Asylum seeker required to leave after rejected refugee application - supervised/forced/escorted	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Non citizen required to leave after criminal conviction - voluntary/unsupervised	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Non citizen required to leave after criminal conviction - supervised/forced/escorted	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Individuals refused entry at the border	No	Yes^	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes^	Yes	Yes
Individuals transferred out under Dublin Convention	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	n/a#	n/a

Notes:

For all countries only actual departures are included in the figures. Individuals required by law to leave who have not departed are not counted.

* Voluntary departures only included in deportation figures if seek government assistance (France), departure is notified to authorities (UK), or part of organised program (Australia)

+ Voluntary departures of asylum seekers are included if depart through an organised program (Norway), departure is notified (UK, Sweden), from 2002 only (Australia), and are included but reportedly occur very rarely (Hungary)

^ Refusals at the border also include juxtaposed i.e. extra-territorial controls (UK), include expedited asylum processing at airports (Germany)

The USA has a similar agreement with Canada that asylum seekers will be processed in the first country of arrival. There is no equivalent agreement in Australasia.

APPENDIX 2 – DEPORTATION DATA GATHERED BY RESEARCHERS (AS PER APPENDIX 1) VERSUS EUROSTAT RETURNS DATA

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
France	9000	9000	9000	12870	16850	19841	23831	23196	29796	29288	28026	32912	
Germany	183486	109946	99151	91761	72535	46205	44709	28712	24172	24037	19533	11295	
Greece	24253	13332	11780	14993	15720	21238	17650	17077	20555	20342	17340	11357	
Hungary			24802	26610	27411		25426	13486	7156		11538	13577	
Italy		75448	88501	65153	59965	54306	45449	26779	24238	18361	20287	25163	
Netherlands	25206	16548	21070	29500	22400	14878	12947	11900	9170	10330	11780	10790	10090
Norway				8393	5956	3508	2754	2628	2882	4359	5733	6556	6641
Spain	39732	46993	77125	93951	121121	92638	52814	55938	46246	38129	30163	30792	26457
Sweden								10816	15732	22007	25536	24323	
UK	46647	50627	68629	64390	61158	58216	63867	63367	67981	67214	60244	52526	
US		189026	165168	211098	240665	246431	280974	319382	359795	393457	385100	391953	
Australia	8876	9563	10894	13878	12689	12524	10501	9489	8404	6818	8825	10175	10785

EUROSTAT

Third country nationals returned following an order to leave - annual data (rounded)[migr_eirtn]

Last update: 08-01-2014

	France	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Spain	Sweden	UK
2008	19,470	14,295	68,565	1,745	7,140	9,350	1,665	29,785	9,015	47,455
2009	18,400	11,900	62,850	2,245	5,315	8,980		28,865	11,980	64,945
2010	17,045	13,895	51,785	2,445	4,890	10,355		21,955	14,645	53,615
2011	20,425	14,075	10,585	4,610	6,180	9,475	4,415	23,350	13,470	53,600
2012	22,760	13,855	16,650	5,440	7,365	9,635	3,735	18,865	16,140	54,180

	Eurostat figures consistently lower
	Eurostat figures consistently higher
	Direction of discrepancy varies

Eurostat counting rules for third country nationals returned following an order to leave:

Third country nationals who have in fact left the territory of the Member State, following an administrative or judicial decision or act stating that their stay is illegal and imposing an obligation to leave the territory (see Art. 7.1 (b) of the Council Regulation (EC) no 862/2007).

On a voluntary basis Member States provide Eurostat with a subcategory which relates to third country nationals returned to a third country only.

Persons who left the territory within the year may have been subject to an obligation to leave in a previous year. As such, the number of persons who actually left the territory may be greater than those who were subject to an obligation to leave in the same year.

These statistics include forced returns and assisted voluntary returns. Unassisted voluntary returns are included where these are reliably recorded.

Data do not include persons who are transferred from one Member State to another under the mechanism established by the Dublin Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 and (EC) No 1560/2003, for these cases see related Dublin Statistics).

Each person is counted only once within the reference period.

Source: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_eirtn&lang=en

APPENDIX 3 – SOURCES FOR POPULATION, FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION AND IRREGULAR POPULATION DATA

Population figures (from national census and projections)

Country	Population	Year
France	65,350,000	2011
Germany	80,200,000	2011
Greece	10,780,000	2011
Hungary	9,980,000	2011
Italy	56,460,000	2011
Norway	4,990,000	2012
Spain	46,100,000	2012
Sweden	9,420,000	2011
Netherlands	16,700,000	2012
UK	63,700,000	2012
US	311,591,919	2011
Australia	21,507,717	2011

Foreign born and irregular populations

Source for foreign born populations World Bank 'migrant stocks' (all 2010) http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL

Source for irregular migrants Clandestino Project http://irregular-migration.net// (unless indicated by shading; midpoint used where range specified in source)

	France	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Italy	Norway	Spain	Sweden	Netherlands	UK	US	Australia
Foreign born population	6,684,842	10,758,061	1,132,794	368,076	4,463,413	485,444	6,900,547	1,306,020	1,752,869	6,955,738	42,813,281	5,522,408
Irregular population	300,000	250,000	390,000	125,000	651,000	18,000	345,000	45,000	88,116	618,000	11100000	58,400
Year of irregular population estimate	2005	2010	2011	2006/8	2008	2008	2009		2005/7	2008	2011	2011

APPENDIX 4 EUROSTAT DATA ON DUBLIN CONVENTION 'TRANSFERS'

	Asylum seekers sent back to each country						Asylum seekers sent out by each country						Nett effect 2010
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012		
France	989	820	827	1046	923		783	1010	883	487	598		-56
Germany	1270	1258	964	1083	1371		2122	2932	2380	2754	3062		-1416
Greece		1202	949	55	38		10	8	11	84	314		938
Hungary	322	938	695	411	335		60	90	178	70	126		517
Italy	996	1800	1041	1801	1639		112	41	62	14	5		979
Netherlands	324	323	432	1239			1195	1458	1683	1239			-1251
Norway		0	0	0	0			1130	716	792	706		-716
Spain	89	451	432	456	728		8	14	13	14	22		419
Sweden			0	0	0			1086	1146	1045	1741		-1146
UK	403	368	268	271	262		1217	995	995		714		-727

Source : **http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_dubti&lang=en** (incoming)

http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_dubto&lang=en (outgoing)

[i] Deportation and removal may have specific meanings in particular legal jurisdictions and may refer to slightly different legal processes. However both terms refer to the expulsion of individuals who have been deemed to have no legal right to remain in a particular territory. For the remainder of the article I will use the term 'deportation' to refer to all processes of expulsion.

[ii] Exporting Risk: The Australian Deportation Project, funded by Australian Research Council Discovery Grant (DP110102453): Chief investigators Sharon Pickering, Leanne Weber, Marie Segrave (Monash University), Mike Grewcock (The University of New South Wales).

[iii] The recruitment of this international network was made possible through the support of an Australian European University Institute (EUI) Fellowship which enabled me to visit the EUI in Florence, Italy for several weeks in 2013. It was the cosmopolitan character of that institution, and the talented multi-lingual students I met there, that inspired me to recruit an international network of researchers to gather the data reported here. Those researchers were Francisco Alonso (France), Andriani Fili (Greece), Julia Iván (Hungary), Kimberly Klein (USA, Canada), Sigmund Mohn (Sweden, Norway), Rebecca Powell (Australia, UK), Lea Schönfeld (Germany), Anne van Es (Netherlands), Francesco Vecchio (Italy) and Jonathan Zaragoza (Spain).

[iv] For convenience, this calculation uses the 2012 population figure and the 2000 deportation figure. It would be methodologically preferable to use a population figure closer to 2000.

APPENDIX 1 –CATEGORIES OF EXPULSION INCLUDED IN DEPORTATION STATISTICS FOR EACH COUNTRY

	France	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Italy	Nether-lands	Norway	Spain	Sweden	UK	USA	Australia
Departure required following breach of immigration law - voluntary/unsupervised	Yes*	Yes*	Yes	Yes*	Yes	Yes*	Yes	No	Yes	Yes*	No	Yes*
Departure required following breach of immigration law - supervised/forced/escorted	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Asylum seeker required to leave after rejected refugee application - voluntary/unsupervised	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes+	Yes	Yes+	Yes+	No	Yes+	Yes+	No	Yes+
Asylum seeker required to leave after rejected refugee application - supervised/forced/escorted	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Non citizen required to leave after criminal conviction - voluntary/unsupervised	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Non citizen required to leave after criminal conviction - supervised/forced/escorted	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Individuals refused entry at the border	No	Yes^	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes^	Yes	Yes
Individuals transferred out under Dublin Convention	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	n/a#	n/a

Notes:

For all countries only actual departures are included in the figures. Individuals required by law to leave who have not departed are not counted.

* Voluntary departures only included in deportation figures if seek government assistance (France), departure is notified to authorities (UK), or part of organised program (Australia)

+ Voluntary departures of asylum seekers are included if depart through an organised program (Norway), departure is notified (UK, Sweden), from 2002 only (Australia), and are included but reportedly occur very rarely (Hungary)

^ Refusals at the border also include juxtaposed i.e. extra-territorial controls (UK), include expedited asylum processing at airports (Germany)

The USA has a similar agreement with Canada that asylum seekers will be processed in the first country of arrival. There is no equivalent agreement in Australasia.

APPENDIX 2 – DEPORTATION DATA GATHERED BY RESEARCHERS (AS PER APPENDIX 1) VERSUS EUROSTAT RETURNS DATA

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
France	9000	9000	9000	12870	16850	19841	23831	23196	29796	29288	28026	32912	
Germany	183486	109946	99151	91761	72535	46205	44709	28712	24172	24037	19533	11295	
Greece	24253	13332	11780	14993	15720	21238	17650	17077	20555	20342	17340	11357	
Hungary			24802	26610	27411		25426	13486	7156		11538	13577	
Italy		75448	88501	65153	59965	54306	45449	26779	24238	18361	20287	25163	
Netherlands	25206	16548	21070	29500	22400	14878	12947	11900	9170	10330	11780	10790	10090
Norway				8393	5956	3508	2754	2628	2882	4359	5733	6556	6641
Spain	39732	46993	77125	93951	121121	92638	52814	55938	46246	38129	30163	30792	26457
Sweden								10816	15732	22007	25536	24323	
UK	46647	50627	68629	64390	61158	58216	63867	63367	67981	67214	60244	52526	
US		189026	165168	211098	240665	246431	280974	319382	359795	393457	385100	391953	
Australia	8876	9563	10894	13878	12689	12524	10501	9489	8404	6818	8825	10175	10785

EUROSTAT

Third country nationals returned following an order to leave - annual data (rounded)[migr_eirtn]

Last update: 08-01-2014

	France	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Spain	Sweden	UK
2008	19,470	14,295	68,565	1,745	7,140	9,350	1,665	29,785	9,015	47,455
2009	18,400	11,900	62,850	2,245	5,315	8,980		28,865	11,980	64,945
2010	17,045	13,895	51,785	2,445	4,890	10,355		21,955	14,645	53,615
2011	20,425	14,075	10,585	4,610	6,180	9,475	4,415	23,350	13,470	53,600
2012	22,760	13,855	16,650	5,440	7,365	9,635	3,735	18,865	16,140	54,180

Eurostat figures consistently lower

Eurostat figures consistently higher

Direction of discrepancy varies

Eurostat counting rules for third country nationals returned following an order to leave:

Third country nationals who have in fact left the territory of the Member State, following an administrative or judicial decision or act stating that their stay is illegal and imposing an obligation to leave the territory (see Art. 7.1 (b) of the Council Regulation (EC) no 862/2007).

On a voluntary basis Member States provide Eurostat with a subcategory which relates to third country nationals returned to a third country only.

Persons who left the territory within the year may have been subject to an obligation to leave in a previous year. As such, the number of persons who actually left the territory may be greater than those who were subject to an obligation to leave in the same year.

These statistics include forced returns and assisted voluntary returns. Unassisted voluntary returns are included where these are reliably recorded.

Data do not include persons who are transferred from one Member State to another under the mechanism established by the Dublin Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 and (EC) No 1560/2003, for these cases see related Dublin Statistics).

Each person is counted only once within the reference period.

Source: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_eirtn&lang=en

APPENDIX 3 – SOURCES FOR POPULATION, FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION AND IRREGULAR POPULATION DATA

Population figures (from national census and projections)

Country	Population	Year
France	65,350,000	2011
Germany	80,200,000	2011
Greece	10,780,000	2011
Hungary	9,980,000	2011
Italy	56,460,000	2011
Norway	4,990,000	2012
Spain	46,100,000	2012
Sweden	9,420,000	2011
Netherlands	16,700,000	2012
UK	63,700,000	2012
US	311,591,919	2011
Australia	21,507,717	2011

Foreign born and irregular populations

Source for foreign born populations World Bank 'migrant stocks' (all 2010) http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL

Source for irregular migrants Clandestino Project http://irregular-migration.net// (unless indicated by shading; midpoint used where range specified in source)

	France	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Italy	Norway	Spain	Sweden	Netherlands	UK	US	Australia
Foreign born population	6,684,842	10,758,061	1,132,794	368,076	4,463,413	485,444	6,900,547	1,306,020	1,752,869	6,955,738	42,813,281	5,522,408
Irregular population	300,000	250,000	390,000	125,000	651,000	18,000	345,000	45,000	88,116	618,000	11100000	58,400
Year of irregular population estimate	2005	2010	2011	2006/8	2008	2008	2009		2005/7	2008	2011	2011

APPENDIX 4 EUROSTAT DATA ON DUBLIN CONVENTION 'TRANSFERS'

	Asylum seekers sent back to each country						Asylum seekers sent out by each country						Nett effect 2010
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012		
France	989	820	827	1046	923		783	1010	883	487	598		-56
Germany	1270	1258	964	1083	1371		2122	2932	2380	2754	3062		-1416
Greece		1202	949	55	38		10	8	11	84	314		938
Hungary	322	938	695	411	335		60	90	178	70	126		517
Italy	996	1800	1041	1801	1639		112	41	62	14	5		979
Netherlands	324	323	432	1239			1195	1458	1683	1239			-1251
Norway		0	0	0	0			1130	716	792	706		-716
Spain	89	451	432	456	728		8	14	13	14	22		419
Sweden			0	0	0			1086	1146	1045	1741		-1146
UK	403	368	268	271	262		1217	995	995		714		-727

Source : **http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_dubti&lang=en** (incoming)

http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_dubto&lang=en (outgoing)