

Bali Tolak Reklamasi: The local adoption of global protest

Convergence: The International
Journal of Research into
New Media Technologies
2020, Vol. 26(3) 620–638
© The Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1354856518806695
journals.sagepub.com/home/con



Birgit Bräuchler

Monash University, Australia

Abstract

Diverted by the virality of social media and the powerful visibility of contemporary global protest, social movement research started to lose sight of the invisible and silent aspects of mobilization and underlying collective identities. Looking at a Balinese protest movement against land reclamation whose anti-capitalist and performative character remind of recent transnational protest, this article refocuses on collective identity and examines the local adoption of global protest. It analyses the evolving actor landscape and the negotiation processes between different cultures, ecologies, generations, media and networking strategies that prominently shape the Bali movement. The article conceptualizes the movement as an emerging information ecology and tracks its entanglements with local identity, national power politics and global activism through a culture and transmedia approach. It thus analyses the loud and the silent side of the protest and the movement's decision-making strategies that involve human and non-human agency, an aspect that is largely missing in current social movement debates. Going beyond simplified notions of strong leadership or leaderless networks, it tracks the difficult balancing acts between openness and closedness, between an ideally consensual and inclusive movement and the necessity to make strategic decisions in a specific local, national and transnational setting.

Keywords

Bali, collective identity, culture, information ecology, Indonesia, non-human agency, ontology, protest and resistance, social movements, social media, transmedia mobilization

Corresponding author:

Birgit Bräuchler, Anthropology, School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC 3800, Australia.

Email: birgitbraeuchler@gmx.net

Introduction

Ongoing protest against land reclamation in Bali's south resonates with the anti-capitalist and performative character of recent transnational protest movements. At the same time, however, Balinese resistance is closely entangled in local culture and religion. Analysing Balinese strategies to set up and maintain a long-lasting protest movement, this article promotes a cultural approach to social movements that goes beyond a mere instrumentalist take on culture or analyses that conceptualize culture as just another aspect added to existing models (for a critique see also Ullrich et al., 2014: 3). Operationalizing that overall approach through a media ecology and transmedia approach, the contribution looks at the different media and cultural layers involved in shaping a specific movement identity – from the transnational, to the national and the local. The article draws on and at the same time distances itself from the extensive literature triggered by Occupy, the Arab Spring or the Indignados in Spain. It argues against deterministic approaches that claim that the deployment of social media was not only decisive for setting up leaderless democratic networks and the revolutions' success, but that they could not have taken place without such technologies (for critique see also, e.g. Barassi, 2013). This study rather supports approaches that emphasize the close interlinkage of online and offline media action as promoted by scholars such as Juris (2012) and Gerbaudo (2015), and that highlight the diversification of protest strategies and a new kind of protest aesthetics.

The article links an integrative approach with a strand of literature that aims to go beyond the notion of 'connective action' – collective action enabled by social media with a focus on the individual (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012) – by refocusing on collective identity as a crucial foundation for successful movements (see e.g. Gerbaudo and Treré, 2015). With its diversified culture approach, however, it aims to go beyond existing studies on collective movement identities with a focus on human agency, a movement culture or a specific culture a movement is drawing on (see e.g. Baumgarten et al., 2014; Kavada, 2015; Treré, 2015) and identify the various cultural layers at work in and around a protest movement. What is largely missing in this literature is the role of more silent and spiritual aspects of movement organization and mobilization and how these become part of its transmedia spaces, with the body being an important mediator of religious experience and with protest support provided by non-human agents such as spirits and gods. Diverted by the virality of social media, protest aesthetics, the powerful visibility and the unexpected force of contemporary protest movements (Werbner et al., 2014), the Bali case clearly shows that we have to provide those aspects more space in our analyses. This article thus focuses on the evolving actor landscape and the negotiation processes between different cultures and worlds (e.g. global activism and Balinese cosmology) and between consensual networking and leadership strategies that together shape the movement's collective identity.

The article first provides a brief introduction into the conceptual and analytical framework of this study: the concepts of collective identity and culture and the transmedia approach. It conceptualizes the Bali Tolak Reklamasi movement (Bali Rejects Reclamation movement, henceforth BTR) as an emerging information ecology (Nardi and O'Day, 1999) and analyses its entanglements with local identity, national power politics and global activism through a transmedia approach as coined by Jenkins (2003) and applied to social/protest movement research by scholars such as Costanza-Chock (2012, 2013). After introducing the local setting (Bali) and the emerging movement, the article analyses both the loud and the silent side of the protest, including non-human agency, and the respective media put to use. In line with more classic social movement research, this article underlines the importance of strategic leaderships for effective movement

mobilization and organization and outlines the difficult balancing act between openness and closedness, between an ideally consensual and inclusive movement, as also promoted by Occupy, and the necessity to be exclusive and make strategic decisions.

Collective identity and culture

Whereas the importance of collective identity was emphasized in earlier studies on digital social movements, that interest has increasingly vanished in later studies that focus on organizational dynamics, technological affordances and transnational connections (the digital frontstage) and tend to neglect internal communicative dynamics (the backstage) (Treré, 2015: 904). Collective identities can be locally rooted relational identities such as ethnicity or religion (see e.g. Barth, 1969; Sokolovskii and Tishkov, 2002) or identities created through joint (mediatized) action or globally circulated hashtags, pictures, slogans and memes, such as the global justice movement or global environmental activism (Diani, 1992; Gerbaudo and Treré, 2015; Melucci, 1995). Ontologies are important parts of locally rooted cultures. They tell us how members of a cultural group conceptualize the nature of being and becoming, how they identify relevant categories of being (such as the human and the non-human) and what relations exist between them. The maintenance of harmonious relations between the human and the non-human, the visible and the invisible is crucial for Balinese culture and people.

When looking at culture and collective identity as analytical tools, it is decisive to note that both culture and collective identity are not fixed entities but processual and constantly reconstructed, contested and negotiated. As Melucci (1996: 67) outlines, we need to look at both ‘the inner complexity of an actor, its plurality of orientations’ and ‘the actor’s relationship with the environment (other actors, opportunities/constraints)’. Social movements, in turn, are an analytical concept to look at networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in conflict with an adversary for the appropriation of resources, and all this on the basis of shared collective identities and solidarity, embedded in specific political systems and apparatus of social control (Diani, 1992: 1, 17; Melucci, 1996: 29–30, 78). Preparing the ground for mobilization and the elaboration of a joint world view, they circulate essential resources for action and the formation of collective identity (Diani, 1992: 7–8) such as relevant information, expertise, material resources, symbols, cultural or religious values, geographical references or normative and formative texts (Assmann, 1999: 139–142) – with their meanings being handed down, adopted or ascribed over generations or through collective action, in villages or in transnational activism.

Social movement literature has so far mainly looked at the culture of a social movement, its communication culture or specific decontextualized cultural elements that a movement is drawing on (see e.g. Baumgarten et al., 2014; Klandermans and Roggeband, 2010). The shaping of a collective identity is central in BTR’s information ecology, both for mobilizing people and resources and organizing activities. Drawing on Balinese cosmology and ontology, it involves human and non-human agency, an aspect that is glaringly missing in debates on social movements and culture (see e.g. Della Porta and Diani, 2006; Downing, 2011; Johnston and Klandermans, 1995), where environment is usually conceptualized as passive entity, with few exceptions (see e.g. Nash, 2014: 75; Lockie, 2004: 42). This contribution looks at the evolving culture of the BTR and the various cultures and collective identities it draws on and is embedded in – from a (trans)national activist culture, to Balinese youth culture to local Balinese culture. It conceptualizes culture both as strategy to strengthen and legitimize BTR’s cause, but also as context that provides specific

values and beliefs that shape movements (compare also Kavada, 2013; Salman and Assies, 2010: 211–212) but also challenge their unity due to frictions between different cultures.

Information ecology and transmedia

Due to ontological and cultural specificities, media need to be conceptualized in a broad sense in the Bali case, from social media to banners, traditional dance and the human body. The latter is essential not only as a loudspeaker for human protest but also as facilitator of religious experience such as trance and possession that serve as channels to convey the non-human agents' stance on the reclamation issue. Here, the notion of religion as mediation is important as it links humans with the divine, spiritual or transcendental (Meyer, 2011: 28). Such a broad conceptualization of media establishes the need for a transmedia approach. A transmedia approach, combined with the notion of an information ecology, allows for an integrative and non-deterministic look that bridges the gap between human and non-human agency, the younger and the older generations and the diverging ways they make use of different media as outlined below. Such an approach allows us to delineate the BTR's evolving mediascapes.

A transmedia approach challenges 'a static reading of media . . . opportunity structures that shifts the focus away from the agency of social movement participants' (Costanza-Chock, 2013: 99). It also caters to the fact that (prospective) movement participants have different skills and access to different kinds of media, which as well changes in the course of the protest dynamics (see also Rucht, 2013: 263). Looking at Occupy, Costanza-Chock (2013) describes the systematic and participatory making and circulating of media elements across media platforms as transmedia mobilization. It allows for a much wider circulation of a movement's message and the co-creation of a movement identity, including its social base and movement leaders. To emphasize the importance of the interactional aspect even further and to grasp context and dynamics of an emerging movement culture/identity beyond its self-representation in social media, I conceptualize the BTR as an information ecology. This is a specific media ecology approach coined by Nardi and O'Day (1999; Tréré and Mattoni, 2016) and applied to social movement research by Tréré (2012), among others. A media ecological approach takes a holistic view on media usage that does not isolate any specific media and focuses on their embeddedness in broader sociocultural and political fields. Arguing against a media-deterministic perspective, Nardi and O'Day (1999) define information ecology as 'a system of people, practices, values, and technologies in a particular local environment'. It is a complex system of parts and relationships that experiences continual evolution and requires diversity 'to permit the system to survive continual and perhaps chaotic change' and a variety of skilled people, for the effective use of technology and others (Nardi and O'Day, 1999).

The following analyses are results of multisited fieldwork conducted over different periods from 2015 until 2017 and in different spatialities, online and on the spot in Bali. I conducted participant observation in online media spaces and offline movement events, but also joined movement members in their daily activities. It was important to see what people in particular sociocultural settings actually do in relation to a movement's objectives and the various media on offer (see e.g. Barassi and Tréré, 2012; Bräuchler and Postill, 2010; Mattoni and Tréré, 2014) to avoid deterministic views and to study how collective action and media use are embedded in people's everyday lives and broader protest settings and how they cross cultural, media, generational and ontological boundaries. I conducted approximately a 100 semi-structured and narrative interviews (and some group discussions), some of them evolving over several hours and repeated

sessions, with activists, government representatives, supporters of the reclamation project (pro-party), journalists, media strategists, environmentalists (including NGOs), lawyers, academics, students, fishermen, priests, spiritual leaders, *adat* and temple officials – all of them involved in the BTR information ecology. I also analysed BTR texts, texts produced by the pro-party and the government, mainstream media texts and social media content. The movement narratives as developed below were not just lying out there, ready to be picked up. They are the result of an analytical and interpretative engagement with my empirical data, in which the concepts of culture, collective identity, transmedia and information ecology constituted a framework that allowed me to put the movement narratives and my interpretations into a broader analytical context. Having said this, the transmedia approach is not only my analytical lens but also a strategy deliberately applied by BTR strategists to reach out for a broad and diverse audience, which leads to an interesting conflation of analytical concepts and empirical observation.

The local setting

A loud protest movement does not fit Bali's image as a harmonious apolitical island of paradise, an image that is internally and externally produced and enforced. Given that approximately 80% of the Balinese live off tourism, one way or the other, there is a strong interest by the islanders and the national and provincial governments to perpetuate that image (Dwyer, 2009: 118–119). Culture is Bali's most prominent tourist attraction and the unity of religion (Hinduism), *adat* (tradition and customary law) and culture is important for Balinese identity. To maintain that harmonious image, Balinese responded with silence to the anti-communist massacres of 1965/1966 and it made them find ways to deal harmoniously with the Bali bombing in 2002 (Dwyer, 2009; Hornbacher, 2009). However, the collapse of the oppressive Suharto regime (1966–1998) together with an increasingly aggressive national tourism policy triggered increasing resistance among the Balinese. The first visible resistance arose in opposition to the planning of a resort near the seaside temple of Tanah Lot in 1993/1994. The protests were mainly driven by students and a local newspaper, the Bali Post; their argument mainly revolved around the religious significance of the site. In the end, they failed and the resort opened in 1997 (see e.g. Warren, 1998).

Twenty years later, from 2013 onwards, another loud protest movement is targeting a huge project that is meant to reclaim around 700 hectares in Benoa Bay in Bali's south. The investor, PT Tirta Wahana Bali Internasional, stresses that it will reclaim land in Benoa Bay for an environmentally friendly development that values Bali's customs and culture. Because of the emerging protest, it changed the project motto from *reclamation* to *revitalization* – an alleged revitalization of a polluted ecosystem that they claim to achieve through the creation of multiple artificial islands in Benoa Bay. These islands shall accommodate resorts, residential clusters, entertainment and Balinese theme parks that save tourists from having to travel the whole island of Bali. It will open up 200,000 new jobs and bring welfare to many Balinese, the investor claims, which hardly sounds convincing given an unemployment rate of less than 2% and the threat of massive immigration of foreign workers. The investor used its economic power to pressure political decision makers in Jakarta and Bali, founded and funded organizations such as Forum Peduli Mangrove that is meant to protect and revitalize mangroves (e.g. through paid rubbish collection), invited football star Ronaldo to become mangrove ambassador and co-opted politicians, security forces, village heads and religious leaders who were made to spread their message, to reiterate the mantra of environmentalism and free-market capitalism and to organize demonstrations and the set-up of pro-reclamation posters.

Initial negotiations for the reclamation project were conducted in the dark and were only revealed to the public in early 2013, thanks to some investigative journalists and activists. A short while later, a presidential decree turned the conservation area of Benoa Bay into a cultivation area of which a maximum of 700 hectares can be reclaimed (Presidential Decree No. 51/2014). All this happened without consulting the Balinese people, which triggered unprecedented massive resistance.

The emergence of a movement

The main actor behind the protest movement is the Balinese Forum Against Reclamation or ForBali (Forum Rakyat Bali Tolak Reklamasi), which was founded mid-2013. It is an alliance of students, NGOs, musicians, artists, environmentally concerned citizens, lawyers and village representatives. They request Indonesia's president to abrogate Decree No. 51/2014 that provides the legal basis for land reclamation; thus the constantly recurring slogan: 'Reject Reclamation. Annul Presidential Decree No. 51/2014' (Tolak Reklamasi. Batalkan Perpres No. 51/2014). The forum's coordinator, Wayan Suardana or Gendo, is an outspoken Balinese lawyer and former head of Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI) Bali, Indonesia's oldest and largest environmental advocacy NGO. He is an environmental activist and experienced strategist, who is influential among the youths, represents the movement to the outside and acts as interface to new members. However, it is by far not him alone driving the movement, but a group of activists (some of them WALHI members) that populate various teams that are respectively in charge of the development of strategies, mass mobilization, quick action, sociopolitics, social media, website, law, popular events, documentation and film, infographics and others; they do so voluntarily and without payment. The teams are the core strategists of the movement. Being lawyers, social scientists, musicians, bands, fans, artists, youth leaders, event managers, film-makers and so on, they draw on their individual skills and resources and put them into service of the movement. Most of these activists know each other from previous undertakings related to environmental activism, the student movement mobilizing against Indonesia's former authoritarian regime, and the pioneering but sensitive breaking of the silence around the 1965/1966 massacres that marked the beginning of the Suharto regime (for the latter see Dwyer, 2015). For these educated youths, the anti-reclamation movement is a new chapter in Balinese history and the Indonesian people's fight for human rights. As Melucci (1996: 292) had noted, next to the identification of an adversary, prior networks and experiences are crucial foundations for the development of a collective movement identity and a mobilization process, in which 'different fragments . . . are integrated into a new system of relations'.

In its efforts to grow and to mobilize people at a large scale, it is important to look at the various cultural layers the movement is both embedded in and drawing on. They are all part of the BTR's complex information ecology, which requires diversity and the continuous change of parts and relationships 'to permit the system to survive continual and perhaps chaotic change' (Nardi and O'Day, 1999), as argued above. Initially, the protest was predominantly directed against environmental destruction and capitalist exploitation, and environmental NGOs, students and artists were the driving forces. They could easily link up with national solidarity networks and the ideals they were fighting for such as human rights, anti-capitalism, grass-roots democracy, environmentalism and radical change had significant transnational resonance (compare Khasnabish, 2008), most vividly expressed in social mediascapes. After the first year, however, it turned out that a globalized protest rhetoric is not sufficient to mobilize the Balinese masses. It therefore

needed the recourse to local collective identities to better root a globalized movement in a local context, to legitimize the activists' arguments and to make the movement grow. It needed mobilization along the lines of religion and adat that strongly determine daily life in Bali. However, we first need to look at the earlier phase and its transmedia actions.

Bali protest: Outspoken and loud

Like Occupy and other anti-capitalist movements, ForBali makes use of the raised fist as a symbol of resistance. ForBali core activists felt inspired by the writings of David Graeber, an anthropologist and prominent figure in the Occupy Wall Street movement. The two movements share an anti-capitalist thrust and a number of characteristics such as non-violence, mediatization and embodiment and diversity. ForBali has a huge following and strategically uses social media to express solidarity, internally and to other like-minded movements. They became a role model in Indonesia for how to effectively organize resistance. In August 2017, it had 133 thousand followers on Instagram, 1,24,113 community likes on Facebook, 93.2 thousand followers on Twitter and had posted 17.2 thousand tweets (@ForBali13; compared to 215 thousand followers and 37.2 thousand tweets of @OccupyWallSt). Starting with two dozen protesters in 2013, ForBali's offline events attracted more than 30,000 people in 2016. This growing movement attracted attention of Occupy Wall Street, who retweeted some of ForBali's posts, posters, videos and pictures, for example, when thousands of Balinese marched to occupy the space in front of the governor's office in March 2016 (11.3.2016): 'Clearly this is a movement to watch. Big stuff coming in Bali'. Shortly thereafter the post: 'Hey everyone, there is a big social movement brewing in Bali: TOLAK REKLAMASI. Follow @ForBali13 now.' A ForBali activist tweeted: 'POWER TO THE PEOPLE!' and 'Occupy parliament!' (@rudolfdethu, 25.8.2016). Due to the popularity of social media in Indonesia, ForBali established its own web team that is made up of experienced web design and social media users. They inform about events and policy developments, they call for action and participation and provide real-time updates and huge amounts of visual and audio material. As a team member explained to me, most posts are tweeted at 'prime time', a time when many Indonesians are on their way back home from work (often stuck in the traffic) or in the evening, when they have time to attend to the urgent news. Through the ForBali account, the movement speaks with one voice (fed by several activists), but members also strengthen its cause via their individual accounts, interlinking the narratives through hashtags and mentioning. Other movement sympathizers massively amplify the media team's work through mentioning and retweeting.

Similar to Occupy, musicians and artists are at the forefront of collective action. Popular Balinese grunge and punkrock bands such as Navicula, Nostress and Superman is Dead (SID) adapt their lyrics, organize concerts, sing the movement song and put together an album. They share their concerns about reclamation and ForBali tweets with their huge followership in social media. Jerinx from SID, for instance, had 361 thousand Instagram followers in August 2017, Navicula 49 thousand and their former manager 16.1 thousand. Artists like Alit Ambara place their creativity at the service of the movement; his poster art is omnipresent in Bali's streets and online (see also <https://posteraksi.org>). The only Balinese comic magazine, BogBog, dedicated a whole edition to the reclamation cause (no. 1, vol. 15, 2016). The drummer of SID is also owner of Rumble, a fashion label that allocates 10% of its profit to WALHI (see also Bräuchler, 2016).

Social media are thus deeply ingrained into a much larger transmedia space and information ecology. Media from traditional theatre, movement T-Shirts to social media are important forms of non-violent resistance and provide for an elaborated protest aesthetics (Werbner et al., 2014).

Protest is both mediatized and embodied by real people; the logics of networking and aggregation in physical space are mutually constitutive as Juris (2012: 260) has prominently argued for the Occupy movement. The use of social media allows for mobilization, the coordination of action, the real-time documentation of unfolding protest events, the extension of the movement's reach, a global web-based engagement and the countering of coverage in mainstream media (Dahlgren, 2013; Poell and Dijck, 2015: 529). Offline networks and the getting together of large numbers of individuals in the streets allow for the embodiment of protest and a visibility far beyond the circle of social media users. Such strategies allow for the unification of large numbers of diverse people, be it on Bali or in New York (Juris, 2012: 265; Kidd, 2015: 457). Other important means in these uniting and collective identification processes and the scaling up of protest are: the identification of common goals and principles such as fighting greedy investors; viral slogans, so-called memes, and strategic Twitter and Instagram hashtags, such as *BaliTolakReklamasi* (*BaliRejectReclamation*), *#TolakReklamasiTelukBenoa* (*RejectReclamationOfBenoaBay*), *#BatalkanPerpresNo51thn2014* (*AnnulPresidentialDegreeNo51/2014*), *#TolakReklamasiBerkedokRevitalisasiTelukBenoa* (*RejectReclamationThatIsMaskedAsRevitalization*); the production and circulation of movement songs and movement T-Shirts with images depicting their struggle or the intrusion of outside threads (often symbolized through huge excavators) into their sacred space; the raising of flags with *ForBali* logos; the replacement of individual profile pictures in social media with iconic protest images such as the raised fist, an excavator or Balinese goddesses; and shared symbols such as the hurt mother earth, places such as Benoa Bay and joint event experiences. Such symbols and icons effectively and publicly display one's belonging to a protest movement, while preserving the individual's autonomy and identity (Gerbaudo, 2012: 14, 2015; Juris, 2008: 14). Social media do not become 'organising agents' (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012: 752), but integral parts of a larger identity formation and mobilization process that is deeply embedded in local and national social, cultural, political and historical contexts (compare also Bakardjieva, 2015). The enrichment and complementation of transnational strategies with local content, symbolism, agency and skills cater for the local appropriation of global protest and an information ecology that is continuously in the making.

Journalist activists have been playing a role throughout and helped to interlink mainstream and alternative media, which immensely fostered BTR's visibility and popularity on Bali, in Indonesia and beyond. As Kidd (2015: 464) outlines for Occupy, movements still depend on 'the mainstream news media to get the attention of the wider public and policy-makers'. While *Bali Post* supports the resistance movement, other local newspapers are neutral, abstinent (e.g. *Tribun Bali* and *Radar Bali*) or pro-reclamation (e.g. *Post Bali*), which is often determined by political orientation, personal relationships or advertisement money provided by the investor. *Bali TV* often plays the anti-reclamation song, whereas *TVRI Bali* is rather supporting the governor and thus reclamation. Balinese tourist or expatriate magazines such as *Bali Travel*, *Sanur Weekly* or *La Gazette* report on *ForBali* actions and discuss the impact of the reclamation project. The movement even made it into national (and international) media such as *Kompas*, *Kompas TV*, *Trans7 TV*, *Tempo*, *Times* magazine and *CNN Indonesia* that report on anti-reclamation events (online and offline), screen interviews with activists and critical documentaries such as 'Kalah Benoa' by *Watchdoc*. Such news are then spread via social media accounts owned by *ForBali* and sympathizers.

In addition, the movement makes use of global platforms such as *change.org* to write petitions. They write official letters and statements to local and national government institutions or the investor and present them to a global public via social media. They also organize meetings with provincial and national government representatives. They meet in cafes and in *Taman Baca*,

a space opened up by one of the movement strategists for discussions surrounding 1965/1966, art events and reading (see in particular Dwyer, 2015: 20–21). However, they also conquer and occupy wider public space through demonstrations or concerts, thus embodying and locally rooting globally articulated protest. One of the biggest processions so far was triggered by the pending decision whether to renew the licence opening up Benoa Bay for reclamation feasibility studies and brought the traffic around Bali's airport to a halt for several hours in February 2016, very much to the annoyance of the government and the pro-party. Moreover, ForBali makes use of big traditional or religious parades to spread its message such as the Ogoh-Ogoh parade the night before Hari Nyepi, the lunar New Year. Punkrock concerts attract thousands of youths, but ForBali organizers also take efforts to include traditional arts into these mass events in order to get the older generation on board and make their objective explicit: the survival of Balinese culture and society. They include traditional music and performances such as the popular mythical fight between the lion-like Barong and demonic Rangda, or Kecak and Topeng and let the narrative circle around the impact of environmental degradation and land reclamation. According to young and older movement activists, the different art forms respect each other (again interlinking the global with the local), contributing to the mobilization of both youth and adat communities. These different art forms represent different types of media (thus transmedia) that require specific skills. Inspired by transnational activism, documentation of these face-to-face practices (including invitations) are circulated online, in text, web-based conversations, YouTube videos or other social and mainstream media.

Whereas generally there is a long tradition of art as a means to express political critique (Jenkins and Catra, 2004; McGraw, 2009; Rubin and Sedana, 2007: 2), the loudness and the forceful visibility of these events as well as the close linkage of musicians and activism are revolutionary and new for Bali. The youth activists are fed up with their parents' generation's passivity, enforced apoliticism and the government's sales policy. Music serves as weapon, as the SID manager put it, as medium of liberation and to raise awareness among the Balinese 'that are intoxicated by the sparkling tourist world, which blinds the mind' (Candra, 2012: 170). Bali is not Singapore that has no tradition to preserve, they said. As Navicula's singer proclaimed in Indonesian at one of the concerts that I attended: 'Each generation has its revolution and the Reject Reclamation in Benoa Bay Movement is our revolution'. For Alit Ambara, the Anti-Reclamation Movement is the biggest justice movement ever (@ForBALI13, 16.11.2016), and, as many emphasized, it created opportunities for dialogue between the generations. Popular national musicians such as Iwan Fals lend their voice to the movement and organize concerts in Bali and Jakarta. ForBali has its own team in Jakarta that organizes demonstrations in the country's capital, lobbying towards the central government and mobilization across Indonesia and beyond. Through individual members' and growing transnational networks the movement gets support from abroad and news about supportive actions further strengthen it – be it in Hamburg, Washington, London or Melbourne. Yet the Balinese protesters still needed to extend their transmedia approach further, in order to include yet another cultural layer: Balinese adat and religion. This again underlines the analytical fit and the complexity of information ecology as a concept that focuses on broader sociocultural contexts, diversity and continual evolution.

The silent side of BTR: Adat and religion

The youths' search for justice and environment protection easily translates into the language of Balinese Hinduism and adat (also compare the conservationist–indigenous alliance described by

Nash, 2014: 69–70). However, they each make use of very different investigative tools and media to express their views. The threat of capitalist exploitation and ecological disasters that destroy livelihoods, culture and ritual places are central to ForBali's scientific and religious argument. Scientific expertise comes from specialist NGOs such as WALHI, legal experts or university research centres. They have all learned from land reclamation on Serangan Island (an area close to the new reclamation project) in the 1990s that led to serious erosion on the main island, destroyed Serangan's environment and spiritual balance and created a desert-like piece of land that is not made use of until today. According to an analysis and simulation of Conservation International, land reclamation in Benoa Bay to the planned extent is not feasible without causing massive flooding due to tide mechanisms and five rivers flowing into the bay (Sudiarta et al., 2013).

From 2015 onwards, adat and religion became increasingly important for the movement's argumentation and actor landscape; they became important means mediating between the various actors, including the invisible world (Bräuchler, 2018). As traditional villages (*desa adat/pekraman*) and leaders (*bendesa*) are very influential in Balinese society, this even stronger turn towards the local was crucial to get more Balinese involved, beyond the educated city youth, long-standing activists and a global rhetoric. The movement grew exponentially. Environmental destruction is not only a transnational concern but a threat to the essential concept of Balinese society, *tri hita karana*, that requires a balanced relationship between humans, environment and god – a concept both opponents and promoters of reclamation use. Before directly approaching the *bendesa*, ForBali activists mobilized the village youth via their traditional village organizations (Sekaa Teruna Teruni), who then mobilized neighbourhoods (*banjar*), villages and village elders. ForBali had organized small concerts in the villages and provided educational work about the impact of reclamation through face-to-face discussions and flyers. As one of ForBali's founders explained to me, the youth then translated this into their own language and creativity, through organizing events, mobilizing peers and parents, designing movement T-Shirts and banners, drawing on both movement identity, Balinese language and local tradition. It was not always easy to win over the *bendesa* as they had been manipulated by the investor who had promised them prosperity and a glorious Bali after reclamation. In particular the older generation had learned to suppress dissatisfaction and found it challenging to openly resist. They had to be approached one after the other. Once the village council had taken a consensual decision (as required by local adat) to support ForBali, an official declaration was made. New movement T-Shirts, posters and flags are inaugurated during declaration events that attract more and more participants and journalists and include processions, heated speeches, cultural events and prayer. In early 2016, the adat villages founded an umbrella organization for better coordination of their anti-reclamation activities and to win over new villages. These adat villages increasingly acquire ownership of the movement and each new ally is celebrated in the ForBali media. Until mid-2017, 39 adat villages had officially joined, including all villages around Benoa Bay, whose youth were among the initiators of the anti-reclamation struggle. The adat youth had founded its own umbrella organization in 2016, which was an effective means to quickly and effectively network and mobilize youth groups across the island.

The close interlinkage of environment and culture, a culture that holds Balinese society together and is its most valuable economic resource, is important. However, what made the adat villages really move was a specifically religious argument, the identification of Benoa Bay as a holy sphere (*kawasan suci*) that is threatened by the reclamation plans – with adat and religion being closely entwined on Bali. As a ForBali activist explained to me, Balinese are very tolerant, which is an important requirement for the extensive tourism industry, but when it comes to their holy sites,

tolerance reaches its limits. Spiritual figures on Bali and Balinese palm-leaf manuscript experts helped to develop the religious argument, independent from and some of them prior to the foundation of ForBali. Turning their bodies and minds into media, meditation and trance allowed gifted priests to communicate with the gods in charge of Benoa Bay's holy sites. The spirits and gods made it very clear that they reject the reclamation plans as intolerable intrusion into their spheres that thus needed to be conceptualized as part of BTR's information ecology. ForBali helped to organize a student team from Bali's Hindu University that conducted 6 months of research and designed a map that includes 70 holy sites identified in and around Benoa Bay, including visible and invisible temples and spots preserved for specific rituals such as cleansing or post-cremation ceremonies and worshipping the deity of the sea. The map was publicly presented and discussed, put up on village posters and served as an effective medium to mobilize other villages. Priests and spiritual leaders regularly come to Benoa Bay to pray and seek support of spirits and gods, or they meet in temples that are considered central to Balinese cosmology and well-being. Going to the extreme, anti-reclamation activists refer to Balinese mythology and history and the spectacular mass suicides in the early 20th century, the so-called *puputan* (see e.g. #PuputanTelukBenoa), as the strongest form of resistance against the colonial empire (Rubin and Sedana, 2007: 2). The current protest movement is seen as its continuation, directed against a new kind of colonialism through global capitalism and environmental destruction (Dewi, 2015; Lanus, 2014; Muhajir, 2014).

The religious legitimization of resistance enabled adat villages to develop alternatives to the loud and angry demonstrations of the youths that are heavily coloured by global ideas and that are not in line with their ideas how to restore social order as they disturb economy, tourism and harmony. Given the impending danger and the need to attract the government's attention they accepted them, but they are convinced that they need to be complemented and legitimized by their kind of resistance and their own mediations to be successful: the holding of temple prayers and rituals or the climbing of holy mountains (Gunung Agung or Batur) – a more silent way of resistance. Religion was the final weapon as some traditional village heads put it. For a cosmic balance, it needs both, the visible/rational (*skala*) and the invisible/irrational (*niskala*), the angry and the silent, the importance of which can only be grasped through a broad definition of media and a transmedia approach.

Balancing openness and closedness

Mobilizing a substantive and diverse crowd – including national and local activists, environmentalists and spiritual leaders, humans and non-humans, producing transnational resonance at the same time as rooting resistance in local culture and identities – was essential to develop a strong case and a collective movement identity against reclamation and neoliberal exploitation. This not only required a transmedia approach but also a strategic combination of openness and closedness of the network and of consensual bottom-up decision making and strong leadership. This was partly achieved through a combination of huge inclusive mass events and a hard-working core group that is in charge of long-term planning (compare Costanza-Chock, 2012: 383), similar to what Earl (2016) called 'flash activism' and 'persistent erosion'. The former is 'a new kind of weapon', the 'massive and destabilising mobilisation of so many that happens so quickly' (Earl, 2016). Such scaling up of protests, 'disruptiveness or radicalness', 'creativity or newness' (Rucht, 2013: 257) are important to attract diverse crowds and media attention beyond the local level (see also Cammaerts et al., 2013: 11). However, connective action and flash activism that only ask for

superficial and temporary engagement are only the visible top of the iceberg (see also Kavada, 2015). It needs in-depth knowledge of the local setting and persistence to strategically adapt globally expressed resistance (through transnationally popular means) to newly emerging prospects and challenges in the local and national sociopolitical landscapes. But it also needs small scale events ‘to maintain media existence’, as a traditional village head on Bali told me, and let the public know that resistance has not vanished.

Media as such are the results of ‘battles over who has the power to represent the reality of others’ (Couldry and Curran, 2003: 6). Participation alone is not only a matter of mobilization but of skills and resources (infrastructure, time, prior experience, social and cultural capital, etc.), which questions claims such as Occupy’s popular slogan, ‘we are the 99%’ (Atton, 2015: 7; Juris et al., 2012). Movements do need to draw on established activist networks and friendships, where, in the Bali case, relationships of trust have been established long before the anti-reclamation movement. Their success lies ‘to a great extent in the organisational skills of its activists and in their capacity to create a compelling sense of togetherness capable of initiating the coalescence of a disparate constituency’ (Gerbaudo, 2012: 162). As Melucci (1996: 313, 330, 355) argued, both a relatively stable horizontal and vertical division of roles, including leadership roles, is necessary for a social movement to survive and be effective.

Many analyses of Occupy and related movements depict them as open decentralized networks that have developed consensual democratic means, in which everybody has an equal say. This is an ideal that ForBali has adopted too. However, ‘networks are not inherently democratic or egalitarian, and they may be used for divergent ends’ (Juris, 2008: 17), which calls for closer investigation. Kavada (2015: 881–882) asks to bear in mind that ‘social media platforms are designed in such a way that once a page or an account is set up . . . , the activists administering the account have to speak in the collective voice’. This is true for Occupy and ForBali, whose social media accounts are managed by a handful of people. Although Occupy members stressed that Occupy social media did not represent the movement, they ‘had a significant role in shaping the collective voice’ (Kavada, 2015: 881–882). Consensus is the ideal, but who, in the end, takes part in strategic decision making are ‘the few who could attend the physical meetings’ (Kavada, 2015: 848). ForBali is engaged in a difficult balancing act between what Kavada called horizontals, who aim to promote participatory democracy and openness, and verticals, who deem a top-down process of content production and communication necessary (Kavada, 2013: 85, 87). The Internet and social media provide the means for both styles.

Arguing against the seeming leaderlessness of transnational movements, Gerbaudo (2012: 163) notes that they need ‘choreographic’ forms of leadership, although I doubt that they are always ‘soft, indirect, and invisible’, given my Bali experience and Gendo’s strong leadership. Here, only strategic leadership and effective core organizers with specific skills allow for the seeming spontaneity of contemporary movements (see also Gerbaudo, 2012: 163–164). They act as (invisible) choreographers, who plan offline action and initiate online threads and hashtags, thus shaping argument and development of the movement and giving coherence to collective action (Gerbaudo, 2012: 44). Gendo is the visible face and consensual leader, but the strategic teams form the invisible leading machinery. In addition, traditional village heads increasingly claim ownership of the movement, ascribing ForBali the role of technical facilitator, thus further diffusing the leadership question. As Melucci (1996: 333) has suggested a while ago, the movement works, as either side sees the relationship as mutually advantageous: leader, constituents, strategic teams and adat villages.

Acknowledging the importance of and engaging in controversial discussion and consensual decision-making, be it in the villages or in the movement's core teams, key strategists nonetheless argue that they have only been successful so far because they follow '*satu komando*' (one command). This prevents them from getting lost in internal debates as has happened in previous movements that they were part of, and it helps the movement to stay focused, not wasting energy with ineffective action or hopeless law suits (for instance when movement members were intimidated and beaten). The movement has dedicated lawyers who provide legal services for movement members who have been sued and they give recommendations for planned actions to prevent the movement from becoming vulnerable. For these very same reasons, social media entries posted by movement accounts need to be tightly watched. ForBali's strategic core and each of the strategic teams communicate via WhatsApp groups for decision-making. These exchanges need to be kept out of the public Twitter zone or 'frontstage activism' (Treré, 2015) so as not to endanger the movement and future events – comparable to Treré's 'backstage activism'. A transmedia approach allows for openness and participation. It provides great opportunity to include many and diverse voices and take on board people with a broad variety of different media skills and access. However, it certainly challenges ForBali's 'security culture' (Costanza-Chock, 2012: 383) and opens up possibilities for counter mobilization, leadership deviance and the criminalization of movement members. As Costanza-Chock (2013: 97) found, it is for that reason that most traditional social movement organizations deem transmedia mobilization too risky.

The criminalization of activists

Direct offline action is as susceptible to repression as connective action (Cammaerts et al., 2013: 14; Gerbaudo, 2012: 9). Around the globe, protest movements are criminalized on the pretext that they endanger domestic security (see e.g. Snow et al., 2013), which provides BTR activists another opportunity to link up to a global rhetoric of transnational activism. In Bali, movement members are exposed to various mechanisms of counteraction, be it by the government, official and unofficial security forces or thugs, or people in favour of the reclamation project. The intensive use of offline and online media by both parties (pro and contra) results in poster wars on the streets and civil war in social media, as ForBali team members coined it and as I have myself observed. ForBali members are very explicit about their identity, uploading self-portraits together with the message they want to convey, thus not only strengthening a collective movement identity but also taking on individual responsibility (compare Treré, 2015: 908). The pro-party media strategists stay anonymous, online and offline; they try to replicate ForBali's media strategies, portals and graphics to fish for passwords and manipulate information; they create fake accounts, so-called bots that create overloads of messages and discredit the anti-reclamation party that does not allow itself to be provoked though.

When ForBali activists are accused of separatism and ForBali's coordinator is sued for online hate speech, the movement gets further impetus. The feeling of being criminalized and victimized fosters further protest and outrage and reaffirms their belief that the government tries to stop the movement and that they are fighting for the right cause. On 7 September 2016, the Balinese Hindu holiday of Galungan, a ForBali activist is put under arrest. He is accused of lowering the Indonesian national flag without the proper formalities during a Tolak Reklamsi protest in front of the parliament building on 25 August 2016, and of raising it again with the ForBali flag underneath it. This was welcome news for the pro-party that extensively commented in social media, including a

video of the flag event. In response to the accusations and to show their loyalty to the Indonesian nation, the adat village association organized a huge event: Thousands of people carried 110 Indonesian flags over a distance of 11 km from Puputan Badung Square in Denpasar to Sakenan Temple on Serangan Island on 25 September 2016, marking the 110th anniversary of the anti-colonial mass suicide (*puputan*) in Badung and the World Maritime Day. The event attracted a lot of media attention, both mainstream and social, local and national. The #KirabBenderaTolakReklamasi (RejectReclamationFlagProcession) was born and respective postings were shared and liked by thousands of social media users.

Around the same time, sympathizers of the reclamation project reported Gendo to the police for online hate speech, as he had allegedly insulted and defamed one of their organizations and one of its leaders (an ethnic Batak) by manipulating his name in Twitter and accusing him of filthy lucre (@gendovara, 19.7.2016). According to the denunciator, who had once jointly struggled for democracy with Gendo and friends but is now a party politician close to the investor, Gendo was breaching the Law on Electronic Information and Transactions (UU No. 11/2008) and the Law on the Elimination of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination (UU No. 40/2008). The criminalization of ForBali activists as separatists or defamers triggered outrage and hashtags such as #LawanKriminalisasiAktivisForBALI (FightAgainstCriminalizationOfForBaliActivists) and it triggered outcries of solidarity as they are known from other human rights violations in Indonesia and beyond. #SayaAdalahGendo (IAmGendo), #GendoAdalahKita (GendoIsUs), #SayaTolakReklamasi (IRejectReclamation) emerged and became trending topics in Twitter (Tribun Bali, 16.8.2016). This resembles slogans such as ‘We are all Khaled Said’ created in Facebook in June 2010 ‘to protest against the police-inflicted death of Said, a young middle-class Egyptian man’ (Poell and Dijk, 2015: 528) or #KitaAdalahMunir (WeAreMunir) in remembrance of the murder of one of Indonesia’s most famous human rights activists. In support, hundreds of people posted images of themselves, holding up one of those hashtags in print (see e.g. Facebook ForBali13, 17.8.2016; @ForBali13, 18.8.2016). Amnesty International (2016) called for urgent action to protect Gendo as the law on electronic information in Indonesia ‘contains vague language which has been used to broadly interpret defamation and blasphemy to criminalise . . . expression’. Some days earlier, the same had happened to Haris Azhar, whom Indonesian security forces and the Indonesian National Narcotics Agency sued ‘for violations against the ITE Law after he posted an article linking security and law enforcement officials to drug-trafficking related corruption on social media’ (Amnesty International, 2016). For Bali’s social media users solidarize with both Gendo and Haris, and ForBali invited Haris to the commemoration event that they organized in honour of Munir (see e.g. Tempo 5.12.2016).

Criminalization also takes place in other forms, for example, when panels on the 1965/1966 massacres and the controversial land reclamation were cancelled at the prominent Ubud Writers and Readers Festival in 2015, when police asked people to take down anti-reclamation posters at the Lunar New Year procession in 2016 (Tempo.co, 8.3.2016) or when policemen beat youngsters wearing movement T-Shirts on the occasion of the Balinese Arts Festival in 2016 for no obvious reason (@ForBALI13 and Tribun Bali, 11.6.2016). Bali’s governor is clearly in favour of the reclamation project and everybody nervously awaits the 2018 elections with candidates trying to instrumentalize the resistance movement with its huge followership. The provincial parliament is torn, almost no member daring to speak out or meet with the anti-reclamation activists. The central government apparently wants to starve the movement by not taking decisions.

Concluding reflections: The local adoption of global protest

There are a couple of lessons to be learned from the Bali case, both for the study and the set-up of protest movements. The Bali movement has been active for more than 4 years now, as per 2017. Such a long-term engagement taken together with a rich and broad media landscape (here conceptualized as information ecology) with a high degree of interlinkage between the respective media (analytically framed through the transmedia approach) allowed for the continuous renegotiation of the movement's identity, the development and adaptation of argumentation and the inclusion of new stakeholders (without abandoning key goals). This allowed BTR to adapt its strategies to make the movement grow continuously, by taking on board a global audience that is familiar with a transnational protest rhetoric and a local population that needed recourse to context-specific cultural resources (analytically grasped through the concepts of culture and collective identity) to legitimize the global resistance spectacle. BTR needed to consider Balinese ontological ideas and cosmologies that require the involvement of invisible agency and that strive towards a harmonious relationship between the human and the non-human worlds.

For scholars researching such movements, this requires a multisited and long-term research approach that follows the dynamics unfolding online and offline. For activists, this requires great staying power and a strong strategic base; it requires extensive knowledge about the specificities of various media forms across interest groups and a strong and large active followership with the necessary skills to successfully play the (transmedia) keyboard of a complex movement like BTR. Those skills enable the movement to navigate between the different cultures and worlds, including invisible and non-human agency, and to facilitate the local adoption of global protest that implies two things at the same time: The global needs local legitimation, but it also helps mobilizing and legitimizing the dynamics of local agency against national power holders and a transnational activist community. What I have not been looking at in this article is how the local in turn shapes the global and thus informs the set-up and dynamics of social movements drawing on transnational resources.

An ecological and transmedia approach has proved to be essential to avoid a media deterministic perspective and analyse the sociocultural embeddedness and the lived reality of media use that is as diverse as boats and kites carrying ForBali messages, theatre performances, prayers, possessions or the virality of social media. ForBali strategists are aware of the limits of social media that are produced, controlled, watched and used by their enemy, corporate capitalism (embodied by the investor) (compare Barassi, 2015; Couldry and Curran, 2003: 8; Lovink, 2011). They serve a certain purpose, but are only one cog in the wheel; they are certainly not the only means to communicate, coordinate, plan and publicize, and they usually have a prehistory, in which social media may have played no role at all (see also Gerbaudo, 2012: 3, 9; Kidd, 2015: 460), which is sometimes forgotten in the age of 'connective action'.

Local cosmologies and religious traditions are specific manifestations of culture or collective identity that did play a prominent role in BTR's resistance against neoliberal capitalism. Every protest movement has a specific sociocultural and political context (each with its specific cultural manifestations and forms of expression), which needs to be catered for if people on the ground shall be mobilized on large scales. In each such setting, it will need specific resistance strategies that not only resonate with global protest rhetoric but also with local cultural requirements. Protest movements need to be inclusive to cross group boundaries, attract sufficient attention and be successful (see e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan, 2012). What John Postill (2013: 3) calls the 'politicised technology "nerds"' need to join forces with the young and the old, with people with and

without access to new media, with environmental and human rights activists, artists, students, intellectuals, journalists, village representatives, religious/adat figures and non-human agents, thus not only ‘blending . . . techno-libertarianism with popular demands for freedom and social justice’ (Postill, 2013: 3) but also with local values and cosmologies. Global protest rhetoric, effectively transmitted through social media channels, needs to be locally adapted and diversified through local media channels (including the human body as trance medium) that cater for local needs and skills. As adat and religious figures legitimize resistance with traditional land management and the sacredness of sites, their claims are not only those of individuals whom capitalism has left empty-handed but of a people that has been suppressed and marginalized by colonial powers and the Indonesian government, despite the economic importance of Bali’s tourism industry for the country. In Bali, it was the combination of, on the one hand, global networks and a transnational activist culture evolving around issues such as environmental degradation, anti-capitalism, justice, human rights, free speech, new protest aesthetics and social media strategies with, on the other hand, strong local identities and a shared history of suppression and exploitation, that made the movement grow and become increasingly inclusive. The Balinese movement combines, what Gerbaudo (2012: 166–167) called ‘rituals of popular reunions’ and ‘rituals of rootedness’ – rootedness in a much more literal sense (through ancestral and religiously legitimized land claims) than is the case for Occupy or the global justice movement.

The circulation of transnational symbols is accelerated enormously by social media, but only their strategic adoption and embedding into local contexts, identity politics and local agency generates solidarity and legitimization towards the inside and the outside and enables the negotiation of equality and difference at the same time (compare also Tsing, 2005: 228). Sufficient time, space, technical and human resources are crucial. Bali and the BTR were able to cater for that, but this is not a given, for instance, in other cases in Indonesia and beyond, where activists only learned about capitalist intrusion when operations had already begun, or where the necessary educational and communication infrastructure is simply not in place. That is where transmedia action reaches its limits and where a cultural approach is all the more important.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The German Peace Research Foundation (DSF) kindly supported this research project and the Freunde und Förderer of the Goethe-University Frankfurt funded the project’s preparatory trip.

References

- Amnesty International (2016) *Urgent Action: Defender Under Investigation for Defamation*. Bern. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA2148332016ENGLISH.pdf> (accessed 1 January 2017).
- Assmann J (1999) *Das Kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und Politische Identität in Frühen Hochkulturen*. München: Beck.
- Atton C (2015) Introduction. Problems and positions in alternative and community media. In: Atton C (ed) *The Routledge Companion to Alternative and Community Media*. New York: Routledge, pp. 1–18.
- Bakardjieva M (2015) Do clouds have politics? Collective actors in social media land. *Information, Communication & Society* 18(8): 983–990.
- Barassi V (2013) Review: *Manuell Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*. Cambridge: Polity, 2012. e-International Relations (27 February 2013). Available at: <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/27/review-networks-of-outrage-and-hope/> (accessed 21 March 2013).

- Barassi V (2015) *Activism on the Web. Everyday Struggles Against Digital Capitalism*. New York: Routledge.
- Barassi V and Treré E (2012) Does Web 3.0 come after Web 2.0? Deconstructing theoretical assumptions through practice. *New Media & Society* 14(8): 1269–1285.
- Barth F (1969) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture Difference*. Bergen-Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Baumgarten B, Daphi P and Ullrich P (2014) *Conceptualizing Culture in Social Movement Research*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bennett WL and Segerberg A (2012) The logic of connective action. Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics. *Information, Communication & Society* 15(5): 739–768.
- Bräuchler B (2016) Punkrock and global protest culture. *Inside Indonesia* 124. Available at: <http://www.insideindonesia.org/punkrock-and-global-protest-culture> (accessed 10 May 2016).
- Bräuchler B (2018) Diverging ecologies on Bali. *Sociology* 33(2): 362–396.
- Bräuchler B and Postill J (2010) *Theorising Media and Practice*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Cammaerts B, Mattoni A and McCurdy P (2013) Introduction: Mediation and protest movements. In: Cammaerts B, Mattoni A and McCurdy P (eds) *Mediation and Protest Movements*. Bristol: Intellect, pp. 1–20.
- Candra (2012) Musik sebagai media pembebasan. In: Wardana A and Hutabarat R (eds) *Melawan Lupa. Narasi-Narasi Komunitas Taman 65 Bali*. Denpasar: Taman 65 Press, pp. 163–170.
- Chenoweth E and Stephan MJ (2012) *Why Civil Resistance Works. The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Costanza-Chock S (2012) Mic check! Media cultures and the Occupy movement. *Social Movement Studies* 11(3–4): 75–385.
- Costanza-Chock S (2013) Transmedia mobilization in the Popular Association of the Oaxacan Peoples, Los Angeles. In: Cammaerts B, Mattoni A and McCurdy P (eds) *Mediation and Protest Movements*. Bristol: Intellect, pp. 95–114.
- Couldry N and Curran J (2003) The paradox of media power. In: Couldry N and Curran J (eds) *Contesting Media Power. Alternative Media in a Networked World*. London: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 3–16.
- Dahlgren P (2013) *The Political Web. Media, Participation and Alternative Democracy*; 67–68. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Della Porta D and Diani M. (2006) *Social Movements. An Introduction*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Dewi S 2015 Pertarungan Untuk Teluk Benoa. *ForBALI Website*, 2 January 2015. Available at: www.forabali.org (accessed 24 March 2017).
- Diani M (1992) The concept of social movement. *The Sociological Review* 40(1): 1–25.
- Downing JDH (2011) *Encyclopedia of Social Movement Media*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.
- Dwyer L (2009) A politics of silences: Violence, memory, and treacherous speech in post-1965 Bali. In: Hinton A and O’Neill K (eds) *Genocide, Truth, Memory and Representation: Anthropological Approaches*. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 113–146.
- Dwyer L (2015) Beyond Youth ‘Inclusion’: Intergenerational politics in post-conflict Bali. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 10(3): 16–29.
- Earl J (2016) Digital change-making: New sources of power and hybrid realities. *Mobilizing Ideas*, 28 November 2016. Available at: <https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2016/11/28/digital-change-making-new-sources-of-power-and-hybrid-realities/> (accessed 8 August 2017).
- Gerbaudo P (2012) *Tweets and the Streets. Social Media and Contemporary Activism*. London: Pluto Press.
- Gerbaudo P (2015) Protest avatars as memetic signifiers: Political profile pictures and the construction of collective identity on social media in the 2011 protest wave. *Information, Communication & Society* 18(8): 916–929.
- Gerbaudo P and Treré E (2015) In search of the ‘we’ of social media activism: Introduction to the special issue on social media and protest identities. *Information, Communication & Society* 18(8): 865–871.
- Hornbacher A (2009) Global conflict in cosmocentric perspective: A Balinese approach to reconciliation. In: Bräuchler B (ed) *Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroots Agency for Peace*. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 34–53.

- Jenkins H (2003) Transmedia storytelling. *MIT Technology Review*. Available at: <http://www.technologyreview.com/Biotech/13052> (accessed 19 August 2017).
- Jenkins R and Catra N (2004) Answering terror with art: Shakespeare and the Balinese response to the bombing of October 12, 2002. *Mudra Jurnal Seni Budaya* 7: 70–88.
- Johnston H and Klandermans B (1995) *Social Movements and Culture. Social Movements, Protest, and Contention*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Juris JS (2008) *Networking Futures. The Movements Against Corporate Globalization*. Durham/London: Duke University Press.
- Juris JS (2012) Reflections on #Occupy Everywhere: Social media, public space, and emerging logics of aggregation. *American Anthropologist* 39(2): 259–279.
- Juris JS, Ronayne M, Shokooch-Valle F, et al. (2012) Negotiating power and difference within the 99%. *Social Movement Studies* 11(3–4): 434–440.
- Kavada A (2013) Internet cultures and protest movements: The cultural links between strategy, organizing and online communication. In: Cammaerts B, Mattoni A and McCurdy P (eds) *Mediation and Protest Movements*. Bristol: Intellect, pp. 75–94.
- Kavada A (2015) Creating the collective: Social media, the Occupy Movement and its constitution as a collective actor. *Information, Communication & Society* 18(8): 872–886.
- Khasnabish A (2008) A tear in the fabric of the present. *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 2(2): 27–52.
- Kidd D (2015) Occupy and social movement communication. In: Atton C (ed) *The Routledge Companion to Alternative and Community Media*. New York: Routledge, pp. 457–468.
- Klandermans B and Roggeband C (2010) *Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines*. New York: Springer.
- Lanus S 2014 Ironi Bali Abad 21: Dari Tawan Karang sampai Karang Katawan (Reklamasi). *ForBALI Website*, 2 January 2015. Available at: www.forbali.org (accessed 6 March 2015).
- Lockie S (2004) Collective agency, non-human causality and environmental social movements. A case study of the Australian ‘landcare movement’. *Journal of Sociology* 40(1): 41–58.
- Lovink G (2011) *Networks Without a Cause. A Critique of Social Media*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Mattoni A and Treré E (2014) Media practices, mediation processes, and mediatization in the study of social movements. *Communication Theory* 24: 252–271.
- McGraw AC (2009) The political economy of the performing arts in contemporary Bali. *Indonesia and the Malay World* 37(109): 299–325.
- Melucci A (1995) The process of collective identity. In: Johnston H and Klandermans B (eds) *Social Movements and Culture*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 41–63.
- Melucci A (1996) *Challenging Codes. Collective Action in the Information Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meyer B (2011) Mediation and immediacy: Sensational forms, semiotic ideologies and the question of the medium. *Social Anthropology* 19(1): 23–39.
- Muhajir A (2014) Pesisir Bali Tolak Reklamasi, Berikut Tuntutan Warga. *Mongabay.co.id*, 16 August 2014. Available at: <http://www.mongabay.co.id/2014/08/16/pesisir-bali-tolak-reklamasi-berikut-tuntutan-warga/> (accessed 23 March 2015).
- Nardi BA and O’Day VL (1999) Information ecologies: Using technology with heart. *First Monday* 4(5). Available at: <https://firstmonday.org> (accessed 5 July 2017).
- Nash J (2014) Reassessing the culture concept in the analysis of global social movements: An anthropological perspective. In: Baumgarten B, Daphi P and Ullrich P (eds) *Conceptualizing Culture in Social Movement Research*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 67–90.
- Poell T and Dijck Jv (2015) Social media and activist communication. In: Atton C (ed) *The Routledge Companion to Alternative and Community Media*. New York: Routledge, pp. 526–537.
- Postill J (2013) The uneven convergence of digital freedom activism and popular protest: A global theory of the new protest movements. Available at: <http://rmit.academia.edu/JohnPostill> (accessed 18 September 2013).

- Rubin L and Sedana IN (2007) *Performance in Bali*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Rucht D (2013) Protest movements and their media usages. In: Cammaerts B, Mattoni A and McCurdy P (eds) *Mediation and Protest Movements*. Bristol: Intellect, pp. 249–268.
- Salman T and Assies W (2010) Anthropology and the study of social movements. In: Klandermans B and Roggeband C (eds) *Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines*. New York: Springer, pp. 205–265.
- Snow DA, Della Porta D, Klandermans B, et al. (2013) *The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*. Chichester/Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Sokolovskii S and Tishkov V (2002) Ethnicity. In: Barnard A and Spencer J (eds) *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology*. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 190–193.
- Sudiarta K, Gede Hendrawan I, Ketut Sarjana P, et al. (2013) *Laporan Kajian Modeling Dampak Perubahan Fungsi Teluk Benoa untuk Sistem Pendukung Keputusan dalam Jejaring KKP Bali*. Denpasar: Conservation International Indonesia.
- Treré E (2012) Social movements as information ecologies: Exploring the coevolution of multiple internet technologies for activism. *International Journal of Communication* 6: 2359–2377.
- Treré E (2015) Reclaiming, proclaiming, and maintaining collective identity in the #YoSoy132 movement in Mexico: An examination of digital frontstage and backstage activism through social media and instant messaging platforms. *Information, Communication & Society* 18(8): 901–915.
- Treré E and Mattoni A (2016) Media ecologies and protest movements: Main perspectives and key lessons. *Information, Communication & Society* 19(3): 290–306.
- Tsing A (2005) *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Ullrich P, Daphi P and Baumgarten B (2014) Protest and culture: Concepts and approaches in social movement research – An introduction. In: Baumgarten B, Daphi P and Ullrich P (eds) *Conceptualizing Culture in Social Movement Research*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–22.
- Warren C (1998) Tanah Lot: The cultural and environmental politics of resort development in Bali. In: Hirsch P and Warren C (eds) *The Politics of Environment in Southeast Asia. Resources and Resistance*. London: Routledge, pp. 229–261.
- Werbner P, Webb M and Spellman-Poots K (2014) *The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest. The Arab Spring and Beyond*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Author biography

Birgit Bräuchler is a senior lecturer in Anthropology at the School of Social Sciences, Monash University, Melbourne. Her research interests lie in media anthropology; peace and conflict studies; cultural and human rights; and Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia. She is the author of *Cyberidentities at War* (Berghahn, 2013) and *The Cultural Dimension of Peace* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) and editor of *Theorising Media and Practice* (Berghahn, 2010; together with John Postill) and *Reconciling Indonesia* (Routledge, 2009) and has published widely in peer-reviewed journals.