

This is a postprint version of an article that is now published: Jacqueline Broad, “‘A Great Championess for her Sex’: Sarah Chapone on Liberty as Nondomination and Self-mastery”, *The Monist* 98, no. 1 (2015): 77-88. Please cite the published version, available here: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/monist/onu009>.

**“A Great Championess for her Sex”: Sarah Chapone
on Liberty as Non-domination and Self-mastery**

Jacqueline Broad

In her 1735 work, *The Hardships of the English Laws in Relation to Wives*, Sarah Chapone (1699–1764) recounts the story of Gyges of Lydia and his magical ring, a story that also appears in book II of Plato’s *Republic*. According to Platonic legend, Gyges’s golden ring possesses the extraordinary power of rendering its wearer completely invisible. With the help of this ring, the lowly shepherd Gyges enters the court, seduces the king’s wife, then murders the king and takes his throne—all with impunity. In her own text, Chapone asks the question: what would a man of honour do, had he such a ring? Her answer is, *the same as he would without it*. Though the wearer of the ring might steal whatever he pleased, or slay whomever he despised, all without fear of punishment, the honourable man would not take such action. Chapone also points out that “A Man of Honour would not desire such a Ring” and that “a Man without Honour should not be trusted with it”.¹ Nobody would think it wise or prudent to permit any man in the kingdom to wear Gyges’s ring, she says, “lest the Power of doing Mischief, might create, as well as assist an Inclination to it”.²

The main purpose of Chapone’s text is to show that the laws in eighteenth-century England have in fact granted husbands this power of doing mischief with

impunity. In this time and place, she points out, the laws permit husbands to hold their wives captive, to psychologically and physically abuse them, to deprive them of their property, and to keep them from seeing their children—all without being accountable to any earthly authority whatsoever. Chapone observes that: “A good Husband would not desire the Power of Horse-whipping, confining, Half-starving his Wife, or squandering her Estate; a bad Husband should not be allowed it.”³ In her anonymous seventy-page treatise, she appeals to King George II and both houses of parliament “for an Alteration or a Repeal of some Laws, which, as we conceive, put us [i.e., married women] in a worse Condition than *Slavery* itself”.⁴

In this paper, I argue that Chapone deserves a prominent place in the history of feminist philosophy as one of the first writers consistently to apply what is now known as the republican concept of liberty to the situation of married women in early modern society. Historians have identified at least three republican moments in England in the 1600s: the first during the Interregnum of 1649–60; the second in response to the looming threat of a Catholic succession and an absolute monarch, c. 1675–83; and the third in the late 1690s as a result of various constitutional crises following the Glorious Revolution of 1688–89.⁵ At each moment, the most prominent republicans did not call for the abolition of monarchy as such, but rather for limited or regulated monarchical rule.⁶ In their view, the liberty of the people could be assured only if just and reasonable laws prevented the sovereign from exercising an arbitrary power over the lives of subjects. A state in which a monarch could take away his subjects’ property (their “lives, liberty, and estates”), at his arbitrary will and pleasure, was not a free state—it was a state of tyranny. The early modern republicans thus called for monarchical rule in the service of the law, and for restrictions on the sovereign’s power to amass a standing army in times of peace (a typical harbinger to

absolute rule).

Though some English women writers endorse the republican ideal of liberty prior to Chapone,⁷ she is the first to follow through with its implications for married women in civil society: a call for an institutionalised guarantee of security for women against domination in marriage. More than this, I believe that Chapone articulates an ideal that is both negative freedom *from* domination and positive freedom *to* be one's own master. Present-day theorist Philip Pettit describes the republican notion of freedom as "intermediate between the ideals of non-interference and self-mastery", but nevertheless denies that the concept is positive in Isaiah Berlin's sense of requiring agents actively to govern or to gain control over themselves.⁸ For Chapone, however, freedom from domination is important because it enables agents to exercise control over their moral choices and actions.

To substantiate these claims, in the following analysis I spell out Chapone's arguments in detail, before defending them against two contemporary critics: an anonymous writer for *The Gentleman's Magazine*, and the novelist Samuel Richardson. Because Chapone is relatively unknown to philosophers, I will begin by filling in a few background details.

I. BIOGRAPHICAL-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Sarah Chapone (*née* Kirkham) was born on 11 December 1699, the daughter of Damaris (*née* Boyse) and Lionel Kirkham, an Anglican clergyman of Stanton, Gloucestershire, in England. Chapone was buried in the same parish on 24 February 1764. The few details that are known about her life come from the Stanton parish registers and the surviving correspondence of her well-known acquaintances, the biographer George Ballard (1706–55), the writer-printer Samuel Richardson (1689–

1761), the Methodist preacher John Wesley (1703–91), and her childhood friend Mary Delany (*née* Granville, 1700–88).⁹ On 28 December 1725, Sarah married John Chapone, a young vicar in a neighbouring township. By all accounts, the marriage was a happy one.¹⁰ In her *Hardships*, Chapone says that “God be thanked, I have an Husband who lets me be *alive*, and gives me leave to be *some Body*, and to tell other People what I think they are”.¹¹ A contemporary owner of *The Hardships* also made a point of noting on the final page that “ye Lady Had a very good Husband & liv’d happy only writ for ye Good of Her Sex in General”.¹² Together the Chapones had five children, four of whom survived into adulthood.

Prior to publication, Chapone appears to have distributed early manuscript copies of *The Hardships* among her friends. In a letter to her sister, dated 22 July 1734, Delany says that “it is an excellent piece of wit and good sense”.¹³ In the same year, Wesley reports in a journal entry that he had corrected Varanese’s [i.e., Chapone’s] “Essay on Laws”.¹⁴ Then in December 1741, another acquaintance, Anna Hopkins, tells George Ballard that “Tho’ I knew that she [“Mrs Chapon”] was the Author of *Hardships of English Laws &c.*, I did not mention it to you because I thought it was a Secret”.¹⁵ The work was published by the Bowyer printing house in May 1735,¹⁶ and then excerpted in *The Gentleman’s Magazine* in May and June of the same year.¹⁷ To date, there is very little scholarship on Chapone’s *Hardships*,¹⁸ and there are no detailed philosophical appraisals of her arguments.

To appreciate Chapone’s line of reasoning, it is useful to place *The Hardships* in the context of eighteenth-century political debates in the reign of George II. Chapone completed her text shortly after the great political controversy known as the “excise crisis”, an issue that generated an unprecedented amount of political pamphleteering in England from 1732 to 1734.¹⁹ The excise in question was essentially a consumption

tax on wine and tobacco. On 16 March 1733, the Whig minister Robert Walpole put forward an excise bill in the House of Commons in a bid to stem the growing tide of smuggling and fraud in custom houses, and to relieve taxation on landholders. But his excise proved to be tremendously unpopular. In numerous newspapers and pamphlets throughout the country, the scheme was vehemently opposed. In the lead-up to the bill, there was a public uproar, “a ferment in society at large”,²⁰ mainly in the form of popular ballads, poems, letters, sermons, and public petitions. The opposition contributed to this public outcry by using the newspaper *The Craftsman* to spread fear of a general excise and a standing army. In a series of articles from October to December 1732, one author contended that an excise on wine and tobacco would introduce a slippery slope to a tax upon all consumable commodities.²¹ In turn, it was argued, this general excise would increase the number of officers needed to collect the revenue—creating, in essence, a standing army in a time of peace. Those officers would be given the power to enter and search anyone’s house, at any time, according to their will and pleasure. To oppose the scheme, its critics drew heavily on republican ideas and arguments of the previous century. They argued that if a man’s possession of property depended upon the goodwill of another person, then that man did not really own his property; and similarly, if a man’s possession of liberty was dependent on the goodwill of another, then that man was not strictly free either. On the strength of such impassioned appeals to property and liberty, Walpole’s bill was eventually defeated.

II. ARGUMENTS OF CHAPONE’S *HARDSHIPS*

In *The Hardships*, published only two years after the excise crisis, Chapone also employs the republican rhetoric of property and liberty.²² In this text, she begins by

noting that out of all subjects in eighteenth-century English society, women are by far the most vulnerable to oppression. For female subjects, this vulnerability is unavoidable in every stage of life, but “in none so notoriously, and without all Redress” than in the state of marriage.²³ Of the marital state, Chapone makes three descriptive claims. The first is that eighteenth-century laws pertaining to marriage place women in a worse condition than slavery.²⁴ The second is that English husbands have the power to keep their wives prisoners for life at their arbitrary will and pleasure, with impunity.²⁵ The third is that, strictly speaking, married women possess no property, “neither in their intellectual, or personal Abilities, nor in their Fortunes”, or in their children.²⁶ Chapone then takes an evaluative stance on these claims: she argues that it is neither reasonable nor just that wives are in a worse condition than slaves, that husbands have the power to imprison their wives with impunity, and that wives have no property of their own.²⁷ She thus calls for a repeal or an amendment to the laws pertaining to marriage.

To support her claims, Chapone draws on empirical evidence from several well-publicised court cases in her time. In a recent case concerning the will of one “Mrs. *Lewis*”, she points out, this widow was accorded fewer entitlements than a freed slave. Along similar lines, she cites the case of a woman whose husband imprisoned her in a garret, without fire or proper clothing, as well as the case of a woman whose husband spent her vast fortune, while she subsisted on the bare necessities; and the case of a husband who denied his wife permission to become a servant, even though he had abandoned his family and joined the army.

In Chapone’s view, the injustices against these women arise from the marital laws pertaining to *coverture*. During this historical period, the wife and her husband were regarded as “one person in the Law”. A wife or a *feme covert* did not have a

separate legal persona to her husband—her legal existence was “covered” by that of her husband. In effect, however, the wife became almost non-existent in the eyes of the law. Upon marriage, the husband came into possession of all the property in his wife’s estate. He was entitled to take any rents and profits from her real estate, and to take any other personal property or earnings, for his own disposal. The same applied to a woman’s property in her children.²⁸ Under English law at that time, a spiteful husband had the power to bequeath the couple’s children to complete strangers upon his death.²⁹ In effect, this meant that a woman’s children did not really belong to her, but rather to her husband.

Of course, there were some limits to the husband’s entitlements: he could not kill his wife without being guilty of murder, and he could not beat her or starve her with impunity (he was expected to protect and provide for her). In addition, before entering into the marital state, a woman could make an agreement with her future husband that she might retain the rents and profits out of her own estate for her own use, or place them in the hands of trustees. But Chapone points to the fact that, once married, women are entirely dependent on their husbands for their maintenance, and so any safeguards might be undermined by the inordinate power that husbands wield: wives might be easily “kissed or kicked out of any such previous Settlement”.³⁰

To highlight the injustice and unreasonableness of these laws, Chapone presents a supposition to her readers. Let us suppose, she says, that a wife found some way to imprison her husband in the marital home, and then covered up her terrible deed by telling everyone that he had gone overseas on a business trip. Every man has the power to imprison his wife in this way, she says. But a reasonable man must allow that “*Though the Law allows him that Power, Conscience does not*”.³¹ Chapone appeals to the moral precept of doing unto others as you would have them do unto

you—a principle that men as well as women, she notes, are obliged to respect.³² She then makes the additional point that if we value freedom as a society, then we will value the freedom of all members of that society, including women. She demands to know “whether by the Nature of Societies and established Rules of Government, all Parts of a Community have not a Right to a Degree of Liberty and Property correspondent to the Constitution under which they live?”³³

These are the principal arguments of *The Hardships*. In themselves, it must be said, they do not fully capture the concept of liberty underlying Chapone’s appeals for reform. The aforementioned points—about the consistent application of moral and political principles to women—might equally well be made with appeal to the classic Hobbesian concept of negative liberty, as freedom from external constraint or coercion. In *Leviathan* (1651), Hobbes says that true liberty consists in the agent’s unopposed power to act in accordance with the last determination of her will, without external interference from others.³⁴ On the Hobbesian view, if a wife is imprisoned in the marital home, or chained up in a garret, then she is not free because there are obstacles to her acting upon the final determination of her will. Along similar lines, we might think that Chapone’s arguments rest on the insight that it is unjust and unreasonable for married women to be deprived of this negative kind of liberty. To see that Chapone’s arguments rest on an application of the ideal of *republican liberty* to the situation of married women, we must turn to her counter-arguments to objections.

III. CHAPONE AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY

In *The Gentleman’s Magazine* for November 1736, an anonymous critic raised a number of objections to Chapone’s work.³⁵ This critic pointed out that one court case

in which marriage is unhappily compared to a state of captivity does not make marriage itself a condition of slavery.³⁶ He asserted that the English laws *do* allow women to take certain measures to secure their property before marriage, and to acquire pin money (money for personal expenses), usually by means of prenuptial settlements.³⁷ Then the author said: “If Women are often *kiss’d or kick’d* out of those previous Settlements ... it shews the Weakness of the Sex, and how improper it is they should be trusted with the Interests of others, who cannot maintain their own.”³⁸ He implied that women do not have the requisite mental skills and strength of character to manage their own affairs. In support of this claim, the author repeatedly highlighted women’s moral inconstancy, their contradictoriness and refractoriness, their mental incompetence, and their lack of virtue more generally. In sum, this author claimed that the marital laws are neither unreasonable nor unjust to women, because women require the protection and guardianship of men.

This antagonist failed to recognize that Chapone had already addressed these criticisms in the middle part of her treatise, in a section devoted to raising and answering objections.³⁹ This critic also failed to understand the concept of liberty at the heart of her work.

According to Pettit, the ideal of liberty as non-domination is crucially different to the dominant negative concept of liberty as freedom from external interference.⁴⁰ On the Hobbesian view, even if wives are in a condition of dependence upon the arbitrary will of their husbands, provided that there are no external obstacles to the actions they will to perform, they might still enjoy their liberty in marriage. Likewise, according to the Hobbesian, if a benevolent slave master does not physically prevent his slave from doing as she wills—through external constraints, coercion, and threats, for example—then that slave still enjoys her freedom. On this view, slavery is not the

antonym of freedom. By contrast, republicans recognise an opposition between freedom and slavery. For the republican, it is irrelevant whether the slave master is cruel or kind—regardless, the slave is not free because she remains subject to his power and is dependent upon his goodwill.

In the excise literature of 1732–34, this point is frequently reiterated. “The Slave, who has the good Fortune to meet with a good natured and an humane master,” opposition minister George Heathcote notes, “is not less a Slave than he who meets with a cruel and barbarous one.”⁴¹ Drawing on familiar republican language, the opposition writers accuse Walpole’s government of seeking to ‘enslave’ the populace under the new excise laws. By ‘slavery’ they mean the subjection of citizens and their property to the arbitrary discretionary power of their political leaders. Under the excise scheme, it is argued, no man could ever be said to be the master of his own affairs or property, given that, at any time, a stranger could enter his home and confiscate his goods, at his will and pleasure. In a speech to parliament of 1733, John Barnard demanded to know: “can any Man be said to be free, who must be the humble Slave of his Excise-man[?]”⁴² It did not matter if that man himself never became a direct victim of the excise officers, he was unfree so long as someone else had *the power* to enter his home and take his goods, with impunity.

Along similar lines, in *The Hardships* Chapone regards slavery as the antonym of freedom. For her, slavery is a condition in which someone else has the power to interfere arbitrarily in your affairs, even if that person never exercises their power by coercing, threatening, or constraining your choices and actions in some way. In the text, she appeals to this idea in response to an objection that truly appalling cases of marital abuse are few and far between, and that most wives have no reason to complain. In reply, she says that “Tis true, these [legal cases] are rare Instances, but

the Law is nevertheless hard, which gives every Husband *the Power* of exercising such Cruelties".⁴³ Like the republican, she identifies freedom with a condition of non-domination rather than non-interference. She says:

let every particular Woman who is well treated, thank God and her Husband for the Blessing. At the same Time, she may reflect, that she is in the Condition of a Slave, tho' she is not treated as such, according to the Opinion of a late eminent Member of the House of Commons, who declared in that honourable Assembly, that he thought 'that Nation in a State of Slavery, where any Man had it in his Power to make them so, tho' perhaps the Rod might not always be held over their Backs.'⁴⁴

Chapone's critic claims that one case of female captivity in marriage does not amount to marriage being a condition of slavery itself. But he misses her point. In her opinion, the marital laws have the effect of depriving *every* married woman of her liberty, regardless of whether her husband is a tyrant, because the husband is permitted an absolute power over his wife, even if he never exercises that power. Every husband is permitted "the ring of Gyges", as it were.

Chapone's critic further points out that women *can* have property under English laws, and that they *can* have relief from abuse. But again, this critic overlooks a key point. Chapone's claim that "married women have no property" cannot be answered simply by highlighting the fact that the law allows women to have property settled upon them before marriage. Her point was that, strictly speaking, married women do not have either personal or real property, because their husbands have *the power* to take that property from them, even if they never exercise that power. A woman's state

of utter dependence places her in a highly disadvantageous position vis-à-vis her husband: “the Husband having so entirely the Disposal of his Wife’s Person,” Chapone says, “he easily finds Means to bend her to his Will.”⁴⁵ If a wife cannot leave the marital home without her husband’s permission, if she can be imprisoned at his will and pleasure, if he can legally take any of her earnings, and if he can dispose of her children as he sees fit—it is not too difficult to surmise that a woman is never fully mistress of her own property.

IV. CHAPONE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY

In *The Hardships*, Chapone also addresses common negative views about women’s mental incompetence. She suggests that female intellectual inferiority is the result of poor education rather than innate deficiencies.⁴⁶ As creatures of God, she says, women must be naturally capable of perceiving divine truths, and of restraining their wills in accordance with their understanding of the divine law.⁴⁷ Women therefore have a “Right by Nature, to be permitted to do all that Good, which God has given us Abilities to do”.⁴⁸ To live up to their God-given natures, she implies, women should be encouraged to take responsibility for their moral choices and actions; they should be permitted a degree of independence and self-governance—*positive freedom*, in other words, in the sense of self-mastery.

According to Isaiah Berlin, the ideal of positive freedom reflects an agent’s desire to control her own destiny. The advocate of positive liberty says “I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object”.⁴⁹ The agent who has this positive liberty is her own locus of control over her moral choices and actions. Chapone elaborates on this positive ideal in her

letters to Richardson.

From 1750 to 1759, Chapone engaged in a correspondence with the famous author of *Clarissa*.⁵⁰ In one part of their correspondence, in 1752, Chapone had had an opportunity to read Richardson's exchange of letters with Hester Mulso, the bluestocking author of *Letters on the Improvement of the Mind* (1773), and later the wife of Chapone's son John. Commenting on this exchange, Chapone takes exception to Richardson's opinion "That it is not proper for any Woman, at any Age, to be independent".⁵¹ In Chapone's view, Richardson's heroine Clarissa errs in placing herself in a condition of utter dependence upon the villainous Lovelace, an unscrupulous sexual predator.⁵² In her next letter, Chapone explains why Clarissa erred: it is a fatal mistake to offer an unconditional submission to male authority, she suggests, because then there is no going back if that authority breaches the moral law.⁵³ If we submit unconditionally, then we forsake moral responsibility. If a woman allows herself to enter blindly into marriage, for example, without exercising her faculty of judgment, then she allows herself to be bartered "like a Horse or a Cow"; she forsakes her humanity.⁵⁴ In Chapone's view, a woman must never give up her faculty of "private judgement", or her ability to regulate her will in accordance with her understanding. "The Perfection of a Creature, as such," she says, "must lie in the Will, whose Province it is, to acquiesce and execute the Dictates of the Understanding."⁵⁵ When it comes to moral decisions, such as the decision to marry, a woman "must judge for herself as God qualified her for it, and she must answer for the Misapplication of her Talents as Man must answer to the Misapplication of theirs".⁵⁶ In short, in her opinion, women have a right or an entitlement to liberty by virtue of their nature as human beings.

As the correspondence continued, Richardson praised Chapone for being “a great Championess for her Sex”,⁵⁷ but he never allowed that women should be permitted independence, on the grounds that they necessarily required the superior guidance and protection of men. In his view, women were *safest* when dependent on the male sex.⁵⁸ In response, Chapone says that

To deprive a Woman of her natural Liberty, under Pretence of keeping her out of Harms way, is just such a Favour as it would be, to deprive a Man of all Pleasure, and then, in return, graciously decree he should feel no pain. As such Deprivation would strike a Man out of being, as a human Creature, who has the Image of God imprest upon him, so such Deprivation of Liberty would strike a Woman out of being, as a Member of Civil Society.⁵⁹

What degrading Notions must it give her of herself? Could she sincerely rejoice in her Being? If she could not, could she thank God for it? I mean as far as it respects this Life. She must behold herself as a Puppet, danced about by Foreign Impulses—A wooden Thing upon Wires, to be plaid off at the Will and Pleasure of (most likely) her more wooden Director. Oh! Sage Cassius, I cannot bear to be in Thralldom to such a Thing as I am.⁶⁰

Here Chapone articulates the idea that freedom from domination is necessary in order for a woman to attain positive liberty—to act as a free agent, rather than a puppet; to be in control of her choices and actions, rather than “to be plaid off at the Will and Pleasure” of her master; and to be the author of actions that are “great or noble”, rather than trivial and insignificant.⁶¹

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Philip Pettit has described republican liberty as “intermediate between the ideals of non-interference and self-mastery”,⁶² but denies that the republican ideal is positive in Berlin’s sense of the term.⁶³ His emphasis, rather, is on showing how the negative ideal of freedom from domination is conceptually distinct from the negative ideal of freedom from external interference. For him, the ‘self-mastery’ aspect of republicanism is captured in the negative insight that the agent’s freedom is freedom *from* a master who has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in her affairs; it consists in ‘non-mastery’ or non-domination rather than non-interference.⁶⁴ For Chapone, the republican concept of freedom consists in the absence of domination (a negative ideal), but this absence importantly facilitates certain positive aspects of freedom, such as a sense of self-mastery or of “being in control” of one’s moral choices and actions. In her *Hardships*, she points out that married women are not free because husbands have the power to interfere arbitrarily in their affairs, even if they never exercise that power. But in calling for an institutionalised guarantee of safety and security for women, she also calls for the positive freedom for women to be their own arbiters in situations calling for moral action.⁶⁵ This point is reiterated in her correspondence with Richardson on female independence. True liberty for women, she asserts, consists in both freedom from the domination of men *and* the freedom to be their own masters.

¹ [Sarah Chapone], *The Hardships of the English Laws In relation to Wives. With an Explanation of the Original Curse of Subjection passed upon the Woman. In an Humble Address to the Legislature* (London: W. Bowyer for J. Roberts, 1735), 50.

The work was also published anonymously by and for George Faulkner in Dublin the same year. For a modern facsimile reprint, see Sarah Kirkham Chapone, *Hardships of*

the English Laws In Relation to Wives (1735), in *Legal Treatises*, intro. Lynne A. Greenberg (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005), vol. II.

² Chapone, *Hardships*, 50.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁵ See Blair Worden, “English Republicanism”, in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450–1700*, ed. J. H. Burns, with Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 443–75.

⁶ Worden, “English Republicanism”, 446–7.

⁷ In the seventeenth century, the civil war women petitioners, Mary Astell, and an anonymous author known as “Eugenia” all apply the republican ideal of liberty to women in some sense, but without calling for widespread marital legal reform. On the strengths and weaknesses of these earlier feminist arguments, see Jacqueline Broad, “Liberty and the Right of Resistance: Women’s Political Writings of the English Civil War Era”, in *Virtue, Liberty, and Toleration: Political Ideas of European Women, 1400–1800*, ed. Jacqueline Broad and Karen Green (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 77–94; Jacqueline Broad and Karen Green, *A History of Women’s Political Thought in Europe, 1400–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), chapter six; Jacqueline Broad, “Women on Liberty in Early Modern England”, *Philosophy Compass* 9, no. 2 (2014), 112–22; and Jacqueline Broad, “Mary Astell on Marriage and Lockean Slavery”, *History of Political Thought* 35, no. 4 (2014), forthcoming.

⁸ Philip Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 27. For a similar view, see Quentin Skinner, “A Third Concept of Liberty”, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 117 (2002), 237–68. Isaiah Berlin’s positive-negative distinction is most famously captured in his essay “Two

Concepts of Liberty” (first published in 1958), in *Four Essays on Liberty* (London, Oxford, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 118–72.

⁹ For details, see *The Autobiography and Correspondence of Mary Granville, Mrs. Delany*, ed. Lady Llanover, 3 vols (London: Richard Bentley, 1861), first series, vol. I, 15 n. On Chapone and Ballard, see Ruth Perry, “George Ballard’s Biographies of Learned Ladies”, in *Biography in the 18th Century*, ed. J.D. Browning (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1980), 85–111 (esp. 91–3); and Ruth Perry, “Introduction” to George Ballard, *Memoirs of Several Ladies of Great Britain*, ed. Ruth Perry (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1985), 12–48. The Chapone-Ballard correspondence can be found in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, Ballard MS 43. In addition to the aforementioned correspondences, Chapone’s letters to Mrs Knightley (c. 1735–6) can be found in the Gloucestershire Archives, UK, D2383/F14.

¹⁰ For details, see Mrs Pendarves [Mary Delany] to Mrs Ann Granville, undated; *Autobiography*, series 1, vol. I, 121.

¹¹ Chapone, *Hardships*, 51.

¹² These words are written on page 70 of the British Library copy of Chapone’s *Hardships* (shelfmark Sach. 331/1).

¹³ Delany to Granville, 22 July 1734; in *Autobiography*, series 1, vol. I, 486–7.

¹⁴ V.H.H. Green, *The Young Mr. Wesley: A Study of John Wesley and Oxford* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1961), 294, n. 1.

¹⁵ Anna Hopkins to George Ballard, 14 December 1741; Bodleian Library, Ballard MS 43, fol. 106.

¹⁶ For details, see *The Bowyer Ledgers: The Printing Accounts of William Bowyer Father and Son*, ed. Keith Maslen and John Lancaster (London: Bibliographical Society; New York: Bibliographical Society of America, 1991), entry no. 2162.

¹⁷ *The Gentleman's Magazine*, vol. V (May and June 1735), 241–2, 284.

¹⁸ See Barbara J. Todd, “‘To be Some Body’: Married Women and *The Hardships of the English Laws*”, in *Women Writers and the Early Modern British Political Tradition*, ed. Hilda L. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 343–61 (344); Thomas Keymer, “Chapone [Capon; née Kirkham], Sarah (1699–1764)”, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/39723>, accessed 31 July 2012; and Greenberg, “Introductory Note”, *Legal Treatises*, xli–xlvi (xliii). For forthcoming analyses, see Karen Green, *A History of Women's Political Thought in Europe, 1700–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), chapter six; and Susan Paterson Glover, “Further Reflections Upon Marriage: Mary Astell and Sarah Chapone”, in *Feminist Interpretations of Mary Astell*, ed. Penny Weiss and Alice Sowaal (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, forthcoming). I am grateful to Profs. Green and Glover for providing me with early drafts of their work.

¹⁹ For details, see Paul Langford, *The Excise Crisis: Society and Politics in the Age of Walpole* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

²⁰ Langford, *Excise Crisis*, 3.

²¹ See *An Argument Against Excises, In several Essays, lately published in the Craftsman, and now collected together* (London: H. Haines, 1733).

²² Various passages and quotations suggest that Chapone wrote *The Hardships* with one eye on the anti-excise invectives in popular newspapers and pamphlets of the

period. For her explicit references to parliamentary speeches and petitions, see *Hardships*, 1–2, 46.

²³ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 2, 4.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 4–5.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 11.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 20, 21.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 33.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 12–13; my added italics.

³² *Ibid.*, 12.

³³ *Ibid.*, 68.

³⁴ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 146.

³⁵ “Weekly Miscellany, No. 300: Remarks on a Pamphlet intituled, *The Hardships of the English Laws relating to Wives*”, *The Gentleman’s Magazine*, vol. VI (November 1736), 648–50.

³⁶ “Remarks”, 648.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 649.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ See Chapone, *Hardships*, 30–47. To be fair, it must be said, this part of the treatise containing ten objections and replies was not excerpted in *The Gentleman’s Magazine*.

⁴⁰ See Pettit, *Republicanism*, 17–50.

⁴¹ *The Year One Thousand Seven Hundred and Thirty-Three will be Ever Memorable for the Effectual Opposition made by the Citizens of London Against the Scheme for an Excise upon Wine and Tobacco* [n.p., 1733], 43.

⁴² “A View of the Proceedings and Debates in last Session of Parliament”, *The Gentleman’s Magazine*, vol. III (December 1733), 617.

⁴³ Chapone, *Hardships*, 20; my italics.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 46. I am unable to identify the parliamentarian Chapone has in mind here.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 68.

⁴⁹ Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, 131.

⁵⁰ These letters are currently being edited for a volume of *The Cambridge Edition of the Correspondence of Samuel Richardson*, gen. ed. Thomas Keymer and Peter Sabor, 12 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). The original manuscripts can be found in the National Art Library, London, Forster Collection. My transcriptions are taken from a microfilm, “Forster and Dyce Collection, Part 2. 18th Century Manuscripts. The Papers of Samuel Richardson”, reel 15, F.48.E.6 and reel 16, F.48.E.7.

⁵¹ Chapone to Richardson, [1752?]; in “Forster and Dyce”, reel 15, item 145, fol. 7v.

⁵² Chapone to Richardson, 22 February 1752; in “Forster and Dyce”, reel 15, item 146, fol. 1v.

⁵³ Chapone to Richardson, [1752?]; in “Forster and Dyce”, reel 15, item 145, fol. 4v, 5v.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 7.

⁵⁵ Chapone to Richardson, 22 February 1752; in “Forster and Dyce”, reel 15, item 146, fol. 1. In her only other published work, Chapone expresses similar sentiments; see [Sarah Chapone], *Remarks on Mrs. Muilman’s Letter To the Right Honourable The Earl of Chesterfield* (London: William Owen and James Leake, 1750), 11.

⁵⁶ Chapone to Richardson [1752?]; in “Forster and Dyce”, reel 15, item 145, fols 7–7v. For a similar point, see Chapone, *Hardships*, 69.

⁵⁷ Richardson to Chapone, 30 August 1758; in “Forster and Dyce”, reel 16, item 16, fol. 1.

⁵⁸ Richardson to Chapone, 2 March 1752; in “Forster and Dyce”, reel 15, item 144.

⁵⁹ Here Chapone echoes a key passage in her *Hardships* (42).

⁶⁰ Chapone to Richardson, [1752?]; in “Forster and Dyce”, reel 15, item 145, fols 7v–9.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Pettit, *Republicanism*, 27.

⁶³ See *ibid.*, 27–31.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁶⁵ I would like here to acknowledge the generous financial assistance of the Australian Research Council. This paper was written as part of an ARC-funded Discovery Project (no. DP140100109) in 2014, and during my time as an ARC Future Fellow in the Philosophy Department of the School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies at Monash University, Melbourne.